Daily Times

What will be the future of Indo-Pak relations under Modi’s administration? How will Modi, with his Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) background and Hindutva leanings, figure in the conduct of Indian foreign policy? Does Pakistan have the appropriate diplomacy to counter Modi’s drive for Indian supremacy in the region? Do present assertive trends of Indian policy portend the likelihood of an aggressive outcome during Modi’s tenure? These questions were haunting the general public and intellectual elite of Islamabad prior to the 16th Lok Sabha elections 2014. However, it was consensus among the entire political leadership that Pakistan would try to stabilise relations with India on an incremental basis. Since then no extraordinarily positive development has been witnessed and still there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

Sixty-seven years have passed since independence but Pakistan and India have been unable to resolve the issues that mar their relations and give them the unenviable position of hostile neighbours who have fought three wars and inflicted incalculable damage to their prospects of socio-economic development and prevented the realisation of their full potential. A climate of mistrust and suspicion, developed over the years, grows thicker as issues like Kashmir await solutions and the future of more than a billion people remains clouded. There have been ups and downs, and hopes have been falsified particularly in the years when the Indian National Congress (INC) was at the helm from 2004 to 2013. The composite dialogue process was a development of that period. Though unpleasant events such as the Samjhota Express incident in 2007 and Mumbai attacks in 2008 have marred its promise and violations of the ceasefire agreement off and on block its resumption, it remains an option for the new governments across the border to give it a try to bring some normalcy to their relationship.

After the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 16th Lok Sabha elections and Narendra Modi’s appointment as Prime Minister (PM) of India, Pakistan tried to open a new chapter of bilateral relationship with India. PM Nawaz Sharif took the initiative to call on Modi to congratulate him on his success. Subsequently, Narendra Modi responded positively by inviting his counterpart to his oath taking ceremony in Delhi. However, like always, this positive turn was once again nullified by incidents of unprovoked violations by the Indian army of the ceasefire not only across the Line of Control (LoC) but even across the working boundary.

Though the agenda of economic development and transregional energy trade are likely to be the points of convergence between the two countries, the BJP’s policies in its first year, such as increased defence manufacturing, strengthening the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), revision of the nuclear doctrine and allowing greater participation of the armed forces in the decision making process overshadowed Modi’s slogans of regional economic development and regional economic integration. India’s status as the world’s biggest arms’ importer and Modi’s ambition to build an advanced defence industry rightly alarmed Pakistani policy circles. The cancellation of secretary level talks on the pretext of the Pakistani high commissioner’s meeting with Kashmiri leaders in August 2014 was a great setback to the composite dialogue process and depicts the inflexible attitude of BJP vis-à-vis Kashmir. The appointment of hawkish officials, most prominently of Ajit Doval as national security advisor, cannot be seen in Pakistan with equanimity.

All these factors are a major hurdle in stabilising relations between the two nuclear powers of South Asia. Unfortunately, India does not seem willing to abandon such practices in the near future. In fact, Modi seems to further expedite them, which will not help South Asian stability. The rejection of the joint Ufa declaration by cancelling the national security advisors’ meeting and the recent Indian blunt refusal of PM Nawaz Sharif’s comprehensive peace process formula are bitter examples of Indian inflexibility and indisposition to peace in the South Asian region. India needs to show its readiness to unconditionally discuss the Kashmir dispute so that the composite dialogue is ventured forth with full determination to resolve all outstanding issues between both countries. Half-hearted efforts mean nothing when it comes to peace in the region.

The writer is a freelance columnist