Daily Times

Those looking for a breakthrough in Afghanistan might find some encouragement in the reported statement recently in Paris by two senior Taliban representatives after attending a two-day conference of Afghan parliamentarians, opposition leaders and government officials, organised by a research institute. It said that the Taliban were not “seeking an exclusive right to power.” And added, “We want an all-Afghan, inclusive government.”

But for that transition to happen, they want direct talks with the US, refusing to negotiate with the Afghan government, which they regard as a “puppet administration”. The statement also reportedly said, “Foreigners and the Kabul administration are not interested in peace.” In that case, what is the point of direct talks with the US when they would not be interested in peace?

Another problem is that the Taliban refuse to accept the current Afghan constitution because it was “written under the pressure of B-52 warplanes in 2004.” They want a constitution based on “the Islamic principles, national interests, and historical gains”, which could mean anything and everything or nothing. In other words, whether in terms of the recent declaration of the Taliban representatives in Paris or other utterances here and there, there is nothing concrete to go by to bring about national reconciliation for a new political order, following the American withdrawal towards end-2014.

The Taliban seem sure of two things: they do not want to deal with the Karzai government, and they want the US-led foreign forces out of Afghanistan. By failing to win the confidence of the Afghan people, the Karzai government sometimes makes the Taliban look good by sheer default. The government came to be seen increasingly as a US creation propped up with foreign troops. Even when elections were held to give it a measure of legitimacy, they lacked credibility and, sometimes, the electoral process was simply rigged. At the same time, the US military presence did not provide much security for the long-suffering Afghan people nor did it improve the country’s economic situation by way of development and employment. On top of it all, the Karzai government’s corruption became legendry. Even the Americans have found Karzai a difficult customer both on account of widespread corruption enveloping his inner circle and the lack of governance.

In a recent article in The New Yorker, Dexter Filkins is scathing about the Karzai government. He writes, “President Hamid Karzai’s government is largely a collection of criminal networks, which are allowed to thrive in exchange for their support.” He adds, “One bit of American military jargon that is actually useful: Vertically Integrated Criminal Enterprise or VICE. It’s a term that officers use to describe the Afghan government.” Not that the US has acquitted itself with much credit. Their own contractors have been deep into shady deals and projects. “The fact is that,” as Filkins points out, “after twelve years and four hundred billion dollars, the Americans have built very little that is likely to stand on its own after they depart,” which is a terrible indictment of the US policy in Afghanistan. As for Karzai, “… the local joke goes [he] will leave Kabul before the Americans do.”

The Americans are now at a stage where they want to get the hell out of Afghanistan, without making it look like a total disaster. Therefore they are training an Afghan military and police force of about 250,000 to take over the combat role when the US leaves by end-2014. So far, with about two years left, the Afghan force is hardly ready to fill the vacuum and, at times, is turning on its trainers. According to a Pentagon report, only one of the 23 brigades of the Afghan army is battle-ready. And, according to the report, “… the [Taliban] insurgency remains adaptable with a regenerative capacity. It retains the capability to emplace substantial numbers of improvised explosive devices and conduct high profile attacks.”

The Afghan government has reportedly been promised four billion dollars annually to support the new force over several years, as well as an unspecified civilian aid programme. But this is based on the assumption that Afghanistan will remain a going concern with a US-allied government, which is a tall assumption, considering the fragility of the situation. It would seem more likely that the US and its allies will disengage after a period and Afghanistan will descend into chaos, fragmentation and civil war. The US will likely expand its programme of drone bombing the tribal areas bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan to snuff out terrorism as they are doing in Yemen and Somalia.

Some believe that the Taliban will simply step into the vacuum created by the US withdrawal, to re-establish their control over Afghanistan, possibly with Pakistan’s help. That might be the case but I would not bet on it. First, the Taliban are more feared than respected. And they will have quite a job on their hands to win the hearts and minds of people, especially after Afghan cities have been ‘corrupted’ by exposure to western capitalist and cultural influences, like education, particularly of girls, and the daily diet of television. Second, the Taliban is not a monolithic entity. It has its divisions and tribal rivalries that have deepened since the US invasion of the country.

Third, however much Pakistan might like to mould Afghanistan in the post-US withdrawal period to serve its strategic interests, its capacity is limited. In the Afghan drama, Pakistan is as much a puppeteer as it is a puppet played by the Taliban. Moreover, at home, Pakistan’s army is pitted against the Pakistani Taliban with its fraternal links to their Afghan brothers. Therefore, Afghanistan and Pakistan are intricately enmeshed.

Fourth, even though the Pashtuns constitute a major part of the Afghan population, the country has sizeable other ethnic entities who will fight any Taliban control. Therefore, even if the Taliban were to establish eventually their domination of the Pashtun areas of the country, its Tajik, Uzbek and other groups will likely revert to autonomous rule, plunging the country into civil war and chronic instability. And they will have the support of some external powers in this.

In other words, it does not look like Afghanistan will have much peace after the US withdrawal, which is rather sad because the Afghan people very badly need peace and unity.

The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au