Daily Times

A modern civilised society must keep its historical account accurate, whatever the likes and dislikes of the times. The current trend of our liberals these days is to criticise the army on all accounts and the attitude of our conservative and religious (to be quite frank, I will call them anti-democratic) sections. Our brainwashed, Punjabi urban middle class is worse when it is both ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ army and, overall, is full of misleading ideas; therefore it is necessary to set the record straight wherever possible. In this article, I wish to only give the correct facts in regard to one incident: that is Kargil and give an unbiased account of what happened. Following are the misconceptions people have regarding Kargil:

—It was a debacle, a fiasco.

—It was a humiliating defeat.

—Clinton saved us from defeat.

—We ran out of ammunition and logistics.

—We left our forces to be slaughtered in Kargil.

That it was a debacle/fiasco might be correct, but politically, we certainly aided it to be a fiasco. The fact is that tactically it was a brilliant plan; but unfortunately, not a far-sighted one (that was why the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is reported to have opposed it). The plan was that when the Indian forces left their Kargil positions for the winter, our Northern Light Infantry (NLI) would march in and occupy these, similar in action to what India did to us in Siachen. The pickets or bunkers in Kargil are so unassailable that India would have to admit defeat and we would bring India to the bargaining table. Indeed, when the NLI marched into these pickets without any resistance they found them well stocked with not only ammunition but also food. The bunkers were so well constructed with concrete and steel on strategic heights they were practically unassailable, especially when the steep slopes around them were mined. What was to be gained? There’s the rub. Of course, India refused to concede defeat or come to the bargaining table. The BJP government had to face elections. It launched an exaggerated propaganda campaign and refused even to acknowledge the defeats and frustration they were facing in their suicidal and ill-organised counteriattack. Thus the best we could hope for was to end up in something like the Siachen situation (but with more strategic territory), where nobody gains anything.

However, the world was so horrified that two nuclear powers were having a skirmish with the threat that they might soon start hurling nuclear bombs on one another that there was a vigorous international campaign condemning the operation. Although they tried to keep their criticism even-handed, naturally, the onus of blame fell on the aggressor — Pakistan — and eventually, international pressure (in the form of Clinton) forced us to recall our forces. Indeed, during hostilities, in desperation, India did start moving their nuclear weapons and if they did not scare our army, they certainly scared the world. The incumbent government was also financially bankrupt after our nuclear test; therefore, more pliant to foreign influence (but then again, when have we not been?). At that time it was following an active policy of rapprochement with India and actively wooing the World Bank for aid. Thus, it quickly threw in its cards when Clinton made an ‘offer it could not refuse’ (a la the film Godfather).

Here many intellectuals accuse the army of deliberately torpedoing the peace talks with India. There are different versions of the Kargil conflict: that of the civilian government and that of General Musharraf. The former suggests that the government was kept in the dark about the operation. In the first place, it appears this operation was planned much earlier, but was opposed by the previous prime minister, thus it could not have been executed then. Thereafter, there was the change in the COAS followed by the problem of India’s nuclear test and world criticism when we followed suit. It seemed the army had been nursing this plan for a long time, waiting for an opportunity to deliver its coup de grace. Let us not forget that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi attacked the east wing immediately after she acquiesced to a dialogue with Pakistan. As for the apparent lack of coordination between the government, wooing peace and the army going gung ho, let us not forget under the previous regime, the matter had been taken up with the prime minister and therefore, why should the army have demurred on this occasion? Furthermore, the incumbent was the most powerful prime minister ever in the country, with his small circle of advisers. He had overseen the change of one COAS, and the head of ISI was his special appointee. Therefore, one wonders exactly in how much darkness was the government kept about the Kargil operation. It is open to question if the PM could have opposed it if he wanted, or perhaps coordinated the operation better if he was in the loop. Anyway, in my school I was taught that if the captain of my team is committed in a conflict, whether I like him or not, whether I agree with him or not, I stand firmly behind him. Instead, while our army was fighting in the mountains, the government was desperately trying to give conciliatory arguments to the growing aggression of foreign criticism. There were unofficial attempts to end the fighting, amongst which was the visit of a noted Indian journalist R K Mishra, and a respected diplomat, Vivek Katju to Islamabad. That was followed by a visit to New Delhi by Pakistan’s former foreign secretary; and then there was a proposal by the US that we endorsed, to send our foreign minister to Delhi (that eventually did not happen). Government also did its best to do crisis management to salvage the peace talks. These overtures sent an apologetic image to both outsiders and our own nation, showing that we too were against this operation. This attitude is the beginning of ensuring this incident to be a debacle.

Now regarding the question of ‘defeat’, the operation was tactically a resounding success. Operation Vijay launched by India was described mainly as a mopping up operation to dislodge the intruders; India lost 600 brave souls and 1,800 wounded. Our losses were 400 gallant jawans who lost their lives, which probably included many wounded who could not receive proper aid up there. Out of 134 pickets taken by the NLI, the Indian army could only vacate 14. The rest were still strongly held by the NLI when we withdrew (with ample ammunition and supplies, courtesy the Indian army). Regarding the famous victory of Tiger Hill by India, Mr Brian Cloughley in A History of the Pakistan Army writes that it was a very costly victory. It seems that we fell for the Indian propaganda as much as the Indians did. It was only a matter of time before the Indian public would have started feeling discontent about the number of casualties being sent home. And the biggest canard is people who claim we left our soldiers to be slaughtered after we sent the signal to withdraw. This is pure and utter rubbish. The withdrawal was organised and executed properly, with India breathing a sigh of relief. Those for what they are worth are the facts of Kargil.

The writer is a freelance contributor