Daily Times

ISAF and the United States being occupiers will ultimately leave Afghanistan, the currently declared year of withdrawal being 2014. The US does not have a big appetite for loss, especially if it involves its own men; it would therefore leave as soon as it ensures that a future Afghanistan will not be a problem for its interests. It would never shy away from engaging the Taliban provided they guarantee a US-friendly government. The US’s previous record is also of turning a blind eye to the Taliban as long as they did not pose a threat to its interests. It has not felt ashamed of dealing with radical elements all around the globe in its counter-communist operations in the times of a bi-polar world. Pakistan should however be cautious in its acceptance of the US dealing with the Taliban as the latter pose an internal threat to it, being the flag bearers of radicalism in this region. The destruction of the sixth century Bamyan statues being their biggest achievement, the Salafi-allied group has never accepted dissent as an option and it would be naive to think that they would change the essence of their character in the future Afghanistan. Their agenda goes beyond the region and includes the imposition of their doctrine all over, even forcibly if so required. Even if for the time being they agree to an acceptable set up, they will try to seize on any presented opportunity to regain the reins of Afghanistan.

The thrashing the Taliban got from the US when they directly hurt its interests would always be in their minds and they would therefore not hurt any US interests in the region. However, the effect of such a situation on radicalisation and both intra-faith and inter-faith relations within Pakistan would be catastrophic. Pakistan, therefore, rather than facilitate the Taliban-US negotiations by freeing the Afghan Taliban it holds as prisoners should press upon the US to work towards establishing a truly democratic government in Afghanistan under an independent Election Commission with candidature allowed to only those who condemn violence and have had no previous role in it. This is the only solution that will in time dilute the power of the Taliban as once given the taste of freedom, the human mind will never accept the repressive ideology of anyone. Repeated elections are the only way to break the mullah-Malik nexus developed over the years.

It was naive of Pakistan that when it reached out to seek amenable partners, it approached Afghanistan largely from an ethnic rather than a political or economic view. Its policy has therefore focused entirely on the Pashtun political factions in Afghanistan, without paying much attention to the Hazaras and Tajiks that were a part of the country. As the dominant ethnic group, the Pashtun provided Afghanistan’s monarchs from 1747 through 1973 when the king, Zahir Shah, was overthrown by his nephew to be deposed later by a series of communists, again all Pashtun. Only for brief periods in 1929 and after the communists were defeated were Afghanistan’s Tajiks able to head the Afghan government. In line with its Pashtun-centric policy, the post Communist governments were not liked by Pakistan. That development made Pakistan bring in the Taliban to establish a Pakistan-friendly regime. Such intervention has never sat well with the non-Pashtun residing there. The Tajiks and Hazaras were therefore never at ease with the situation as they too had developed heightened aspirations. This caused the post-Taliban non-Pashtun Afghan politicians to be non-friendly to our interests.

While it is understandable that Pakistan has always remained fearful of a trans-border Pashtun alliance that is unfavourable to the federation, the solution it pursued to ward off the threat was wrong. The solution that keeps the Pashtun of Pakistan to keep seeking Pakistan as their federation of choice is a level of economic prosperity unmatched in Afghanistan, complemented with real involvement of the people in decision-making. Unfortunately, Pakistan itself being under either direct military rule or effective military control could not offer the latter part. This was missing from our policy and we instead created political stooges in the form of Mujahideen commanders and then Taliban to lead Pakistan-friendly Pashtun groups. Pakistan’s approach that centres on security has thus caused the state to lose goodwill among Afghans even though the ethnic Pashtun ties at the people-to-people level have remained strong. Pakistan is widely reviled and mistrusted in Kabul while countries like India are viewed positively. This needs to be properly addressed and Pakistan needs to make all efforts to be seen as a friend of all Afghans, Tajiks and others included. Afghanistan’s loya jirga of 1949 had declared the Durand Line invalid as it suited the Pashtun community there. This should have made us work on improving ties with the Tajiks and Hazaras there who had no direct interest in the declared annulment, but we have made poor choices most of the time.

Pakistan needs to pursue an outcome where there is a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards it, albeit with Pashtun participation away from the Taliban influence. The Taliban never had a right to represent the Afghan people, as they have never been put to any electoral test. The influence they wielded was due to their usurpation of power with our help and they should not be given more weight than they deserve. The Afghan government of the future thus needs to be democratically elected through a truly independent Election Commission to give a real sense of participation to the Afghan people. It needs to be recognised by all ethnic and political stakeholders in Afghanistan. Pakistan should work with the US and the present Afghan regime to make this possible. A significant international presence to keep strengthening the future Afghan government is necessary. The OIC should be made to help Afghanistan by complementing the Afghan security apparatus with a force drawn from its member countries to ward off any future internal threat from the radical Taliban. In such an event, the need for the presence of US bases in Afghanistan will automatically go away.

The only bad omen for such an outcome is a fearful democracy in Pakistan that always feels threatened and talks of conspiracies against it. How it can draw the strength required to pursue a course so different from what was chartered for it by its military predecessors is another matter. On its resolve rests the future of this region.

The writer can be reached at thelogicalguy@yahoo.com