Daily Times

Addressing the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 30, 2015, the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif, preferred peace to warfare with the country’s archrival, India, in particular and Afghanistan in general. Having been humiliated and castigated by the national media after the Ufa summit that took place in Russia a few months ago, PM Sharif, this time around, did not let the opportunity go against him and his party, which nominally is in charge of foreign and other affairs.

The PM proposed the following four-point peace plan: (1) Pakistan and India formalise and respect the 2003 understanding for a complete ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir to be monitored by an expanded UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), (2) Pakistan and India reaffirm that they will not resort to the use or the threat of use of force under any circumstances, a central element of the UN Charter, (3) steps be taken to demilitarise Kashmir and (4) agree to an unconditional mutual withdrawal from Siachen Glacier, the world’s highest battleground. Importantly, elaborating on the Kashmir dispute, the PM emphasised the need for consultations with Kashmiris, who are an integral part of the dispute, to evolve a peaceful solution. On the issue of terrorism, the PM said, “Wisdom dictates that our immediate neighbour (India) refrain from fomenting instability in Pakistan.”

The above are indeed bold suggestions though they have already been talked about. Unfortunately, however, India and Pakistan, despite scattered peace gestures and, at times, ventures, such as composite dialogue, the Delhi-Lahore Bus Service etc., failed to move in the direction of building on stated confidence building measures (CBMs). One would be surprised to note that after very war that India and Pakistan fought, the two states turned to the table and negotiated terms of peace. Even after the 1998 nuclear test, to avoid any nuclear escalation in the future, the two sides concluded what is now known as the Lahore Declaration. It is a pity, however, that after every declaration/agreement India and Pakistan entered into a peculiar state of conflict that in one context may take the shape of a border stand-off and, in another context, violation of ceasefire on the LoC and, recently, Working Boundary.

Interestingly, every time India and Pakistan have engaged in a military stand off, regional and international powers, after initial silence, take notice of the situation and urge the two states to deescalate and de-militarise. Indeed, the UN, on whose forum the Pakistani PM shared his country’s peace vision, came forth with measures to put an end to warfare between India and Pakistan. In this respect, it was the UNO that called upon India and Pakistan to stop fighting in Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of the 1947-1948 war. Moreover, the international body established a commission to monitor the sanctity of the then established Line of Ceasefire, which was termed the Line of Control under the terms of the Simla Accord. Disappointingly, however, the UN did not prefer to transfer the status of the Jammu and Kashmir issue to priority areas that require urgent conflict resolution measures — for example, the case in Afghanistan (2001) and Iqra (2003) where the UN hurriedly provided legal justification for military solution — but on the other hand, miserably failed to implement Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. In this respect, PM Nawaz Sharif pointed out that the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved, the UNSC resolutions remained unimplemented and three generations of Kashmiris had only seen broken promises and brutal oppression, with over 100,000 losing their lives in their struggle for self-determination. “This is the most persistent failure of the United Nations,” he argued.

The UN’s “persistent failure” has a wider context beyond South Asia. It failed, for example, to implement its resolutions on Palestine where the majority of the Palestinians are forced to live outside their homeland. And those who are still inside their claimed land have resorted to agitation politics and an armed struggle to make their cause heard internationally and legally. The same is the case with the Kashmiris whose right to self-determination is militarily and legislatively (Article 370) restricted by the Indian state.

In such a context where the UN has not been able to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir dispute (and where India and Pakistan lack mutual will and trust to talk peace), General cum President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) attempted to reach out to Delhi in order to settle the dispute for good. Various proposals such as the Chenab Formula were proposed, which sought essentially a bilateral solution to the problem.

My namesake teacher, Dr Ijaz Hussain, an expert in international law, commented in these pages in 2006: “Musharraf appears to be a man in a great hurry. He seems to believe that now is the time for a deal on Kashmir favourable to Pakistan, as India is destined to become a global player before long. He does not trust future generations or the forces of history to deliver a verdict favourable to Pakistan or Kashmiris. Under him, Pakistan also appears to suffer from some kind of ennui on Kashmir, as if the burden of struggle for the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination has been too exhausting to continue. Perhaps these factors explain Musharraf’s numerous gratuitous concessions to India, particularly on UN resolutions. They also seem to inspire his latest offer to surrender claim on Kashmir in return for large autonomy. In this backdrop, India deserves to be commended for conducting a relentless and ruthless campaign to bring Pakistan to its knees. The question is whether history will remember Musharraf conducting the Kargil misadventure twice.”

The foregoing marks the urgency and extraordinary nature of the conflict that somehow urged the top Pakistani military man to find an “out of the way” solution. Linked to it was the implicit assurance of non-interference through proxies inside Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. According to some independent security experts, under Musharraf’s post-2002 stand off, the nature and scale of Pakistan-backed anti-India militancy saw an unprecedented reversal inside Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir. Apparently, the plan was not to attack each other to generate enough space among the Kashmiris and the two states to work out an ‘autonomous’ Jammu and Kashmir. The Sri Nagar-Muzafarabad Bus Service and intra-Kashmir trade were realised consequently.

However, realpolitik overcame such ventures and subsequent governments in Delhi and Islamabad remained unable to either implement the ongoing plan or find another way to resolve the impending issues. To add insult to injury, Modi sarkar started reversing whatever the preceding Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) governments had concluded. It is unfortunate that the current Indian political and military leadership believes in a military solution to issues with Kashmiris and Pakistanis. India should be aware of the fact that the Pakistan state is equally capable of engaging its counterpart in a military stand off over or away from the LoC and Working Boundary. Hence, in my view, it is in the mutual interest of both India and Pakistan to deescalate and demilitarise as suggested by the Pakistani PM at the UN, and strive to a find a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Kashmir.

The writer is a political scientist by training and professor by profession. He is a DAAD fellow and the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He tweets @ejazbhatty