Daily Times

Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy suffers from the historical overhang of its earlier close and cosy relationship with non-state outfits whose principal objective was the promotion of their religion-based agenda through militancy. These organisations were once used as proxies to further some of the foreign policy agendas through covert military operations. Having come under intense pressure from the international community following the events of 9/11 and 26/11 to sever ties with those accused of international terror activities, Pakistan had adopted an ambivalent policy where public pledges to go after the groups suspected of cross-border terror acts have not been fully met. Some of those that had been labelled as terror organisations by the world community simply morphed, changed their title to reflect an organisation with a charitable agenda while continuing with business as usual right under the nose of the state.

During conversation with a serving four-star general of Pakistan army after the Pakistan-India 2002 standoff, I had humbly suggested that with the world closely monitoring our pledge to cut ties with militant outfits suspected of conducting cross-border terror activities, we must make a clean break with them. To my utter surprise and dismay, the general replied with a grin that yes, that should be our public stand but in private we still have plenty of leeway to utilise them to cause pain to our adversaries where required. With such an irresponsible attitude by those who have taken upon themselves to be the sole arbiters of the country’s counterterrorism policies, is it any wonder then that the universal accusation of Pakistan playing a double game still resonates.

To be fair, the current lot of senior army commanders has had a genuine change of heart, having witnessed the barbaric acts of the religious fanatics, especially after the Army Operations Rah-e-Rast (Swat 2009) and Rah-e-Nijaat (South Waziristan 2009-10). The realisation that the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) syndicate currently poses a greater existential threat to the national security than the traditional adversary on its eastern front has finally dawned and the current army chief, General Pervez Kayani spelt it out in unambiguous terms during his national address on August 14, 2012 that marked the 65th Independence Day anniversary of the nation. There is also a realisation that there is a firm nexus between the TTP and all factions of the Afghan Taliban whose principal objective is to wrest power back from the current administration of Hamid Karzai. Hence, the concept of good and bad Taliban has little relevance in the current milieu; all of them have a common agenda of enforcing the Deobandi/Salafi model Sharia by force if necessary.

Despite the change in heart at the top level of the military command, there is a reluctance to go after the Afghan Taliban Haqqani faction in North Waziristan for a variety of reasons: the army is severely overstretched; the inability of ISAF and Afghan forces to act as the anvil should the Pakistan army unleash the hammer through a concerted military operation against the Haqqani group and finally, the lack of public support for any military operations against the Afghan Taliban. The army could well undertake the North Waziristan military campaign but is reluctant to do so without a clear directive from the civilian leadership and the politicians are mortally afraid of taking the responsibility for fear of a serious setback in the impending general elections. The successive governments’ penchant to blame the USA-Israel-India trio for all their failings and condemning the CIA-led drone strikes in the tribal belt in public while acquiescing to them in private, has led to the anti-American sentiments among the general masses being raised to a feverish pitch. Any political party seen as taking steps that are likely to promote the US’s Afghanistan policy is likely to be fatally wounded in the coming general elections. This is where the matter stands as of today. Will the new political set up take a bolder stand is the million dollar question.

To call Pakistan’s counterinsurgency policy an abject failure would be harsh but failure it is for a number of factors, both internal and external, and on balance both the political and military leadership of Pakistan must share the major portion of the blame — the military for their myopic approach and for hijacking decisions that should have always been in the domain of the political leadership and the politicians for allowing the military to do so.

The writer is a defence analyst and Director of Centre of Airpower Studies and can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk