Daily Times

Politics in Pakistan went through a radical phase during 1967-1969 when the political and ideological opposition took to the streets against Ayub Khan questioning his domestic and foreign policy. Ironically, some old allies of the regime turned sides. ZulfikarBhutto and Air Marshal (rtd) Asghar Khan are cases in point. Each formeda political party to ostensibly democratise Pakistan. On the other hand, the leftist organisationsrevolutionised against both the military rule and its opportunistic political and bureaucratic collaborators. The student and trade associations were at the forefront of a popular political movement that made Ayub a liability rather than an asset for the military.

Paradoxically, instead of trusting his ‘basic democracy’ model in terms of transferring powers to the political dispensation, General Ayub preferred his own institution of the army to stir the country out of crisis. Little wonder then thatGeneral Yahya Khan declared martial law in Pakistan the day General Ayub resigned. Consequently, the 1962 Constitution was abrogated, the national and provincial assemblies stood dissolved, members of the president’s council of ministers and the two provincial governors ceased to hold offices. Moreover, GeneralYahya assumed the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and appointed the deputy army chief, air force chief and naval chief as deputy CMLAs. In addition, he issued 25 martial law regulations on the same day.

Regarding the project of democratisation, General Yahya arbitrarily assumed the office of president with effect from March 25, 1969 through a notification dated March 31, 1969 gazetted on April 4, 1969. Not only this; in order to democratise the country, he, on November 28, 1969, outlined the rules of the game: elections would be held on October 5, 1970, parliamentary system would be preferred, the elected National Assembly (NA) would be tasked to frame a new constitution, maximum autonomy would be granted, One Unit would be undone and, from January 1, 1970, political activity could be resumed.

Yahya’s announcements and regulations were political in nature. The military having witnessed and calculated the popular demand for elections opted for it in the hope of not only defusing, in the short term, anti-regime agitation politics and thus maintaining relative law and order but also expecting a hung parliament given the intra-opposition political differences.Nonetheless, working on the project of democratisation a regulation was enacted in December 1969 by the CMLA, which strictly prohibited any opinion or action in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan’s ideology, integrity or security. Moreover, on March 28, 1970 the general-cum-president formally made the rules of the game public by promulgating the Legal Framework Order (LFO). The LFO was a political device, at best, to manage the country’s constitutional-political matters on the military’s terms. Moreover, the LFO was used as an instrument to further divert the public and politicians’ attention to electioneering. In addition, it set rules and regulations for the upcoming elections in terms of elections schedule, assemblies’ seats etc.

Nevertheless, the political forces responded to such arbitrary measures rationally. They preferred participatory politics for the ballot was seen as more powerful. Therefore, the election campaign was launched by a variety of politicians and political parties to contest for the 313-seat parliament. The Bhutto-led PPP, however, did not opt to nominate any candidate from East Pakistan. On the contrary, the Mujib-led Awami League did nominate seven candidates from West Pakistan. Both the politicians criticised Ayub and the Yahya-led military rule for a multiplicity of reasons i.e. a pro-west defence policy, non-resolution of Kashmir, poor economy and poor governance. Importantly, the elections were held in December 1970. The Awami League, due to its popularity and massive campaign, was able to clean sweep in the East (153 seats with no seat in West Pakistan) whereas the PPP won 81 seats but all from West Pakistan. Interestingly, the once pro-AyubMuslim League (Convention) could win only two seats.

Though there were incidents of ‘moderate’ pre-poll rigging, almost all the parties viewed the elections as free and fair. However, the process of post-poll rigging, and that too at the highest level, began with the interference of the principal in the process of government formation. In this respect, Yahya met with Mujib in January 1971 to persuade him to soften his position on the Six Points. The latter preferred non-compromise over the Six Points which, in fact, was the basis of his party’s victory. Moreover,Mujib asked Yahya to call the NA session where he would show his strength to assume the office of PM. Since the Awami League had formed the electoral majority, it should have been, from the perspective of democratic theory, allowed to form a government at the centre. Nevertheless, having been unsuccessful with the Awami League, Yahya Khan turned to the PPP in order to urge the latter to politically negotiate with the party.

Bhutto, on his part, had a different priority from both Mujib and the military. He had a political interest to prolong the situation to a point where the military strategically opts to engage with him to possibly form a government in West Pakistan. In this regard, Bhutto’s position on the Six Points is a case in point. Logically, had this not been the case, then Bhutto’s January meeting with Mujib would have focused on the contours of coalition formation and not the Six Points on which the AwamiLeague remained adamant. The military, on its part, chose to be flexible; it called for the assembly’s meeting on March 3, 1971. Meanwhile, the Awami League’s politicians, indeed the party’s parliamentary committee, had adopted a draft constitution that incorporated the Six Points. However, Bhutto prioritised non-compliance and called upon General Yahya to postpone the scheduled session of parliament. Moreover, the former warned the participants of dire consequences and publically demeaned the Bengalis. In such a tense strategic context,Yahya’s preference ultimately converged with that of Bhutto due to the principal’s policy of non-transfer of power(s) to the majority Bengalis.

Thus, General Yahyaformally postponed the NA session on March 1, 1971.Indeed, no session was allowed for the Yahya regime invoked, on March 25, military means to resolve a political matter. The Indian military’s involvement turned the civil war into the India-Pakistan war and, consequently, Pakistan was partitioned into Bangladesh. Had Pakistan been genuinely democratised under the Ayub and Yahya regime, and had Pakistani politicians seen to the larger interest of the country, the 1971 tragedy could have been avoided. “Till the night of March 25, everybody in this part of (East) Pakistan was a Pakistani. By morning, everyone was a Bangladeshi,” summarised a professor of International Relations at Gono University during a conversation with the author in 2013.

(To be continued)

This is the third part of a five-part series appearing every Saturday

The writer is a political scientist by training and professor by profession. He is a DAAD fellow and the author of Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan.
He tweets @ejazbhatty