Daily Times

What does the US government and its citizens learn from the past in the conduct of politics and crises? Four persistent propositions explain the vagaries and uncertainties of politics, whether geostrategic or local, and crises. First, unpredictability reigns. Second, history is forgotten or ignored. Third, administrations and publics are ill-prepared for crises and the unexpected. And, fourth, when things go wrong, whether in politics or after crises, a reflexive response is the inevitable call for a lessons learned review.

The resilience of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump is illustrative of the first proposition. President Barack Obama’s handling of Islamic State (IS) is reflective of the first two. The September 11 attacks, the second Iraq War of 2003 and the financial meltdown of 2008 are representative of all. The emergence, persistence and current success of Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy clearly were unpredictable. So-called experts declared Trump self-destructive and un-electable. So far, these predictions have proven wrong although not a single caucus or primary vote will be cast for five weeks.

A year ago, President Obama labeled IS as the “junior varsity”. Was he uninformed or simply politically expedient in trying to minimise its danger or honouring his commitment to reduce US military presence in the region? And, in any event, why did critics, including senior officials in his administration, have a better understanding of IS than the president once its “unpredictable” emergence became self-evident.

Regarding history, the 2011 Libyan regime change that removed Muamar Gaddafi ignored what happened in Afghanistan and Iraq. To a degree, Obama may have learned this lesson in his reluctance to put American ground troops in Syria to disrupt and destroy IS. Yet, his administration recognises that IS can only be overcome by forces on the ground.

At some point in the future, “lessons learned” analyses no doubt will flourish like ants at a picnic dissecting the success or failure of Mr Trump and the fight against IS. But will anything that is learned be applied for future political or geostrategic and military campaigns? Judging by history, the answer is no.

Take two of the most disruptive events of this century: the September 11 attacks that destroyed New York’s Twin Towers and a part of the Pentagon in the nation’s capital, and the financial meltdown of 2007-2008. The 9/11 Commission, as it became known, was established more than two years after the attack. Its first two commissioners, Henry Kissinger and former Senator George Mitchell, resigned after being selected to avoid conflicts of interest. Ultimately, former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean would occupy the chair with former Representative Lee Hamilton as the vice. The commission published its findings in 2004 and was formally disbanded in 2006 although McKean and Hamilton carried on to provide oversight on the implementation of their recommendations. Despite contrary views, the commission’s findings were critical and thoughtful in assessment of why and how the attacks succeeded and why government and the intelligence community were both at fault and mal-organised.

While its major recommendations (creation of the Department of Homeland Security, a director of National Intelligence and a National Centre for Counter-Terrorism), the plea for a “realistic strategy” and analyses of how to deal with regional states such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were largely ignored. Sound bites and headlines rather than acceptance of the analytical and conceptual frameworks used by the commission dominate, reflecting the US preference to deal with tactics and symptoms of crises and not strategy and causes.

Similarly, the financial meltdown precipitated many lessons learned studies, particularly the Congressional Budget Office’s Financial Crisis Inquiry that reported out in 2010. That study, however, was divided along party lines in its findings. The major response was the Dodd-Frank legislation (named for former Senator Chris Dodd and Representative Barney Frank) with some of its provisions still being drafted by the Security and Exchange Commission five years later.

With the arrival of 2016, 2015 will be subjected to retrospective dissection and examination. And, likewise, predictions about 2016 will be limitless in number. If granted even one wish about the future, the excruciating question is which one to select. Removing unpredictability, ensuring history is remembered, preparing for crisis or listening and implementing lessons learned are all viable candidates.

Unfortunately, as hope is not a strategy, neither is wishful thinking. One of the realities is that experience and analytical ability are not qualifications for the presidency. Unless or until Americans decide to change that reality, do not bet on neutralising the four propositions that prevent our learning from the past.

The nation will survive but at what cost?

The writer is chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business and senior advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council. His latest book, due out this fall, is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of an Archduke a Century Ago Still Menaces Peace Today