Daily Times

Much was made when China supported the latest Security Council resolution for further sanctions against North Korea, following its testing of a third nuclear device. Undoubtedly, by voting with the rest of the Security Council to make it a unanimous decision, China was signaling its unhappiness with Pyongyang for going its own way against the wishes of its only major ally and patron. Some of the political and media commentary in China over North Korea’s waywardness has been quite blunt to further reinforce Beijing’s displeasure.

But, at the same time, it doesn’t signify any strategic shift in China’ position. There is no indication so far that China will be part of the sanctions regime. And Beijing stands by its oft-stated position that a real breakthrough has to come through negotiations because as China’s foreign minister told a recent news conference that, “We always believe that sanctions are not the end of the Security Council actions, nor are sanctions the fundamental way to resolve the relevant issues.”

China, though, has some serious issues here. It is extremely worried that North Korea’s ranting and raving about raining nuclear bombs on the United States and South Korea could trigger a regional conflict that might get out of control and threaten China’s own security. For instance, a military conflict in the Korean peninsula will activate US’ security pact with South Korea creating the potential for US military engagement across the border and beyond into North Korea.

Which could force China into an unwanted war as happened during the Korean War back in early 1950s. As Deng Yuwen, a deputy editor of the party newspaper, Study Times, recently wrote that, “Would that not [standing by China’s alliance with North Korea] be drawing fire upon ourselves?” Therefore, the danger of China’s steadfast strategic commitment to Pyongyang, when it is talking of war with nuclear weapons, is not a risk free option. It is also a way of telling the hot heads in North Korea that unless they take into account their patron’s interests, it might not be able to bank entirely on China. China is, therefore, letting some media and academic analysts to continue sending cautious signals to Pyongyang.

This is a complex game China is playing, hoping that it might work. On the one hand, by voting for the Security Council resolution, it seeks to express its displeasure with North Korea’s dangerous antics to tame the regime. By the same token, it is reassuring the US that it is steadfast in its opposition to North Korea’s nuclear program and that, to this end, is keeping up the pressure. In other words, China seems keen not to let things blow up through a complex interplay of diplomacy and politics.

This kind of crisis management strategy deployed by Beijing simply drives Pyongyang mad. It is extremely paranoid and sees enemies all around. It feels treated like a pariah state, even with its panoply of nuclear weapons. All its threats, including the scrapping of the Korean War armistice agreement of 1953, are not being taken seriously. The US and South Korea continue to do their joint military exercises despite Pyongyang’s threat of preemptively attacking them to frustrate their war plans. All the bluster in the world by North Korea doesn’t seem to be having much effect on the US or, for that matter, China. Beijing looks like ignoring the new and young North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, unlike his father who was now and then invited to China for fraternal talks between the two communist states.

It is this growing sense of isolation, when some Chinese commentators are even questioning whether to “keep or dump” North Korea, that is further fuelling Pyongyang’s hysteria. That doesn’t mean China is likely to dump North Korea. As long as US and China are in a competitive and contending situation in the region, North Korea remains strategically important to China. At the same time, it doesn’t want Pyongyang to start a regional war that might unleash a series of events beyond China’s control.

It is a difficult time for China during a leadership transition and growing social and political tensions within the party and with the people. The regime needs to carefully manage problems arising from widespread corruption and widening economic disparities as well as open up the political system to ensure greater transparency and accountability. In short, China has more than enough on its plate to deal with pressing domestic issues, without having to deal with a potential military conflict triggered by Kim junior.

It already has territorial sovereignty issues in the South China Sea and the East China Sea with its Asian neighbors that is galvanizing them into a tighter US strategic embrace. It is not surprising that China is not enamored of what its North Korean neighbour is getting up to. The problem, though, is that China doesn’t have much leverage with North Korea.

Pyongyang’s rhetoric, though, is louder than its actions so far. Even though it has unilaterally scrapped the 1953 armistice agreement, there is so far no sign of any aggressive military activity on their joint border. Going by the past experience, it might stage some incident as it did in 2010 by torpedoing a South Korean naval vessel in their contested maritime border resulting in the death of 46 sailors. It might, as it did again in 2010, subject an outlying South Korean island to artillery bombardment causing some casualties.

At the time, apart from disrupting some hopeful trade and investment initiatives by South Korea to help North Korean economy, these incidents didn’t lead to a wider military conflict. And during all this China maintained neutrality, urging resolution of issues through negotiations. It is possible that Pyongyang might create some such provocations to create a sense of urgency. In that case, China is unlikely to get involved apart from urging negotiations.

As for the nuclear threat, according to the US intelligence chief, James Clapper, this is unlikely other than when the Kim regime fears for its survival. But it remains unclear how Pyongyang might define survival threat. In other words, the situation is dangerous but not apocalyptic.

The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au