Why the talks failed

Author: Syed Kashif Ali

In July, Pakistani Prime
Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif’s meeting with his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, at the sidelines of the Ufa Summit, rekindled hopes for the resumption of a stalemate in the Indo-Pak dialogue process as both sides agreed to ‘discuss all outstanding issues’ in order to ‘ensure peace and promote development’. However, back home, Nawaz was strongly criticised for agreeing not to mention the Kashmir dispute in the joint statement issued through the foreign secretaries of both countries. Pakistan’s foreign office came out with the explanation that the mention of “all outstanding issues” implied the inclusion of Kashmir.
India, however, was adamant that the National Security Advisor (NSA) talks — the first of five steps agreed to by both sides in the Ufa statement — would discuss terrorism and matters related to terrorism alone. India also outright rejected any third party role in Indo-Pak bilateral issues, thereby disapproving the meeting between Pakistan’s NSA Sartaj Aziz and the Kashmiri separatist leadership during Aziz’s stay in Delhi for the now called off NSA talks.
Historically, PM Nawaz Sharif has been a staunch supporter of normalising ties and enhancing bilateral trade with India, so much so that he was ready to give India the status of Most Favoured Nation (MFN), disliked by many among the political and security elite of the country as they believe that doing so without solving the thorny issues of Jammu and Kashmir would undermine the national interest of Pakistan. In May 2014, PM Nawaz was invited to the swearing in ceremony of Narendra Modi. During the visit, breaking from the old tradition of Pakistani leadership visiting India, Nawaz did not meet the separatist Kashmiri leadership, raising quite a few eyebrows back in Pakistan, especially of those among the security establishment in Pakistan.
Ever since the four-month long sit-in of Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf started in August 2014, there have been visible changes to the Nawaz government’s Kashmir policy. During the early days of the sit-in, Pakistan’s high commissioner in New Delhi invited separatist leaders from the disputed Jammu and Kashmir for ‘consultations’ in the Indian capital ahead of the foreign secretary level talks between the two countries. In response to the Pakistani high commissioner’s meeting with Kashmiri leaders, India called off the foreign secretary level talks scheduled to be held on August 25, 2014 in Islamabad.
The push for the Kashmir issue was seen by many as the first sign of the Nawaz government to follow the strong Pakistani military line vis-à-vis Kashmir. In the aftermath of the sit-in, the civilian government of the PML-N had to concede on foreign policy and issues related to combating terrorism. Therefore, contrary to the traditional stance, the ruling PML-N chose a more hard-line and stern stance on Kashmir and refused to accept the pre-conditions set by India for the called-off NSA talks as any dialogue without the core issue of Kashmir would become very difficult for the PML-N government to sell to the public.
In the recent past, Pakistan was obsessed with its internal turmoil and instability affecting its Kashmir policy. Pakistan not only failed to highlight the Kashmir issue on international forums but also the allegations levelled against it regarding its support to Kashmiri insurgents. Now, with great success in countering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), relatively much better control in Karachi, comparatively less Indian influence in Afghanistan and a re-vigour in Jammu and Kashmir, Khalistan and other separatist movements in India, a renaissance to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is evident as Pakistan sees itself as being placed at a much better position on the negotiating table.
On the other hand, ever since 9/11, there has been a consistent Indian policy to keep Pakistan on the defensive vis-à-vis terrorism and proxy wars by accusing Pakistan of supporting militancy and ‘cross-border infiltration’. India sticks to its traditional stance calling Kashmir its integral part and diplomatically leaving no stone unturned to deny any third-party mediation for the solution of the Kashmir dispute or preventing the issue from being raised on any international forum. Therefore, allowing Kashmir to be included in the bilateral talks or the Pakistani NSA meeting with the Kashmiri leadership will once again highlight the Kashmir issue, which surely undermines the consistent decades’ long Indian efforts to sideline the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir.
There is also strong pressure from the hawks in India on the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government to deal with Pakistan austerely and not to resume the dialogue process unless Pakistan expedite the Mumbai 26/11 trial and provide voice samples of Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the alleged mastermind of the terror attacks as evidence. Pakistan, on the other hand, insists that the Mumbai trial should be left to the Pakistani courts to decide who have already granted bail to Lakhvi.
Due to recent incidents of violence in different Indian states and Indian held Kashmir, the skirmishes with Pakistan on the Line of Control (LOC) and Indo-Pak border, and the media hype created against Pakistan, the public sentiment in India seems to be against any dialogue with Pakistan, especially on Kashmir issue. The state elections in Bihar are due in November this year and the hard-line ruling BJP — badly defeated in February in Delhi’s state elections on the allegations of corruption and bad governance — believes that any concessions given to Pakistan at this critical juncture could undermine its political interest. A more hawkish approach towards Pakistan by the ruling BJP could cover its governance issues as well such as bringing the hard-line voters out in the BJP’s favour during the polls.
Due to regional and domestic factors, chances of the resumption of a composite dialogue between India and Pakistan are very slim in the near future, especially when both sides seem to remain hostage to the past: Indian refusal to accept Kashmir as a dispute and Pakistan’s insistence on Kashmir as the core issue between the two countries will ensure that any dialogue with India would be impossible for Pakistan.
The law of win/win says, let us not do it your way or my way; let us do it the best way. And the best way could be India accepting Kashmir as a core dispute while Pakistan shows its readiness to start the dialogue with other issues in a bid to create an environment conducive to resolving a thorny issue like Jammu and Kashmir.

The writer is an IT professional and passionate writer and speaker. He can be contacted at meetkashi514@gmail.com

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