Daily Times

The other day, on social media, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was seen driving an army van while Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif sat beside him, looking apparently cool and calm. The two personalities were in Balochistan where both, at the same time, inaugurated the M-8, the first ever motorway that will connect strategic parts of that province with the would-be strategic and economic hub that is Gwadar. This development took place in the immediate context of a statement released by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) on the behalf of the army chief. According to that statement, the top military man vowed not to seek an extension in his tenure and instead preferred to retire in November this year. Importantly, the chief held his institution in high esteem in terms of believing in institutional rather than personal rule. While on the one hand, the statement put an end to the debate on whether General Raheel Sharif would seek extension like his predecessor, General Ashfaq Kayani, but on the other hand it started a new debate on the dynamics, if not nature, of civil-military relations in Pakistan. The opinion expressed online and in academic circles can be categorised in three broad categories.

Firstly, there are those who argue that given the security situation of the country and the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which was initiated and continued by General Sharif, the latter should carry on with the agenda and the civil government led by Nawaz Sharif should not hesitate to extend the tenure of the COAS (anywhere from one to three years). This group was then deeply disappointed by the COAS’ decision to seek retirement. Indeed, some elements from this section wrote openly in favour of an extension and literally urged the army chief to revisit his decision in the larger interest of the country, which according to them is at the brink of death and destruction at the hands of extremists and terrorists.

Secondly, there are those from media and other opinion circles that hailed the retirement statement and viewed it positively. They argue that by not seeking an extension the army chief has set a precedent and such an attitude reflected the maturity of Pakistan’s civil-military relations. Some, out of this category, argued that the military was assigned a “role” by the current Sharif government which they are supposed to fulfil constitutionally. The apparent reference was made to the 21st constitutional amendment which was passed and adopted by the Pakistani parliament in January 2015 in the context of the terrorist attack on the Army Public School (APS) on December 16, 2014. What this category wanted one to believe was that the military had not intervened in Pakistani politics in the past and whenever it did, it was done on the invitation of political forces. Last time, it was the Sharifs who sought arbitration from the army (chief) when the former were engulfed in a political crisis set forth by the agitation politics unleashed by Imram Khan and Tahirul Qadri in the summer of 2014.

Empirically, such a view ignores the intricacies of the civil-military relations and the way they are structured and played. One wonders, were Generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf assigned a “role” by PMs Malik Noon, Zulfiqar Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1958, 1977 and 1999 respectively? Such a superfluous understating of Pakistani politics in general, and regarding civil-military relations in particular, serves little purpose academically. There is thus a need to take all relevant data into account and theorise it, either in terms of structure or agency, in order to provide policy input and basic understating of the subject to a layman.

Thirdly, there a handful of voices based in and outside Pakistan, which take a holistic view of politics of Pakistan and civil-military relations in particular. This category, by and large, has taken a structural view of the nature, character and dynamics of power politics in the country. In their view, the military has structurally impacted politics and the state to its advantage since, at least, the Ayub era. From then on, it has acted as the most powerful social and political force in the country, which has even arbitrated among other stakeholders. In principle, I agree with this view, however with a minor disagreement of theoretical positioning. In my view, along with its structure, it is the military’s agency that has made it the principal force in Pakistan, socio-economically, politically and even psychologically. The military strikes a coup with the timing of its own choice; it re-moulds the structure of the state to its taste; it produces and decomposes politicians according to its own political vision; and it disposes off those militant forces that are no longer required from its strategic perspective.

If we apply the foregoing to the current civil side of the government, the latter counts nowhere comparatively. Nawaz Sharif and other political forces assumed powers in May 2013 under a military dominated political system and culture. Even regardless of Imran Khan’s sit-in politics, the structure of military dominance was to prevail since the political forces were and remain myopic, incapacitated, self-centred and, by and large, pro-military. From this logic, therefore, the debate on extension was futile and unnecessary.

Who needs an extension when the rule of army is already extended to the future generations of this country? Don’t get shocked when you see Raheel Sharif driving. It simply signifies his power, control, direction and will to do as he wishes and wants as the head of the most powerful force in Pakistan. I will be rather shocked if the civilian Sharif jumps to the driving seat. The Sharif should remember that it is a privilege to be driven by a civilian and a paralysis if drove around by a khaki.

The author is a DAAD fellow and the head of department of social sciences at Iqra University, Islamabad. He has authored Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan.
He tweets @ejazbahhty