Daily Times

The current elected government of the PTI is in shambles due to the No-Confidence Motion (NCM) by the opposition where several members of the ruling PTI has switched to the opposition to vote against PM Khan. In the past period of three and half years of the PTI government, PM Khan’s relationship was quite smooth with the military, however, in the past couple of quarters, a gap can be noticed following the issue of the selection of the ISI chief. PM Khan’s time and again appeals to not be neutral reckon to something else, that should not happen, according to him.

In the past, we had not seen such bonhomie and convergence between civil-military leadership – ranging from foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic policy. It is often discussed that PM Khan came with the support of the establishment and enjoyed it for three years. However, if it was so and the civil and military leadership can be on the same page, there is no harm in it if the latter does not cross its limits. If we talk about minus military policies in Pakistan, it may be misleading thinking as the theories of civil-military relations do not support this view – except that of Huntington’s view of “objective civilian control,” which is, at least not possible, in a developing world.

The model of “objective civilian control” cannot be adopted in its real sense. The best option is to operate peacefully as two arms of the same body.

The real question in Pakistan is how both civilian leadership and military authority can coexist, which has never been seen on a smooth track throughout our history.

The leading theorists of civil-military relations, Professor Samuel P. Huntington in his book Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations and Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait agree that the world of military and that of civilian are fundamentally different from one another. Both political scientists have discussed the friendly coexistence of civil-military leaderships from their respective worldviews.

Huntington believes there is a sharp contrast between the attitudes and values of both segments of the state. The military holds conservative thinking, while civilian, on the other hand, remains liberal. Besides, each of them has a separate world consisting of separate institutions with their operatives, rules, and norms. He suggests that to maintain control, the civilian authority should not infringe on the internal autonomous character of the military. The civilian authority should determine such control which must be institutional and lawful and not for seeking any political advantages. Professor Janowitz agrees with the above thesis but indicates a theory of convergence. He argues that the civil authority, understanding the need for a strong military, must try to get institutionally closer to each other through better understanding and arrangements.

Huntington, by furthering the concept, presents two models for civil-military relations: “objective civilian control” and “subjective civilian control.” An “objective civilian control” according to Huntington, relies on an autonomous nature, expertise, professional competence, and above all political neutrality of the military. This model presents civilian authority as supreme and the military as a tool for the implementation of policies planned and directed by the political leadership. On the contrary, the “subjective civilian control” provides the military with an independent role in setting national priorities. The military, like the other groups, strives for maximum influence in the formulation and setting of national policies.

Huntington’s objective control is the ideal one; however, in the developed world is impossible to exist.

Janowitz argues that clear demarcation between civil and military authority is not possible and can never exist in a developing world due to their history, culture, and regional characteristics. Besides, the model of “objective civilian control” cannot be adopted in its real sense. The best option for him is to operate peacefully as two arms of the same body. However, unfortunately, I am doubtful, as many, including our most politicians, know theories of civil-military relations. For them, it is implausible because the two institutions can be compatible and operative in coordination as well.

Furthermore, Janowitz suggests three ways by which civilian leadership can control the military: via the budget, via allocation of roles and missions and advice to the head of the state on foreign policy (Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 435). The current U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, a former military officer and the Director of the CIA is the best example of playing such a role. Many other examples can be referred to in the US Government, which portray how the military has influenced the government and interfered in their civilian affairs, or play its role inside the governmental machinery. Bob Woodward, in his book, Obama’s Wars, for example, discusses the 2009 tension between the pentagon and the White House where the former was looking for a different approach. Similarly, General McCrystal’s differences with President Obama on the troops level in Afghanistan is also a piece of evidence.

Richard Kohn, a well-known commentator on contemporary civil-military relations, observes: the professional military, with its allies and communities, has developed into a potent political force in the American government. Knowledgeable people, particularly those who, in each administration, are charged with the direction of national security affairs, recognize this, even if they cannot, for political reasons, admit it openly.

All these theories and shreds of evidence, those provide a basis for civil-military relations, suggest a mechanism of coordination and cooperation among both the organs of the state. A complete detachment is not possible, especially in the developing world. All those who comment on this difficult-to-understand relationship must know the basics of the subject matter. The issues we have experienced in the past were those of military coups, not influence or coordination. If better coordination can save democracy from the danger of military coups and work for the betterment of the state, that is understandable and viable. Also, keeping in view the current political turmoil in the country, a better role from the establishment is expected to avoid any conflict among the mobilized political forces.

The writer is Senior Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. He tweets @yousafzaiZafar5.