Daily Times

Senator Mushahidullah of
the PML-N has apparently wreaked havoc by alleging that the ex-ISI chief, Zaheer-ul-Islam, hatched a conspiracy against not only the Nawaz Sharif-led civil government but also the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Raheel Sharif. The senator disclosed this information on August 14 on BBC Urdu. His interview video went viral and a heated discussion about engulfed the social and electronic media. The pro-military section of the media castigated him, along with other members of the PML-N, such as Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, who were using the media selectively to build up a case against the PTI, which attempted to disrupt the existing parliamentary dispensation in connivance (allegedly) with the ex-ISI chiefs. To what extent this narrative is true and what role the former ISI chief might have played in this respect needs plausible explanation. It is equally important to analyse the reason behind such media vibes on the part of the members of PML-N. Moreover, it is pertinent to assess the implications of such statements on the contours of civil-military relations in contemporary Pakistan. This article is an attempt to address the above-mentioned issue.
To begin with, contrary to the general belief that democracy was restored after the May 2013 elections, we need to go a step forward to understand the nature of democracy in this country. The democracy that is functioning superbly in the US or Germany is quite different from the type we are observing in most of the developing world, including Pakistan. In the advanced world, political scientists have developed the typology of democracy. On the top of the list is the liberal democracy that is being successfully internalised by the highly industrialised nations. At the lowest ebb, however, is the defective democracy whose chief characteristic is the role of an overwhelmingly powerful military in domestic and foreign decision making. In this defective democracy, members of the judiciary, politicians, civil bureaucracy, and even the clergy and the media, ally with the military for a variety of reasons. In my view, Pakistan has been a classic case of a defective democracy from very early on in its history. If it was a democracy during the 1950s or 1990s, it was this defective democracy that the military loathed and the politicians loved. The common man was and is aloof from such theoretical debates; he is only concerned with his daily food supply. If the food items are apparently cheaper under General Pervez Musharraf, everyone is happy. If the prices sky-rocket during the Zardari-Gilani years, the ordinary people become angry to the extent of urging the army to take over. This is the extreme politics that Pakistan has been going through for decades. The situation does not improve. Indeed, the socioeconomic and political plight of the majority of Pakistanis was and is abysmal.
In such a perplexing context, Nawaz Sharif assumed the powers of prime minister in June 2013. Pakistan’s economic performance during his previous terms was relative. However, his latent attitude towards the men on horseback was absolute. He attempted to get free from the iron hands that nourished him and failed. As a consequence of the 1999 martial law, he and his family took refuge in Saudi Arabia and England. This third time, however, political observers and, of course, the khakis wished him to be different and not interfere in the army’s sphere of decision making and implementation. Being a politician with heavy bags of votes, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, having unlearned the lesson of the 1999-2007 treatment, attempted to once again assert himself by visiting India, the chronic enemy, and re-visiting Pakistan’s defence policy from the east (India) to the west (Afghanistan).
There might have been other institutional variables at play as well. For example, Sharif’s belief that appointing another Sharif, and that too from Lahore, as COAS eradicated the possibility of any attempt at a coup. Moreover, his political and security advisors might have convinced him to bypass the army, which is too busy with its operations to take over the government. The Sharifs and co miscalculated. They ruled out the political and social presence of the military in the width and breathe of the Pakistani society. No wonder that people like Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri did in peace time what armies do in war times. Being already deceived at the election and deprived of the position of prime minister, Imran Khan operationalised agitation politics with the effect that he, Dr Qadri and the prime minster rushed to the military general headquarters on August 28, 2014 to save their skins. Herein lie the causes and consequences of the ruptured civil-military relations after the PTI’s dharna (sit-in).
To begin with, being politically wise and obedient Dr Qadri chose to fly back to Canada. He is politically irrelevant at the moment. Imran Khan was supposed to do the same, but he is struggling because he has a mixed constituency and is further perturbed by the findings of the Judicial Commission (JC). Quite interestingly, it is the PML-N that is rejoicing for more than one reason. The party is happy to live another day after having negotiated the terms of reference with the army’s top brass. Moreover, the party is reaching new political heights after the JC report. It is in this context that certain members of the PML-N have started a conscious campaign to further malign the PTI. Khawaja Asif, Shahbaz Sharif and others felt confident enough to leak out the details of the London plan. Initially, there was little or no mention of the ex-ISI chief. Gradually, the canvas was expanded to literally accusing General Zaheer for the failed conspiracy or, better yet, the failed coup. To add fuel to fire, on August 14 of this year, Senator Mushahidullah, who is the information secretary of the PML-N, summarised the aforementioned allegations. The senator might be targeting the PTI on the first anniversary of the dharna. His informal and confident style of narration reflected the inner-world of PML-N in general and the Sharifs in particular. Since the limits were already crossed, the said senator had to resign and the party felt humiliated because the military was likely to strike back hard. If the Sharifs wanted to test the waters, the situation is still the same. However, the relations between the Sharifs and the army will not be the same. The element of distrust, which somehow already existed, will only grow.
Therefore, the party in power needs to avoid unnecessary tussles with the military. The latter ought to probe the allegations made by Mushahidullah and others. If Genenal Zaheer was involved in the dharna, he should be treated the same way as the generals in the National Logistic Cell case who were punished the other day. Accountability for all is the way to not only balance civil-military relations but also strengthen Pakistan both politically and strategically.

The writer is a political scientist by training and professor by profession. He is a DAAD fellow and the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He tweets @ejazbhatty