Daily Times

That Pakistan
released 13 Taliban commanders on the request of the delegation of the Afghanistan peace council is a welcome move. But given the formidable challenge of rehabilitation and stabilisation of Afghanistan, one can easily shrug off the development as not very significant. The little importance it carries is because it is arguably indicative of Pakistan’s willingness to extend its support to the Afghanistan peace process.

Pakistan is allegedly believed to have hijacked the peace process by detaining all those Taliban commanders who could have negotiated peace with the Afghan government. The Taliban claim that their 30 to 40 commanders, including Mullah Ghani Baradar, Mullah Omer’s close associate, Mullah Nooruddin Toorabi, the former minister of justice, and Mullah Jahangirwal, the former secretary of the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, are languishing in Pakistani jails. While the Afghan government claim that almost 1,000 Taliban commanders who can help in bringing peace are detained by Pakistan, Afghanistan has been requesting the release of these commanders for quite some time. The Afghans are sceptical of the intentions of Pakistan; they fear that Pakistan will use these commanders as proxies in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal. The release of these commanders by Pakistan may assuage the fears of the Afghans.

It is not as yet clear to what degree will these commanders be helpful in making peace with the Karzai regime. Are they authorised to talk peace with the Karzai regime? Have they any influence over the foot soldiers? Are they themselves ready to make a compromise? Even if answers to these questions are imagined in the affirmative, it is not a big deal. To address the secondary issues and shy away from the core issues is to cure the symptom, not the disease. And the disease that is affecting the health of Pak-Afghan relations is the trust deficit between the two neighbouring states.

Afghanistan has presumed that Pakistan can never see it as a stabilised state or respect its sovereignty in its true sense. Therefore it believes it is required to find the means to stop Pakistan from interfering in its internal affairs. For this purpose, it is presently relying on the US and the international community. It wants the US to open its eyes to the intervention of Pakistan (in Afghanistan), resort to extreme actions against Islamabad in order to pressurise it to stop the intervention. It also believes that owing to the Taliban attacks on American and NATO soldiers emanating from Pakistan’s border region, the US will one day feel constrained to resort to harsh actions against Pakistan. Besides that, it also believes that the international community’s long-term commitment to peace and stability (in Afghanistan) will deter Pakistan from destructive interference in its internal affairs. In one way or the other, it believes, it will stabilise itself and will not be called upon to yield to the dictates of Pakistan.

Pakistan believes that given the hostile attitude of the weak and de-stabilised Afghanistan to its sensitivities, it is easy to conjecture that a stabilised Afghanistan will create problems for it. Pakistan needs a guaranteed assurance that Afghanistan will respect its sensitivities. In the absence of any serious negotiations about these apprehensions and the presumed intransigence of Afghanistan, Pakistan is relying on self-justifying fantasies. It believes that the Taliban having already defeated the US will show a little more resilience to disgrace, humiliate and compel the latter to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. As the US quits, NATO and other forces will follow suit and Afghanistan will once again be left at the Taliban’s mercy. The Afghan army will stumble, armed factions will be resurrected, and civil war will only be a matter of time. In such a scenario, Pakistan believes that it will not be hard pressed to seriously talk to Kabul or reconsider relations.

Yes, some change in Pakistan policy towards Afghanistan has come, but it is merely a change in attitude, not substance. How can there be a substantive change in Pakistan’s policy if its sensitivities are still there and Afghanistan’s response to those sensitivities is still the same, i.e. hostile? Pakistan will not disclose all its cards at once. It neither wants to remain irrelevant to the peace process nor wants to close ‘other’ options altogether.

The trust deficit between the two states is caused by differences about the Durand Line. That is the main problem between the neighbouring states and all other issues such as cross-border terrorism, respect for sovereignty of Afghanistan or mutually hostile attitudes are only the byproduct. The most fateful aspect of the relationship is that there is no serious talk about this core problem, let alone any improvement towards a solution. Although it is quite clear that the clearance of the understanding about the Line is the need of the hour, one cannot hope this problem will be solved in the near future.

Managers of both the states have deemed it an issue of collective honour and dignity. With utter disregard for the miseries of the wretched citizenry of both states, they are trying to outwit each other and solve the problem in accordance with their own lofty ideals. The elites and those officials who enjoy privileges have an opportunity to concern themselves with the collective honour and respect, but the wretched need peace, progress and prosperity. Peace and stability have become a luxury for them. Inaction on the part of the diplomats of both the states will bring a new spate of destruction and chaos on the people of this region. This time if that was to happen to Afghanistan, it will not be confined to it but will spread in the whole region, especially in Pakistan.

The writer is a political observer and can be reached at khetranazk@gmail.com