Daily Times

Turtle on a post is an interesting proverbial and actual story that depicts comprehensive helplessness despite power and capability to control the flow of events. Imagine a full-size turtle placed on the top of a five feet fencepost, his belly resting over the top and legs flailing helplessly in the air but not moving an inch. The sight is funny but also educative. It means power and capability need sense and an appropriate point of application to achieve results. This time, the turtle is the giant Leatherback American Sea Turtle and the fencepost is incurable, incorrigible Afghanistan. Two decades of application of US military, economic and diplomatic power to eliminate Taliban and iron out the country to suitably redress her for the “civilised” world according to their lights came to nought in a matter of two weeks. That crashed the US hopes of scuttling the BRI at its very point of take-off; from the Afghan base of operations.

The entire façade of a so-called structured representative government, led by an unlikely president, Professor Ashraf Ghani, crashed upon itself with a bang just as the US’s crutches were removed from underneath. Ghani never had the material to rule Afghanistan (from all relevant angles: historic, ethnic, moral and substantial). Normally, such angles are not discussed in such an analysis, but then again, what happened in Afghanistan is very unusual. Professor Ghani hailed from a Kochi Powinda stock of Ghilzais–the shepherding pastoral nomads–that is normally quite low in the hierarchy of Afghan tribal pecking order. They are usually the kitchen-service providers, but not considered capable for administration or eligible for governance. Occasionally, they were enlisted as peripheral foot soldiers by local warlords. Nowhere in history has a Powindah ever ruled any patch let alone the whole of Afghanistan. To place a shepherd as the head of that country could be the ultimate affront that did not occur to the Pentagon’s Afghanistan avatars like Bruce Reidel and Joshua T White. True to the tradition of Kochis, who are not attached to their land but the greener pastures, he fled the moment the heat of war reached Bala Hissar. Before that, his troops deserted him enmass as they must have harboured dislike of his awkward rule since long. The professor may have been an expert in the Western discourse, but his oblique and slanderous selection of words and his strange theatrical body language did not sit well with the Afghans. They look for a dominating posture, an air of definite authority, measured speech and regal poise of an Amir in their ruler. They do not wish him to act like a circus clown. So he did what he had to: escape before putting up a fight. The irony is that his troops knew he will and, ergo, did not fight for him. In short, Ghani was not the administrator material but a useful seminar speaker. So much for the failed US scout in Afghanistan.

The entire façade of a so-called structured representative government crashed with a bang just as the US’ crutches were removed from underneath.

Now let’s examine the evolving post-US withdrawal environment or to be exact, what transpired after August 15 and the likely reactions abroad. It was never expected that the US and its allies would easily digest their unprecedented military reverse at the hands of much-despised irregular Taliban militia. Yet, they negotiated a mutual standoff after prolonged parleys. Both sides were careful not to dent or rattle the delicate accord reached at Doha for the troop withdrawal by September, which the US expedited to the end of August. Taliban kept the Kabul airport open for the evacuation of foreigners and were vigilant against spoilers. Just who could be these spoilers and with what agenda is a complicated question to answer. A safe withdrawal means a smooth takeover by the Taliban much to the disadvantage of ex-Ghani administration beneficiaries. These include the drug mafia, Shumali Etihad, collaborators and their sponsors, notably India and the US. This is where the thing comes around full circle. On a different plane, it hurts terror organisations like ISKP, TTP, JuA, ETIM and their chief coordinator, India, if the Taliban stabilise Afghanistan and actualise their resolve to not let anyone use Afghan soil against any other country. This would mean no space for the non-state actors and India’s Chanakya doctrine against Pakistan.

A trickier question is how would the US and its allies view and deal with a Taliban-ruled stable Afghanistan-an entity that they vehemently demonised for decades and to whom they ceded the country grudgingly and quite unceremoniously? This is where the haze of the future intervenes with a vast potential for mischief and uncertainty. All these factors put together the opening signs of the things to come. The first is the ominous assembly of anti-Taliban elements in Panjshir Valley. The other is the ISKP-claimed twin bomb attack at Kabul airport gate on August 26 that killed four US Marines and at least 170 Afghans and wounded including Taliban security men. This was expected and it took place all the same. Many more devastating attacks should be expected. The design behind the bombing can be understood to create an environment of hostility between the Taliban and the US over their failure to prevent such terror attacks on a secure facility as well as to provide an excuse for the US to retaliate. They may not do so by ground troops this time but by the use of armed drones and aerial bombardment. The upshot has been that President Biden has announced that the perpetrators of the attack will be punished and has authorised Pentagon for retaliatory action. This, in other words, means air attacks on suspected ISKP hideouts anywhere in Afghanistan for every terror attack, which could be many. That will not only take care of the Taliban’s much-vaunted sovereignty but also badly dent their authority due to the inability to prevent ensuing collateral damage. Doesn’t it appear too much of a coincidence that the ISKP bomb attack was carefully executed towards the tail end of the evacuation, to open the way to US military repivot on Afghanistan albeit through airstrikes this time? Few US soldiers would be a small price to be able to rub the Taliban’s nose in the dirt. Much like a Machiavellian tactic or shall we say Doval expertise!

Taliban will have to put their act together quickly. They need to shut down all avenues for India to insert or conspire, particularly in Panjshir, Nangarhar, Kunar and Paktika in addition to ging after ISKP and their affiliates TTP and BLA. Taliban know their bases and hideouts lying very close to their eastern border better than anyone else. These must be destroyed in close coordination with Pakistan, just the way we did in former FATA. Taliban must strongly protest the US decision for unilateral military action in Afghanistan as that would amount to a different variety of foreign overlordship and could prevent their emergence from the widely established but very unfavourable old dye. They must also reach out to the regional countries for cooperation to this end. One is alone and two are many. That would help the Leatherback American turtle off the Afghan fence post gently and safely before it attracts the mocking birds. The earlier, the better.

The writer can be reached at clay.potter@hotmail.com