Daily Times

The state is not ready to speak to Baloch nationalists-turned-separatists but ironically, the state is ready to negotiate certain terms and conditions with the Taliban. The Baloch nationalism of today revolves around the causes of political and economic deprivation while the phenomenon of Talibanisation represented by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) revolves around factors of the way of life and pattern of thinking.

Pashtun tribalism is a way of life and the Deoband school of thought is a pattern of thinking. Wahhabism is more driven to the Arab orientation while Deobandism is an Asian orientation of Islamic fundamentalism. The blend of tribalism and Deobandism is what the meaning of Talibanisation is. Will this mix be acceptable to the future generation of Pakistanis?

These two main dimensions of Talibanisation are militating against the rational underpinning of the state. The tribal aspect challenges the democratic norms of the state. In principle, democracy should have influenced tribal culture and transformed it into a democratic one. Failure to do so has bolstered the resolve of tribal people to preserve the sanctity of their culture and consider it the best way of living their lives. The Deoband aspect is at variance with the pluralistic norms of society, which is supposed to be tolerant towards minorities and all sects of Islam. In the formation of this country, the Deoband school of thought played a role but that role cannot make the state let the school of thought overwhelm the state affairs and undermine societal pluralism. A similar or perhaps a better role was played by non-Deobandis.

What a pass Pakistan has reached. In the past, Pakistan supported and recognised the Taliban in Afghanistan and today the same phenomenon is knocking at Pakistan’s door. Certainly, military-sponsored construction of national interest and foreign policies have put Pakistan in trouble. The burden of the military’s follies has to be shouldered by civilians.

Do the explosions of bombs in Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi make any organisation credible to be talked to? The term ‘peace talks’ indicates that the TTP is an insurgent organisation and the holding of the talks means recognising the TTP. As signs indicate, the state of Pakistan is ready to submit to the TTP’s gambit. Does it not mean that the state listens to those that hold more ability to disrupt national life by launching national terrorism? Does it not mean that the state pays heed to militants when the scale of militancy (or terrorism) is broad and multifaceted?

The objective of the talks is to achieve certain compromises based on give and take. Even if one condition of the TTP is accepted, the compromise can be said to have taken place. By submitting to any condition of the TTP, Pakistan will commit a blunder. Pakistan has no power to stop drone strikes and the consequent collateral damage. Secondly, Pakistan enjoys no power over the TTP’s policy of offering refuge to the members of al Qaeda. Thirdly, Pakistan has no measure to distinguish between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban.

Even if the peace talks fail at the state level, the TTP will be recognised formally as a force to reckon with and with which negotiations can be held, pledges can be made and a truce can be forged. When the TTP offers peace talks with the state of Pakistan, it is clear that the organisation does not acknowledge the existence of the constitution of Pakistan.

One trouble Pakistan is faced with is that the election is approaching. Several political parties, especially those in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, might be apprehensive of their electoral future, which is why they are constrained to conduct an All Parties Conference (APC) to smooth the way to holding talks with the TTP. There is a difference between talking to the TTP at the local level and at the state level. Nevertheless, the point is why these parties cannot hold talks with the Taliban on their own at the local level without involving the state. If talks take place at the state level, it is going to be the first ever formal talks with the TTP, which yearns for a tribal-cum-oriental way of life in the name of Islam. Pakistan should mull over the consequences of this venture. At least ten such consequences can be cited.

First, the option of talks may be viral in nature as moderate Islamist groups may turn radical to be heard and compromised with. Second, the spread of violence in the name of Islam can be rationalised and militancy may become a way of life. Third, the process of radicalisation of society may be hastened. By compromising with the TTP, the state will be offering a logical choice to Pakistanis to join the TTP and get heard. Fourth, small groups comprising non-state actors may join the TTP. Through their militant actions, any such group can pitch Pakistan once again against India. Fifth, the TTP can also be joined by (Sunni) sectarian groups that can play havoc with the lives of anyone who they consider does not conform to their ideology. Sixth, the TTP may turn from an apolitical radical Islamic organisation to a political, violent one. Seventh, the criminalisation of society will commence, as drug barons, bank robbers, arms smugglers and proclaimed offenders exploit the tribal traditions of offering refuge to tribal guests. Eighth, any new 9/11, the footprint of which is traced to the tribal areas will have direct repercussions on Pakistan, ranging from foreign military intervention to the imposition of international sanctions, as Pakistan will be considered in cahoots with the Taliban. Nine, the strengthening of the Taliban in Pakistan also means the strengthening of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The failure of the Kabul government in the post-2014 era may be considered a direct result of Pakistan’s inclination towards the Taliban. Tenth, ignorance will be encouraged in society, as the Taliban version of life is based on ignorance. If the state submits to the strength of ignorance, the state will compromise its future.

The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com