Daily Times

The recent fall of Kunduz to the Taliban has effectively rejuvenated those who were fearful of their irrelevance if the Afghan peace process had been successful. They are now out to claim it a major Taliban victory in Afghanistan after 2001. If the late General Hameed Gul were alive today, he would have felt excited and elated.

Kunduz is a city in the north of Kabul in Nnrthern Afghanistan near the Tajikistan border. It is the capital of the province of Kunduz and is the fifth largest city of Afghanistan. The fall of Kunduz is neither a significant victory for the Taliban nor a substantial failure of the Kabul regime, though the fall signifies that the Kabul regime overlooked both the importance of Kunduz and the renewed resolve of the Taliban. The onslaught on Kunduz may be an improved version of the phenomenon of launching suicide attacks in urban areas.

It is not that the Kabul government had been expecting the Taliban resurgence from the south of Afghanistan where the Taliban are numerically strong and that the Taliban have made a surprise move by selecting a comparatively less guarded city in the north of Afghanistan; it is that, since 2014, the Taliban have been trying to capture Kunduz but were repulsed each time. They did seize villages but not a city. This time, since April this year, they have finally been successful in making the first appearance of their spring offensive palpable in Kunduz.

History offers a sense of comparison. In November 2001, the Taliban became able to retain Kunduz for two weeks in the face of US airstrikes coupled with a ground offensive launched by the Northern Alliance. At that time, the Taliban were more well-entrenched than now in terms of both bunkers and defence equipment such as tanks and trucks. This time, the Taliban are more visitors than locals. Secondly, at that time, there were more fighters on the Taliban side (about 10,000) to lay down their lives than there are now. Thirdly, at that time, the Taliban had to flee to the south of Afghanistan to save their lives and launch the kind of guerilla warfare that is more suitable for a hilly, rugged terrain. However, this time, the Taliban intend to test their ability of fighting an urban (street) battle. This can be considered a new tactic employed by the Taliban. The tactic is dangerous because the Afghan national army may not be trained for an urban street battle and in doing so innocent Afghans may be killed to the disadvantage of the Kabul regime. However, if the Taliban become successful in engaging the Afghan army and the US’ residual forces in urban warfare for a certain period of time — say one month — more such attacks and taking over urban cities may follow. Above all, on both occasions (past and present), foreign fighters in the shape of fugitive Arabs, Tajiks and Uzbeks help swell the ranks of the Taliban. Nevertheless, Kunduz may also prove a test case for the Taliban on whether or not they can fight an urban street battle successfully.

There is another facet of comparison. First of all, in contrast to the past, the Taliban are now getting weary of the guerilla fighting they are thought as being specialised in. Secondly, in contrast to the past, the Taliban have lost their patience, which they used to employ in biding their time and waiting for the enemy to come to their positions (or hideouts) to fight. No doubt, the Taliban hiding in the hilly areas were proud of their guerilla warfare tactics but they unwittingly allowed the US to perfect drone technology by trying it on them. Consequently, the Taliban paid a heavy price in terms of manpower for sheltering al Qaeda, which has now mostly fled to Arab countries. Drones laden with missiles made life horrible for the Taliban. Additionally, there is also a sense of desperation in the Taliban after Pakistan launched, in mid-2014, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which compelled the Taliban, both Pakistani and Afghan, to abandon their retreats in North Waziristan. The Taliban along with remnants of al Qaeda, Uzbek, Tajik and Chechen fighters left the hilly areas of Pakistan and disappeared into Afghanistan. It is surmised that the same lot has reared its head in Kunduz.

After capturing Kunduz, the Taliban set prisoners free in the hundreds from jails. One aspect of this malevolent act goes in favour of the Taliban as they get more fighters joining them from amongst the freed prisoners. However, another aspect of this spiteful act goes against the Taliban as the locals begin hating the Taliban who have freed prisoners caught in crimes against them.

It is known that the Afghan army, which is still small in number (about 200,000 soldiers) is too stretched to defend all cities of Afghanistan simultaneously against the Taliban insurgency and the same is the case with the police, which are about 150,000 in number. Secondly, with available light weaponry, the Afghan army cannot defend cities. Thirdly, it is short of the experience needed to repel an organised Taliban attack. In fact, the Taliban have instigated the Kabul regime to think of deploying more forces, even the borrowed ones from regional countries who support the Kabul regime against the Taliban threat. This aspect would be a new version of the solution for Afghanistan unless the Taliban threat is over.

Interestingly, on the one hand, the conquering of Kunduz by the Taliban is a step towards papering over their mutual rifts and bringing all the Taliban under the unified leadership of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, the political descendent of the late Mullah Omar. On the other hand, the fall of Kunduz will compel the US to keep the residual combat force backed by air power in Afghanistan for the time the Taliban negotiate their way into the Kabul government instead of overrunning it.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com