Daily Times

Once again, the debate about civil-military relations is raging in the media. The cue has been taken from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release, which stated that in the last corps commanders’ meeting, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) “while appreciating the progress of the ongoing operation and intelligence-based operations, their achievements and effects, he acknowledged the full support of the nation for ongoing operations to eliminate terrorism and extremism. He, however, underlined the need for matching complimentary governance initiatives for long-term gains of the operation and enduring peace across the country. The progress of the National Action Plan’s (NAP’s) implementation, finalisation of FATA reforms and concluding all ongoing Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) is at priority, were highlighted as issues, which could undermine the effects of operations.”
The country’s history has taught politicians and political analysts to be wary of such statements by the establishment. They could not miss that while the COAS appreciated the army’s success, he underlined the need for matching governance initiatives. Some parliamentarians objected to the ISPR’s press release as it was uncalled for to send a critical message a day after the meeting at the Prime Minister (PM) House in which the nation’s security issues were discussed. It is quite evident that the army must have expressed similar feelings at the meeting regarding “lack of matching governance initiatives” by the civilian government. Such interdepartmental frank discussions cannot be found at fault in any dispensation. However, to publicly criticise the parent government is not in good taste particularly when in the Pakistan context it can stir the feeling of destabilisation of an elected government.
There is no doubt that the Pakistan army is in the forefront of the war against terrorism and many soldiers have lost their lives in the line of duty. The nation has high regards for them and supports the military operation but the real problem is that the army establishment has to act as one of the important departments of the government and not as a parallel government. It is in this context that the PM House had to point out that the NAP goals’ implementation had to be pursued by all national institutions “while remaining within the ambit of the Constitution”.
According to newspaper reports, the areas where the government is lacking in the implementation of NAP goals are: FATA reforms, the return of the Afghan refugees, issues related to the Karachi operation, slow progress on the Balochistan reconciliation programme, controlling terror financing by taking action against hawala dealers and restricting the work of banned jihadi organisations. Indeed, on all these counts progress has been quite slow considering that the country is almost in a state of civil war. But it should also be borne in mind that the much-maligned civilian government has provided the working conditions in which the military operation was made possible: it passed the 21st Amendment giving almost all the powers to the military, powers that are provided in a state of emergency. The military courts were allowed to be established although the same facilities could have been given to the Anti Terrorism Courts (ATCs) as suggested in the Liaquat Hussain case by the Supreme Court (SC). It gave the military establishment the power to arrest terrorists and hold them for 90 days for investigations. It gave police powers to the Rangers who are actually an extension of the military establishment. And, above all, it provides the necessary funds for the military operation against the terrorists from the exchequer. For all practical purposes the country is in a state of emergency, which has been made possible by the civilian setup.
The FATA reforms have been a long pending issue for the last many decades. The government should move on this urgently keeping in mind the wishes of the people of these tribal areas. Most of the political parties that have roots in that area have been demanding the merger of FATA into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This should have been done long ago but most previous governments — military and civilian — wanted to resolve the Durand Line issue with Afghanistan first. All Afghan governments have opposed converting the Durand Line into a formal border between the two countries. Even the Taliban government established with the support of Pakistan did not agree to formalise the border between the two countries.
This issue is closely linked to Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, which are not managed by the civilian government but by the establishment. Had it been left to the civilian governments perhaps they could have normalised relations with all northern neighbours long ago. The media critics who blame the civilians for failing to have a well thought out foreign policy tend to forget that it was mostly handled by the establishment and not by the civilian setups. Not because the civilians were incapable of devising a workable policy but because they have not been allowed to do so by the security establishment.
It is amusing to hear overrated experts on prime time television telling us that the political governments are not geared up to run foreign policy and that the establishment has think tanks and a system of debate that helps in making foreign policy. If the boys were so good all along than one wonders why we erred in 1965 by sending 7,000 insurgents into Kashmir thinking that India would take this infiltration lying down and not attack on the working boundary, why did the military launch an operation against the people of Bangladesh in 1971? Why did General Zia start a 10-year war against Afghanistan in 1979 and allow the intense weaponisation of the country? Why did he allow the drug trade to finance the insurgency beyond the northern border? If the establishment did do its homework then how did General Musharraf attack Kargil, underestimating India’s massive response? If they are so good then why did they fail to stop the jihadis from launching the Mumbai carnage? Why, to the embarrassment of the nation, did they allow Osama bin Laden to hide in the garrison town? Why did they launch the Taliban government in Afghanistan only to realise much later that it would work closely with al Qaeda and provide its territory and resources to Islamist terrorists the world over? The list of failures in the foreign policy managed by the boys is long.
However, that does not absolve the political governments from their omissions and commissions. The media should criticise them so that they are forced to improve but not in a way that paves the way and encourages the establishment to once again take over, something to which we are familiar given the wretched history of democracy in the country.

The writer can be reached at ayazbabar@gmail.com. He is the author of What’s Wrong with Pakistan?