Daily Times

In the contemporary international system, states are the fundamental customer of classified and processed intelligence information for security, law enforcement and policymaking. However, Islamic State (IS) and the Taliban also perceive a need to collect and process advance information to protect their networks against the theft of their strategic, defence and political secrets. As intelligence is more than an organised collection of targeted information, processing can include technical issues such as transcribing and translating intercepted telephone conversations and verifying the reliability of information. In modern philosophy, intelligence involves a real struggle with human opponents, carried on to gain some advantage over them. Michael Warner understands that argument over the definition of intelligence resembles perhaps nothing so much as a trademark dispute. In essence, the debate among intelligence experts has caused deep confusion over the basic job of an intelligence agency during war and peace times.

Western intelligence scholars describe intelligence as an advance warning; it serves to establish conditions in which threats are eliminated or kept at a distance. Some say intelligence is the umbrella term referring to a range of activities from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination, all conducted in secret. The basic task in using intelligence to develop a doctrine and forces for deterrence and defence is to estimate threats posed by adversaries, in terms of both capabilities and intentions, over a period of several years. The intelligence cycle starts with the requirement of decision makers who need collected and processed information on time. The case of Afghanistan additionally raises the question of intelligence agencies gearing assessments to what their customers need or want to hear positive messages.

The above-cited way of intelligence information collection, process and analysis elucidated by experts is quite different from the way Afghan intelligence operated in yesteryears. During the last 14 years, we have heard or seen no success story from the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in the country because it adopted a political culture and its leadership acted like politicians. The fall of Kunduz, consecutive terror attacks in Kabul and the abrupt appearance of (IS) in Afghanistan, raised important questions about the credibility and competency of the Afghan intelligence agencies. Before the Taliban attack on Kunduz, NDS operatives safely left the city without informing the government in Kabul. Large-scale desertion of the Afghan army soldiers, intelligence units and the police enabled the Taliban to enter the city unopposed. After their capture of the city, they looted weapons, including tanks. The president’s appointed investigative team in its 30-page summary report also noted that there was coordination among the police, intelligence and Afghan army commanders. The CIA and Pentagon killed innocent patients and doctors shamelessly and apologised that their five billion dollar intelligence computer system went offline the day of the bombing on Kunduz hospital. Human rights groups termed it a serious violation of human rights and an unprecedented war crime.

In fact, writing on the intelligence mechanism and operation of the NDS is an industrious task as there is limited information available to analysts and researchers in libraries and market. The NDS is a remnant of the Khidmat-e-Etlaat-e-Dulat (KHAD), established in the 1980s, and trained by KGB experts. However, from 1980 to the collapse of the Afghan state in 1992, no intelligence reforms have been undertaken by successive governments in the country. In 1992, the mujahideen undermined the basic structure of intelligence and used it against each other. In 2002, when the CIA reorganised the scattered pieces of Afghan intelligence under the name of NDS and trained its officers, two ideological camps emerged. The Soviet trained agents and CIA trained agents opposed each other, and established secret contacts with various mafia groups across the country.

The presence of Russian and Chinese intelligence in northern Afghanistan further complicated the process of intelligence sharing and cooperation between Afghan and western intelligence agencies in the country. The state and system of government has ultimately been hijacked by these agencies. The secret war between Russian, Chinese and US strategic clandestine intelligence in northern Afghanistan raised serious question about the intensifying great game in the country, which might possibly prompt a destructive nuclear war in Central Asia. The exponentially spreading web of foreign espionage in the region and the recruitment of Afghans agents for it cause fear and anxiety. Dr Abdullah Abdullah in his recent statement raised concern about the existence of foreign spies within the state institutions. “Double agents are more dangerous than insurgents,” he said. The fall of Kunduz, Pakistan’s re-engagement in the peace process and policy differences between the president and Intelligence Chief Rahmatullah Nabil forced him to resign. He was, in fact, unprofessional, and an incompetent chief who knew nothing about the way intelligence operates. He was acting like a politician. His precursors were also street children who made the agency ethnicised, sectarianised and regionalised. Now, with the appointment of Major General Masoud Andarabi as the chief of the NDS, we hope he will introduce some structural reforms and changes within the controversial intelligence infrastructure of his half Sovietised and half Americanised agency. Yesteryears’ news stories showed that former Afghan intelligence chiefs also acted like politicians and interfered in the decision making process in the country.

Distrust between the government and intelligence chiefs have affected friendly relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours. They openly issued statements on television channels and criticised the presidents and their diplomatic approach. They opposed Pakistan’s role in the peace process and branded the country an enemy of the Afghans. The way the NDS operates needs to be changed now, introducing wide-ranging intelligence reforms to make effective the NDS and its countrywide networks, which may lead the fight against IS and the Taliban in the right direction. The Afghan leadership needs to depoliticise the agency and expel illiterate elements appointed on ethnic and sectarian lines. The mujahideen and Taliban supporters within the intelligence agency are making things worse. The roots of the NDS must be re-established in the south and east, and the influence of drug smugglers and war criminals needs to be undermined. The NDS’ leaders are making money, purchasing properties and plundering secret funds. The government needs to investigate its involvement in corruption and smuggling.

The writer is the author of The Prospect of Nuclear Jihad in Pakistan and can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com