Daily Times

Kuldip Nayar is one of the most respected journalists in South Asia. He is well known for his authenticity and professionalism. The book, which he calls an autobiography, in actual sense, is a political biography of India. He has disclosed many facts, which he may have known due to being part of the system and a long career in journalism. In this column, I am going to highlight what he has written about the India-Pakistan relationship. This is important because he has been a leading peacenik and being equally hated and loved on both sides of the border for being anti or pro someone or the other.

Talking about partition, Nayar writes that in the 1940s, the poison of hatred between Hindus and Muslims was so deeply ingrained that they were not ready to believe anyone from the other community. The social bonding, which took centuries to grow, started crumbling. On the railway stations, there were separate water pitchers with ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ written in bold letters (page 24).

In his book, Nayar has sketched a different portrait of Mohammad Ali Jinnah that is almost unknown to most, and especially to Indians. Once, when Jinnah was in Lahore, Mian Iftikhar-ud-din, Pakistan’s rehabilitation minister, and Mazhar Ali Khan, the editor of The Pakistan Times flew him in a Dakota over the divided Punjab. When he saw streams of people pouring into Pakistan or fleeing it, he struck his hand on his forehead and said despairingly, “What have I done?” (page 10).

Then, on June 23, 1947, Jinnah requested Lord Mountbatten to “shoot Muslims”, if necessary. On the other side, Nehru suggested handing over cities to the military, but Lord Mountbatten’s response was wanting. He did not want to annoy either India or Pakistan because his dream was to become common governor general of the two countries (page 53).

Although I have a different position about which I have written in my earlier articles, but for most Indians and Pakistanis, Kashmir is the ‘core’ issue. Nayar writes that Pakistan did offer the Maharaja of Kashmir a Sikkim-like status, with defence and foreign affairs remaining with Karachi. The Maharaja did not even consider the offer because he had no trust in the Pakistani leadership. Also, the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947-48 on Kashmir, instead of resolving the conflict, paved the way for three more wars and a series of political-cum-military tensions between them. The Kashmir war prompted New Delhi to stop the transfer of Karachi’s share of the cash balances of undivided India. The Arbitration Tribunal had given Rs 750 million, but New Delhi had paid only Rs 200 million. Mahatma Gandhi was appalled over the non-payment of the amount due to Karachi. Patel never forgave Gandhi for forcing the issue, nor did the extremist Hindus (page 60). As a result, he was assassinated by a fanatical Hindu.

Nayar has mentioned a few interesting incidents that occurred during the peace talks between India and Pakistan after the wars in 1965 and 1971. Talking about the Tashkent Pact, he writes that in the early morning, Aziz Ahmad, then Pakistan’s foreign secretary, rang up Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to inform him about Shastri’s death (page 168). This shows that Bhutto was not happy with the peace deal and with his political master, General Ayub Khan. About the Simla Treaty between the two countries after the 1971 war, Nayar writes that P N Haskar, the principal advisor of Mrs Indira Gandhi, told him that there was an oral agreement according to which Bhutto accepted the ceasefire line as an international border. It meant thereby that Pakistan would retain the territory it held in Kashmir, called ‘Azad’ Kashmir, and India the rest of the valley, Jammu and Ladakh (page 215). But he did not want to be part of this agreement, and he reportedly argued with Mrs Gandhi that if he were to announce the acceptance of the status quo in Kashmir, he would have to face a military coup (page 15).

About Afghanistan and where it had been in the beginning of the Soviet-backed communist revolution in 1978, Nayyar writes that when Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then minister of external affairs, visited Kabul he was taken aback at the suggestion of the Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the Khalq faction of the Communist Party. It was suggested that India and Afghanistan should jointly wage a war against Pakistan and divide the country between them (page 275).

One of the most important stories Nayar carried and is known for was an interview of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, where the former disclosed that Pakistan had a bomb. He has talked in detail about how it happened (pgs 304-08).

Nayar has also written about the initiatives and engagement with Pakistan by the governments led by the United Front, National Democratic Alliance and United Progressive Alliance. Moreover, he has also talked about the track-II diplomacy and initiatives taken by civil society of the two countries to establish peace between India and Pakistan. Finally, the book is full of interesting facts disclosed by Kuldip Nayar. It is useful for students of journalism and anyone interested in South Asia.

The reviewer is an assistant professor (guest) at the Delhi University, New Delhi. He can be reached at amitranjan.jnu@gmail.com