Daily Times

On November 12, Afghanistan’s High Peace Council (HPC) delegation led by Chairman Salahuddin Rabbani visited Pakistan to seek Islamabad’s close cooperation with the government in Kabul. The delegation remained successful in ensuring the release of a few middle-level Taliban prisoners but not the high-level ones such as Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mullah Toorabi. The Kabul government required all the prisoners to be released and serve as a conduit for opening a negotiation channel with the Taliban to settle the post-2014 affairs in Afghanistan.

The question is, why should the high-level Taliban prisoners not be released by the Pakistani authorities? The next best question is, why were all these Taliban held in the first place and if they were held on genuine charges, why are they being released now? The broader question is, by imprisoning certain Taliban commanders, can Pakistan force Karzai’s government and the US to accept it as a party to the internal situation of Afghanistan? By withholding the Taliban who can play any decisive role in negotiations to bring peace to Afghanistan, Pakistan is not doing justice with its expected role as a neighbour.

Pakistan’s gratuitous claim on Afghanistan’s internal situation backfired in the past and holds the potential to boomerang again in the future. Such a stance of Pakistan is tantamount to inviting trouble from all corners of the world, which is otherwise longing for having a stable Afghanistan sans al Qaeda and its protectors. While the world is scared of another 9/11, Pakistan is still fishing in troubled waters. Is it a sane policy? If Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American who received bomb-making training in Waziristan from the Pakistani Taliban, had become successful in exploding the explosive-laden wagon in Times Square, New York in May 2010, can one imagine what would have happened to Pakistan in reprisal? As al Qaeda became a bane of Afghanistan’s existence, the Pakistani Taliban (whether they are the Tehreek-e-Taliban or someone else) would have become the bane of Pakistan’s survival.

In the wake of the re-election of President Barack Obama, the US strategy seems to be two-pronged: first, to promote a dialogue between the Kabul government and the Taliban, and secondly, to initiate a dialogue with the Taliban in case the Kabul government fails. The US would prefer to have a negotiated settlement of Afghanistan so that there are fewer chances of its having to come back to Afghanistan once again.

Hamid Karzai’s government seems to be ready for opening a new round of negotiations with the Taliban for post-2014 Afghanistan but on two conditions: first, the Taliban renounce their affiliations with al Qaeda, and secondly, the Taliban become part of a broad-based government in Kabul. It is also clear that the Taliban are extending three major demands: first, to have direct negotiations with the US for a post-2014 settlement; secondly, the release of five Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay; and thirdly, the ouster of Karzai’s government and their own consequent ascendancy to power. Certainly, the demands and interests of both Karzai’s government and the Taliban are opposed to each other.

The question is, should Afghanistan shun democracy? The (fourth) wave of democracy has swept across the Arab world. Are the Muslims inhabiting those countries lesser Muslims? To break the back of the former USSR is one thing but to assimilate into the international mainstream is a different thing. In the past, Afghanistan failed to achieve the latter. Why should the countries of the world accept an island of despotism radiating messages of radicalisation and destruction to them? The presence of a minimal but active US force in Afghanistan after 2014 is also beneficial for Pakistan to check any outgrowth of the Taliban having the potential to destabilise the region or to make Afghanistan once again a hotbed of any al Qaeda-like outfit.

The next question is, why are the Taliban not ready to be part of any broad-based government in Kabul? The Taliban must understand the democratic preferences of the world and the aspirations of the people of their own country. If democracy has been introduced to Afghanistan somehow, why should this opportunity for making a democratic Afghanistan be wasted? If the constitution in place is not of the Taliban’s liking, they can amend the constitution after being elected.

Pakistan must revisit its strategy of incarcerating key Taliban commanders in Pakistan. This act must be making the Kabul government hostile to Pakistan. The symptoms of hostility are noticeable, such as an escalation in attacks from across the border, the government in Kabul disputing the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and Afghanistan entering into socio-economic agreements with India. The animosity being nursed by the Kabul government portends trouble for bilateral relations in the future. Pakistan must be desirous of having a role to play in Afghanistan after 2014 but the way that role should be played ought to be mulled over.

Pakistan should not hesitate to convey the Taliban its pro-democratic leanings: Pakistan cannot support any regime in Kabul that is not founded along democratic lines. Secondly, Pakistan should promote an Afghanistan that takes care of its own affairs instead of becoming a liability on Pakistan: Pakistan envisions an independent Afghanistan. Thirdly, Pakistan should not do anything that projects the impression as if it was poking a spike in Afghanistan’s wheel: Pakistan intends to play the role of a neutral neighbour. Fourthly, instead of thrusting itself on others, Pakistan should offer its services to arrange the next round of negotiations amongst Karzai’s government, the Taliban and the US. Pakistan should not squander this opportunity of acting as a mediator that requires peace in its neighbourhood. The role of a mediator is bound to enhance the image of Pakistan in the comity of nations.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com