Daily Times

Some readers have wondered where to find the book where my findings on Jinnah’s political career can be found. It is published under the same title as that of the present series of articles. The book was published in India by Penguin Viking, Gurgaon, 2020; and in Pakistan by Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2021.

Jinnah’s third and arguably most famous phase in politics was as a Muslim nationalist. He was no longer seeking a communitarian solution within a loosely united India, but a separate state for Muslims to be created through the partition of India.

As I explained in the introductory article in this series, as circumstances changed, Jinnah re-assessed the possibilities of making a difference while simultaneously enhancing his political leadership. Sir Shafi had died in 1932, Sir Aga Khan had left the Muslim League in 1934 and Sir Fazle Hussain died in 1936.

In 1937, the Muslim League was routed in the Muslim-majority provinces, winning no reserved seat for Muslims in Sindh and NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa): two in Punjab only. While the Punjab Unionist Party, led by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, won all the remaining reserved Muslim states in a total of 84. In Bengal, the Muslim League won 40 seats out of 84 and 44 were won by the Krishak Sramik Party. The Muslim League did moderately well in the Hindu-majority provinces.

The Congress was the main winner. Before the election, Nehru had declared that in a free and independent India, the Zamindari system will be abolished, and India would be radically restructured on the model of the Soviet Union. After winning the election, it declared that there were only two parties in India: the British and the Congress.

Jinnah refused to accept that and instead launched a campaign, which he confided to the Bombay Governor Lord Brabourne. This would, henceforth, be based on communalism. Moreover, Jinnah went around convincing the powerful landlords of north-western India that the only way to prevent a Congress takeover of India was to accept the Muslim League as the sole representative of Muslims at the national level. He succeeded.

Jinnah went around convincing the powerful landlords of north-western India that the only way to prevent a Congress takeover of India was to accept the Muslim League.

At any rate, the Indian National Congress formed governments in eight provinces including with their allies the Khudai Khidmatgar in the NWFP. Jinnah launched a vigorous campaign alleging that Muslims were being victimized. The Pirpur Report and the Shareef Report presented what they described were cases of discrimination and attacks on Muslims by the Congress ministries. The British Governors in their secret reports rejected the allegations made by the Muslim League. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow told Jinnah that ‘there was no evidence of any positive instance or real oppression’ but the Muslim League propaganda produced the desired effect: a fear was generated that Islam will be annihilated and the Muslims will be obliterated in a united India under Congress rule.

World War II broke out in September 1939. Congress refused to support the war effort. It demanded instead that the British should transfer power to Indians and only then a democratically elected government could freely decide to support the war against fascism.

Such a demand was anathema to the British whose prestige included the possession of India and the services of some 2.5 million Indian troops of the British Indian Army which were deployed in different battle theatres all over the world. They looked for a counterweight to the Congress menace.

Jinnah met Linlithgow and told him that only the Muslim League can help them ward off the Congress threat. He offered a hand of friendship and helped recruit Muslim soldiers to the army from all over India. In return he wanted the British to promise to let the Muslims exercise the right of self-determination after the war.

On March 18, 1940, the Congress Party in its annual session at Ramgarh reiterated once again that the British should transfer power to Indians and leave it to them to defend India against foreign aggression.

Linlithgow sent a message to Jinnah to demand something concrete to checkmate the Congress demand for transfer of power. On 22 March 1940 Jinnah advanced the Two-Nation Theory which portrayed Hindus and Muslims were two separate hostile nations. He warned that if they were forced to live together in one state the result would be chaos, anarchy and civil war. The only solution to their antagonism was to give them separate states.

On 23 March the Lahore resolution was moved by Qazi Fazlul Haq of Bengal demanding the creation of independent, sovereign Muslim states in the north-western and north-eastern zones of India where Muslims consisted of a majority of the population. Supporting speeches followed on 23-24 March by delegates from the Muslim-minority and Muslim-majority provinces. A hostage theory was leveraged which stated that if Muslims left behind in India were harmed by Hindus, then Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan will be made to pay a price.

Distinguished Professor Sharif Al-Mujahid asserts that it was a paradigm-shifting event because henceforth the Muslims of India did not see themselves as a minority but as a nation entitled to exercise the right of self-determination leading to the establishment of Pakistan.

Important to note that within a week of the passing of the Lahore resolution the Sikh leader Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia of the Sikh National Party declared that if the Muslims insist on dividing India based on religion, they will resist living in such a communal Pakistan. The Congress leaders and press condemned the Lahore resolution affirming their resolve to keep India united.

Congress committed another major blunder by launching the Quit India Movement in August 1942 to drive the British out of India. Viceroy Linlithgow ordered massive repression. All Congress leaders were arrested and sent to jail where they remained until June 1945.

In the years that followed Jinnah unleashed a relentless campaign damning the Indian National Congress and its leaders as Hindu imperialists. I have quoted extensively his speeches where he underscores that he wants nothing short of Pakistan to be created through a partition of India.

In 1944, Gandhi was released by Viceroy Wavell, who had succeeded Linlithgow to discuss with Jinnah if a peaceful resolution of their differences were possible. Gandhi met Jinnah several times at his home in Bombay. He proposed that after the British leave, a plebiscite could be held in the north-western and north-eastern regions of India to ascertain if the people living there (Muslims and non-Muslims) wanted to live in Pakistan. Jinnah took the view that only the Muslims could take part in the plebiscite. Thus, the talks ended in a deadlock.

(to be continued)

The writer is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; Visiting Professor Government College University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He can be reached at billumian@gmail.com