Daily Times

Would it be cynical to suggest that Saudi Arabia’s newly minted 34-member alliance to fight “terrorist organisations” exists solely for roping in Pakistan’s military assets? Maybe, but such is the dearth of tactical details and a clear battle plan that you cannot help but scratch your head and wonder: what is the point? That said, Riyadh’s modus operandi has done Islamabad a huge public relations favour. Pakistan has parried Saudi requests for troops since March, but there was clearly a time cap on how long this dithering could continue, especially with Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif in charge. By repackaging the request as an epic alliance against the enemies of Islam Riyadh has provided Islamabad a sturdy shield against dissenting voices at home.

It was clear months ago that the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC’s) war in Yemen would not close quickly, and now the promise of UN-backed peace talks has imploded. With Russia inserting itself in the Syrian conflict and a reticent Obama White House unwilling to lock horns with Moscow, the Saudis have no leeway to impose their favoured solutions in the region. Their major worry will be Islamic State (IS) militants, who not only claimed a spate of suicide attacks in the Kingdom this year, but also issued a formal call-to-arms against Saudi royals on December 18, 2015 through a series of online videos. Factor in approximately 7,000 Saudis in IS ranks and you can understand why Riyadh is on edge.

Sidestepping the irony of Saudi Arabia as the cradle of jihadist Salafism now fearing its own Frankenstein, let us focus instead on two important questions. One, what is the Saudi coalition if not an attempt to pull in Pakistan’s military resources? Two, considering the initial confusion and backpedalling in Islamabad on December 15, who eventually green-lit Pakistan’s involvement? The answer to the first question is: not much. Turkey, Jordan and Egypt have as one welcomed the alliance, but tepidly, since they are already fighting IS as part of the larger US-led coalition. Also, the Saudi version will “coordinate efforts against extremists in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan,” according to Defence Minister Mohammed bin Salman, but neither Iraq, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan are part of the alliance. How, then, will Riyadh corral the support of nations unworthy of inclusion, but clearly in the gun-scope? Moreover, it is puzzling that a coalition designed to fight Islamic extremism includes the small, Christian-majority African nations of Togo and Benin. What possible stake do they have in this fight? Were they enticed through petrodollars to reach some arbitrary number that the Saudis felt looked important? Perhaps Riyadh feels a grand gesture of Muslim unity here will gloss over its costly campaign in Yemen.

The answer to the second question may lie in meetings a month earlier when General Raheel Sharif visited Saudi Arabia and met the Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz. This in itself was a highly unusual event since the king rarely bothers with anyone other than heads of states. Through a series of tweets, the army’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) wing informed us that General Sharif repeated “Pakistan’s commitment to the safety and protection” of Saudi Arabia’s borders and agreed that both countries shared a “significant responsibility towards [the] Muslim ummah”.

Off the record, General Sharif may also have hinted to his kingship that the Saudis needed to reframe their distress call for Pakistan to invoke a higher purpose than Yemen and respond favourably. The coalition idea, hence, is perfect. As the world’s largest arms importer, Saudi Arabia is not in want of additional hardware. It needs specific counterinsurgency skills that the Pakistan army is presently most qualified to supply.

Clearly, the coalition announcement caught Islamabad unawares. Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry was first “surprised” and then feigned ignorance. A day later, however, Foreign Office Spokesperson Qazi Khalilullah roasted the media for misinterpreting Chaudhry, who had ostensibly stated that Pakistan was “ascertaining details” of the coalition, although “yes, we are part of it”. The real mystery is how any English-speaking journalist could confuse such vastly different vernacular.

Nevertheless, rumours of a General Headquarters (GHQ) diktat turned feverish enough for Defence Minister Khawaja Asif to appear on BBC Urdu and outright deny the army “meddling” in civilian matters. Elsewhere, both the US and China have greeted the alliance with enthusiasm and promises of cooperation. The only worried parties are human rights’ organisations like Amnesty International, which fear an open-ended definition of the word terrorist will trigger political witch-hunts in a kingdom notorious for curbing free speech.

Still, the idea of a Muslim-majority coalition against Islamic terrorism is a strong message of ownership, and one the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) should have mandated years ago. The real problem with the Saudi coalition is how it paints itself into a patently Sunni corner by excluding Iran and Iraq. This perpetuates the kind of sectarian divide that the Muslim world can no longer afford.

The writer is a freelance columnist and audio engineer based in Islamabad