Daily Times

After every spectacular terrorist attack in Pakistan, there starts a debate about talks with the Taliban. Liberals and leftists oppose the talks, arguing that it is will merely give them opportunity to rearm themselves and gather potential for new offensives. They imply that the Taliban are irreconcilable. Conservatives and rightists support the talks, saying that ‘negotiations’ are the ultimate solution of every dispute.

The Taliban attack on the 14-year-old Malala Yousafzai once again triggered the debate. Liberals held that it is an opportune time to launch an operation in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) to rout the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other al Qaeda-linked groups and individuals. Conservatives claim that the attack on Malala was pre-planned and that it is being used as a pretext for a NWA operation. They implicitly consider the attack the handiwork of those who forcefully want the Pakistan army to march on North Waziristan. In other words, they smell a conspiracy. In my opinion, their view is a conspiracy theory at best and rubbish at worst, because the TTP has pompously claimed responsibility for the attack. To suspect that someone else is behind the TTP is to obscure the whole issue and make criminal concessions to the militant organisation. Keeping aside the arguments of leftists and rightists regarding talks with the Taliban, several factors should be taken into consideration.

First and foremost, what could be the probable goal(s) of the Taliban from negotiations? They would undoubtedly not like negotiations to result in their elimination. On the other hand, they could simply lay down their arms and the whole drama will be over. They would negotiate only to promote their cause, which is to get political power and Islamise Pakistan on the model of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Therefore, in the long term, their participation in negotiations will be a tactic meant to earn some leverage in the war they have waged against Pakistan. In the short term, their goals could be the following.

The Taliban may want to prolong the war. If they are feeling the heat of ongoing military operations in FATA and fear elimination, they would negotiate to elude death and live to prolong the war. For any militant organisation caught in such a situation, it would be a win-win situation to strike a deal with the government. Are the Taliban caught in such a situation or not? Only the government or its institutions know that. It does not mean that the Taliban have no other objectives if it is presumed that they are not caught in any such scenario.

The Taliban may aim at gaining legitimacy and public support. From a strategic and diplomatic perspective, to negotiate with a force is to acknowledge its status as a power. It improves its standing in the masses, which earns its fighters funds, shelter and logistical support — the most crucial needs for guerilla warfare. The fish would definitely have a sea to swim in if it strikes such a deal and then encashes it through subsequent supportive statements and actions. The media-savvy Taliban know how to cash it.

To get time to rearm themselves and launch fresh offensives could be their third goal. The history of talks between governments and terrorist organisations tells us that it is the most common goal of the latter when they participate in negotiations. In such conditions, negotiations bring more trouble and bloodshed instead of preventing it. Theorists of terrorism warn governments particularly against such intentions of terrorist organisations.

Based on their assessment any set (1, 2 or all 3) of the above most probable of the many goals could lure the Taliban to the negotiating table. Here a question arises: what are our goals for negotiations with the Taliban?

Ours, our government and our army’s long-term goal must be the elimination of terrorism from our soil. Negotiations should only be treated as a means to this greater end. As a tactic we may strike a deal with them only to compel them in later days to break it so as to hurt their standing among the public and make them liable to be cleansed. Or we may negotiate to postpone a battle to lighten the burden on our security forces if they are simultaneously busy in other areas. Or we may negotiate with them to splinter them and wean away the soft factions of the Taliban to our side if the soft factions have significant numerical strength. Or we should negotiate with them if we have planned to approach potential terrorists and then deradicalise them through proper scientific mechanisms. Any one of these cases can be pressed as a genuine reason for negotiations.

Those who believe that negotiations with the Taliban will end terrorist attacks in other parts of the country are mistaken. In the past, they have violated agreements many times and it is likely they will violate them this time too. Conservatives like Imran Khan and Munawar Hassan also bring forth the argument that if America can negotiate with the Taliban in Afghanistan, why cannot we do the same? It sounds nonsensical. The US is the alien in Afghanistan; she will not be concerned with the peace and stability of Afghanistan after withdrawal. She is set to leave Afghanistan; if the Taliban were to march, they will be marching on Kabul, not on Washington, and if the Taliban were to shed blood, they will be shedding the blood of Afghans not Americans. So the US has every reason to negotiate with the Taliban for temporary relief even if it is at the cost of long-term miseries. Do we have this option? Are our forces alien in FATA? Are we going to abandon it? Are we willing to leave it to the Taliban? If the answer to these questions is a plain ‘no’, we should not shy away from taking hard decisions in the most favourable of times.

It seems the attack on Malala has made an operation in NWA inevitable and feasible. If Plan B cannot be resorted to for the elimination of terrorists and an all-out open operation is the only option we are left with, then the following aspects of critical importance must be taken into account. (1) Almost half a million population will flee their homes; proper arrangements must be made for them before the operation is launched. (2) Security forces should not make the local population face avoidable ordeals. (3) Respectful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) should be guaranteed in advance. (4) IDPs should be provided with the basic needs of life in adequate quantity. The situation may get out of control if manmade calamities are not handled properly. (5) Care should be taken to fish out militants who may attempt escape in the guise of IDPs. Massive intelligence is required for this operation to become a success story.

In the end, the question of questions remains: is the planned operation going to be ‘as usual’ or not? A sincere operation requires a change in the mindset of our policymakers. However, perhaps this is the last time that the dwellers of NWA are showing willingness to bear the brunt of a military operation for the sake of the future of Pakistan.

The writer is a political observer. He can be reached at khetranazk@gmail.com