Daily Times

History repeats itself; in Afghanistan’s case, first as tragedy and then as a bigger tragedy. On November 17, 1999, the then Taliban regime publicly executed a Pashtun woman named Zarmeena in Kabul stadium’s pitch. She was accused of killing her husband. Almost 16 years to the date, another band of Taliban, operating now under the aegis of Daesh or Islamic State (IS), beheaded seven passengers — including two women and a girl child — this past Monday. The jihadists kidnapped several Hazara passengers a few months ago on their way between the Ghazni and Zabul provinces. The brutal killing of the women — a sordid first even by Taliban standards — triggered spontaneous protests against both the jihadists and the Afghan national unity government in Ghazni where the bodies were first brought. If there was any consolation in the tragedy it was the coming together of the Hazaras, Pashtuns and Tajiks to mourn the slaughtered Afghans. The bodies of the fallen innocents have arrived in Kabul where protestors are assembling to seek justice from the government against the jihadists. And Afghans are protesting against jihadists of all hues. To a common Afghan, it does not matter whether it is a Taliban of Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s group, his rival Mullah Muhammad Rassoul’s faction or those claiming to be IS in Afghanistan. The jihadists’ flags may be black or white but their hands are soaked red with innocent Afghan blood.

The Afghan president, Dr Ashraf Ghani, swiftly condemned the killings but his statement added that he “considers the atrocious act a sign of desperation and defeat of the enemies of the people of Afghanistan. By beheading civilians, the enemies of Afghanistan proved once again that they have been defeated on the battlefield by our security and defence forces.” One just shudders to think what a jihadist victory would look like if they were still capable of such brutal massacres while on the run. While there is no doubt that the Afghan national defence and security forces defeat or neutralise the jihadist enemy day in and day out there is also little doubt that after regrouping the enemy is resilient, resurgent and now on the rampage. Presidential pronouncements, even if for consolation, should be anchored in reality and not fancy. But the disconnect does not end with the boss; the Afghan ministry of defence just said that the security situation in Afghanistan will “improve within a month”. The ministry is perhaps counting on the expected snowfall to finally stymie one of the deadliest fighting seasons in the current Afghan conflict. Then there was Afghanistan’s deputy chief executive, Mr Muhammad Khan, who while visiting Peshawar said that a statement of the US government terming the Taliban ‘important partners’ was insignificant. He reportedly said, “We should not believe in such statements. Just a few days ago the US government announced extension of the stay of its forces in Afghanistan.”

The fact is that the statement by the US department of defence spokesperson did indeed reiterate a policy point that was presented to the US Congress in June this year. The defence department’s Congressional report notes that the US mission transitioned from combat to support and that “US forces no longer target individuals solely on the basis of their membership in the Taliban; however, if a member of the Taliban threatens US or coalition forces, or provides direct support to al Qaeda, US forces may take appropriate action.” The problem is that the jihadists are not neatly boxed like chocolate. Today’s Taliban may be a dissident Taliban tomorrow, an IS fighter the next and return to al-Qaeda and the Taliban fold the following day. The troop strength — 5,500 by the end of 2016 — that President Obama had announced last month to keep in Afghanistan would barely provide adequate support to the Afghan security forces let alone take on a combat role, especially when the enemy is mutating rapidly and the mission is at best vague. And even if it were designated as a combat mission again it would still do nothing to address the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Raheel Sharif, arrives in the US this weekend with the agenda reportedly “to share ideas on Afghanistan”. Curiously, the COAS invited himself for the visit, as reported by the media. According to a department of defence official, “The COAS, General Raheel Sharif, is travelling to Washington DC of his own volition and department of defence officials are meeting with COAS General Raheel Sharif at his request.” Another Pakistani military chief who had visited Washington DC of his own volition was Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who visited the US in September 1953 over the heads of the civilian leadership. Dennis Kux notes in his book The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies: “(General) Ayub stormed into (Secretary of State Henry) Byroade’s office” saying, “For Christ’s sake, I did not come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let us make a decision.” Chances are that the verbiage may be different but the pitch would not be drastically different this time either. The proposition likely will be that Pakistan can manage the Afghan imbroglio for the US if a berth is granted to the Taliban in the Kabul government. The Taliban’s battlefield gains — or atrocities depending on one’s perspective — will be presented as a fait accompli with a pledge to bring them to negotiations once again if the US leans on the presently talks-averse Kabul government to resume the parleys. The perennial ‘India-in-Afghanistan’ scarecrow will be used to justify the relentless pursuit of ‘strategic depth’ through the jihadist proxies.

Reams have been written about Pakistan betting on the US packing up and leaving Afghanistan, which would allow it then to have a field day west of the Durand Line. The operation in North Waziristan was delayed for half a decade to wait for the US troops’ drawdown so the Chechen, Uzbek and Uighur jihadist hordes could be offloaded onto Afghanistan. Never mind that the previous attempts to subdue Kabul in 1992 and 1996 through the mujahideen and Taliban proxies, respectively, had a massive jihadist blowback into Pakistan, and the current project seems to be coming to fruition. The Afghan government has no military answer to what it calls an undeclared war. The incumbent Pakistani civilian leadership turned out to be an unreliable or incapable interlocutor for Afghans for it abdicated the foreign and national security policies quicker than its predecessors. The Afghan unity government has limited options vis-à-vis Pakistan’s continued hegemonic posturing. Kabul has to have a vigorous diplomatic initiative inducing a rethink in the US’ waffling Afghan policy. The deadly stalemate in Afghanistan is untenable. Afghan officialdom simply cannot afford to misread the intrinsic and extrinsic factors that fuel the insurgency or the ones that could help curtail it.

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com and he tweets @mazdaki