Daily Times

The study of comparative administrations and case studies helps us understand bureaucracy and its various shades and consequences in terms of change in society and the issues of power and power play. The structure of bureaucracy reflects on behaviours and the need for norms desirable for a way forward.

The political challenge of the permanent civil service’s strength and influence, with its own goals and traditions, was unimportant as long as the bureaucracy’s social and economic principles and those of the ruling politicians did not clash. However, when a new political force gains office and proposes reforms that go outside the customary frame of reference of the prior governmental activity or disrupt the established system of ties with the bureaucracy, the problem becomes critical.

According to Max Weber, the absolute dictator is often entirely dependent on his bureaucracy. Unlike a democratic ruler, he has no way of knowing whether his plans are being implemented. In a democracy, the bureaucracy has less authority since the public keeps the ruling politicians informed. However, this assertion is only half-true because the public is only aware of a portion of the government’s operations. Cabinet ministers are frequently denied access to areas of government operations that are not visible to the public. When a government department’s consumers and civil personnel both disagree with the minister’s ideas, there is a good chance that the policies will not be implemented. Clients and bureaucrats will try to persuade the minister that his approach is incorrect or correct.

Civil officials, of course, do not operate in a social vacuum; their views on relative “right” and “wrong,” like those of all people, are shaped by the pressures present in their social environment. A department official is concerned not just with whether a minister’s recommendations can be implemented but also with the impact of such policies on the department’s conventional practices and long-term relationships with other organisations.

Elections will lose much of their relevance unless the people are allowed to change crucial experts and politicians.

Equally essential are government officials’ assessments of the practicality of each idea, which are always influenced by their political views and the climate of thought in their social group. Humans, not robots, make up the bureaucracy. The desire to preserve a specific bureaucratic organisation is merely a complicated set of considerations that influences their decisions. Depending on its background, each group acts differently in a particular situation. The lack of a sociological perspective among political scientists has aided the reliance on a single theory of bureaucracy. They have mostly avoided raising concerns about the government administration’s social origins and principles.

Political scientists have realised that the government bureaucracy substantially influences policymaking. However, they continue to leave the bureaucracy in a social vacuum. The activities of the bureaucrat are examined in light of the civil service’s goals of self-preservation and efficiency. These concerns might be classified as preservation and efficiency. These interests could be defined in terms of prestige and privilege, the conservation of organisational patterns or links with a department, or the upholding of departmental traditions and policies. There is scant awareness that government officials’ behaviour is influenced by the non-governmental social background and interests of individuals in charge of the bureaucracy. Civil servants belong to a variety of non-governmental social organisations and classes. Individual conduct is mostly determined by social influences stemming from a variety of group memberships and loyalties. An individual’s or a group’s behaviour in a specific situation cannot be viewed as if the individuals or group members had no other life outside of the studied events.

Only when a “radical” party takes power does it become necessary to address the problem of bureaucratic opposition to change. When the state’s overall goals later, the principle of civil-service neutrality breaks down. The socialist state aims to reintegrate societal values, prioritise underserved groups in government services, and secure significant government control. The initiative may fall short of its goals if it places administrative power in the hands of men whose social background and previous training prevent them from empathising with the new government’s goals. “Men of “push and go,” enthusiastic innovators, and hard-driving managers will be required by the planned state…men who are fully devoted to the goal the state is undertaking to serve.”

There was no simple solution to the challenge of maintaining government administration affectionately yet also sensitive to the voters’ desire during the American New Deal period in the 1930s. The current government’s increased power, functions, and sheer bulk necessitate the search for a way to control the bureaucracy. “The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery,” Max Weber said.

Today, the government is a large-scale administrative undertaking that necessitates the use of professionals. Elections will lose much of their relevance unless the people are allowed to change crucial experts and politicians. This challenge will become increasingly prominent as efforts are made to strengthen the state’s economic and social welfare role.

The writer is former Director (National Institute of Public Administration); a political analyst; a public policy expert and a published author.