Daily Times

The Pakistani state’s monopoly on the use of force has been seriously contested by various terrorist organisations, armed sectarian outfits, nationalist insurgents, armed drug traffickers and extortionists. Such organisations and outfits normally operate from the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), which includes South and North Waziristan. However, they have sleeper cells in major urban centres such as Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Resultantly, suicide bombings and target killings of, for example, Shia professionals have been a common phenomenon in major cities of the country. In other words, the writ of the state is constantly challenged not only in the tribal areas but also in other parts of Pakistan by, for example, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2013 alone, 5,379 people, including 676 security forces’ personnel, lost their lives in terrorist attacks. In March 2014, the Nawaz Sharif government initiated peace talks with the Taliban but it failed to achieve desired results. The Pakistan military later launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb (June 2014) in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network. Nevertheless, 5,496 people, including 132 school children, died in terror attacks in 2014. January 2015 witnessed the death of 300 people including 55 Shias who were killed in a suicide attack on January 30. In 2015 alone, more than 2,000 people lost their lives in terror attacks.

Moreover, the notion of state identity is highly vague in Pakistan. Though the state is constitutionally declared an ‘Islamic republic’, Islamic laws (sharia) are not implemented fully. Instead, the country’s judicial system is based on British laws. This has enabled pro-Islam political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) to question, on the one hand, the state’s reliance on the western model of parliamentary democracy and, on the other, legitimise their existence in an extremely polarised society. The identity discourse has been intensified post-9/11. Pro-religion political parties and Islamist militant organisations such as the TTP have resorted to coercive means to compel society and the state to follow their kind of Islam. Moreover, nationalist forces in Balochistan and Sindh, i.e. Jay Sindh Mahaz, have launched left-oriented political movements to assert their cultural and political identity. The Pakistani state has, ironically, invoked the religious identity of the state to counter secular ethnicities at the local and provincial levels. From 2013 to the present, certain anti-minority sectarian organisations have flourished, for instance in parts of Balochistan, with the effect that the ethnic Hazara people, who are Shia, are killed indiscriminately.

Pakistan is a state with an overwhelming 96.4 percent Muslim population. Minority religious groups include Christians, Ahmedis, Hindus and Sikhs. Muslims are divided into different sects, i.e. Sunni and Shia. Shia-Sunni rivalry has increased with both communities targeting each other. According to a report published by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in April 2014, violence against religious minorities increased in 2013 by 22 percent. From 2013 to the present, around 2,000 people have been killed in sectarian violence along with scores been paralysed permanently. The Pakistani state has been unable to control religious outfits in the country.

In addition, the persecution of Ahmedis and Christians in the name of blasphemy continues with more ferocity. The most barbaric act in the name of blasphemy took place near Lahore, — the home of the Sharifs — in November 2014, when an enraged mob burnt a Christian couple in a brick kiln after accusing them of desecrating the holy Quran. In view of the aforementioned facts, one can argue that the government’s record to protect religious minorities and religious freedom is abysmal. It has neither the capacity nor the political will to investigate and prosecute the offenders of these barbaric acts.

Besides, the working of the basic administrative system in Pakistan is not smooth. It is stalled by the wrong priorities of the government. The provincial governments have amended the Local Government Ordinance 2001. Local government elections were initially delayed in Punjab and Sindh. Moreover, the local bodies’ elections held in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were made controversial as both the opposition and the party-in-power, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), called for an objective investigation into the rigging committed even at the local level. Furthermore, civil bureaucracy has unrivalled control at the district level. However, its record in service delivery is very poor. About 52 percent of Pakistanis lack access to sanitation while 80 percent lack access to safe drinking water. The bureaucracy has become a highly politicised institution in Pakistan. Civil bureaucracy acts as a proxy of the federal and provincial governments. The village panchayat system continues to function as a parallel justice system in some areas of southern Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. It continues to deliver informal justice, which is in some cases very harsh. The government has made no effort to reform the district administration or to provide it with sufficient funds to upgrade health, education and other basic facilities.

What the foregoing informs is that Pakistan’s state writ has been questioned and challenged by a variety of forces that were initially nourished by the state for strategic purposes. Moreover, the service provision capacity of the state has dwindled gradually with the effect that the common man lacks access to speedy justice, quality education and modern healthcare. The state bureaucracy works in tandem with the political elite for partisan interests thus neglecting mass issues. Until the state owns its people, the identity crisis and writ of the state will remain at stake.

The author is a DAAD fellow and the head of department of social sciences at Iqra University, Islamabad. He has authored Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. He tweets @ejazbahhty