Daily Times

Prophet Mohammad (PBUH)
lived for only 22 years to see his followers multiply after the divine revelations. In that short period he founded a Muslim state in Medina, defeated his fellow clansmen and conquered Mecca. Simultaneously, he set up a socio-economic revolution in the fissiparous Arab society that cut across tribal and clan affiliations with amazing ease. Single-handedly, he converted a matriarchal Arab society to a patriarchal one, putting an end to the age-old practice of polyandry. That changed the entire family infrastructure in tribal Arabia effectively, curbing male infidelity and holding them responsible for their gender derelictions and duties, simultaneously restoring the central position of the woman in the family unit.

The Holy Prophet (PBUH) was unique in many ways. He not only initiated a different and more comprehensive religion but also was the lawgiver, social reformer, jury and statesman in one. To an untrained mind this might appear an over-concentration of power in a single person, which is an uncomprehending view of his towering stature and falls short of the objectivity of the spirit of enquiry. To proceed further we first have to travel back to his times; this means having to visualise his contemporary context and to enter a proper frame of reference. Having done that, we could agree that a person in his position as the fountainhead of a new religion, social order and state system had to wear many caps. That he had to wield the kind of authority that he did in order to make the systems initiated by him work. It is entirely to the credit of his multiple genius that all the three streams that he initiated met success and changed the history of the world.

The religion Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) preached is one of the major ones today and the society he created is distinct. However, the system of state that overarched all other streams underwent various alterations and finally came to an end after the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1918. This decapitated the Islamic package, thus creating a widespread yearning for the caliphate among the masses suffering gross mis-governance and decline in various Muslim countries. The powerful, popular urge to recreate the caliphate became violent from time to time, leading to bloodshed and anarchy in many Muslim societies ranging from autonomous Muslim states in Africa and Asia to eruptions in Muslim enclaves in Europe and elsewhere. A common feature in these movements had been a kind of built-in mechanism for failure. The secret of the failure may not be as much in the concept of the caliphate or emirate, as in the lack of power of rationalisation, rigidity and inadequate competence of its practitioners and emotive followers.

Just as being a Muslim is much more than sporting a thick beard, a prayer patch on the forehead and shin-length trousers, similarly, the caliphate or emirate, in other words Islamic state system is far more sophisticated than whipping women in public, beheadings and severing hands of thieves.

The sensitive nature of this subject and stigmatised repeated failures have made it very difficult to examine this phenomenon clinically. However, it has become necessary to do so for two main reasons. One, because of the continuing mis-governance in many Muslim countries and the Arab Spring, popular interest seems to have increased. Second, a call for a caliphate/Islamic state seems to startle various democratic systems in the world, evoking fears of dictatorship and lust for religious militarism. The two stripes of governance have apparently become mutually exclusive, potentially on a collision course. This is a destructive trend that leads to various notions of conspiracies, subversion and the so-called hidden agendas in both the opposing camps. Expanding militancy and mistrust are two of the ugly offshoots of this unfortunate stand off.

In-house, it does not require any great knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence to figure out what went wrong if not so right in the Islamic state system. This enquiry can be divided into two parts. From the time of the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) emigration to Medina in AD 622, to the death of the last of the famous four caliphs succeeding him, it comprises a period of 39 years. The second part comprises the rise of the Ummayid Caliphate immediately after that to the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1918, and that is a huge span of 1,257 years.

Let us take the first illustrious period of the Islamic state. Islam spread quickly in the Arabian Peninsula and its dazzling conquests enveloped Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The Peninsular Arab society was subjected to multiple shocks in quick succession. It was transformed from exclusive tribal to inclusive regional. A state was formed capping tribal fiefdoms and then this state was exposed to a flood of wealth, culture and multi-ethnicity of vast and newly acquired territories outside the Peninsula. The Prophet (PBUH) handled the great upheaval of social transformation, state building, socio-economic influx and diplomatic interaction with tremendous skill and astuteness. When he died in 632 AD, he left behind a working and an essentially responsive Islamic state, a new Arab society and a wealth of example and precedence in practically every walk of life including his admirable emphasis on education, comparatively remarkable female emancipation and a level field for equal opportunity. This is no small feat, given the short time at his disposal, lack of means and his noble but humble origins. The four caliphs that ruled after him tried to follow in his footsteps exactly and the period ended within 29 years of the Prophet’s (PBUH) death.

Learned scholars of Islamic history could identify any number of causes for this abrupt end but basically there are two major reasons. These caliphs who were elected retained the Prophet’s (PBUH) concentration of powers, which should not have been the case as they were his followers. They should have decentralised power to create checks and balance in the affairs of the state. Resultantly, their opposition sprouted. Secondly, an Arab state that had just been formed could not continue to produce sufficient political, social and economic elasticity to withstand and absorb vast non-Arab territories and populations. The Caliphate of Medina’s social and state structures began to be severely strained and eventually snapped under pressure.

The unravelling caliphate reconstituted itself into an Islamic emirate-cum-semi-caliphate ably developed by the experienced Umayyids starting from Emir Muavia’s rule from Syria in AD 661. The Umayyids belonged to the Qureish of Makkah and were hereditary chieftains. They quickly separated the judiciary from the executive in order to create a balance of power and deflect public ire if an executive action went wrong. While they retained the main strands of the caliphate of Medina, the Emir was no longer elected but attained his position on a hereditary basis. They encouraged and helped create an independent pool of expert religious scholars who could pass edicts on mostly social but at times political matters. These edicts were binding in nature. They would also authenticate a ruler to be striving for promotion of Islamic norms or otherwise. A triad of state power emerged whose apex was occupied by the Emir. This model, more or less, was followed with local variations by the subsequent Abbasids of Iraq, Fatimids and Memluks of Egypt, Umayyids of Spain, Ottomans of Turkey and all other kingdoms and sultanates elsewhere in the Muslim world.

(To be continued)

The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan army and can be reached at clay.potter@hotmail.com