Daily Times

Colonialism started in antiquity with ancient Greek, Roman and Egyptian empires. These empires extended their borders and drew the resources of the people they conquered. Modern colonialism started from the age of Discovery (15th century) during which Portugal and Spain sent their explorers to discover great colonies, including the US, and explore several trade routes to enrich their countries.

The tendency to grab more and more land on top of the acquisition of more and more power is the fundamental instinct of man. This practice was euphemistically called conquests, considered the crown and glory of an Empire. But as fortune would have it, the conquered lands remained incongruous to the languages and cultures of their Victors. Similarly, the conquerors never found themselves fully synchronised with the indigenous language and culture. But it took centuries of occupation of the colonies to fully integrate themselves with the language and culture of a new environment. For such strong reasons, the present debacle in Afghanistan faced by the American was noted by the New York Times in these words:

“Recent history suggests that it is foolish for Western powers to fight wars in other people’s lands and that the U.S. intervention was almost certainly doomed from the start. This was for the second time America repeated its mistake.”

In the case of the Vietnam War, President Charles De Gaulle gave the same advice to President Kennedy when he said, “I predict that you will sink step by step into a bottomless military and political quagmire, however much you spend in men and money.”

Americans had put all their bets on the ability of the central authority of Kabul to control the entire country.

This was also the lesson that France had learnt after extricating itself from a brutal eight-year colonial war in Algeria.

America jumped in South Vietnam to restrict the advancement of communism into Indochina. The culture and environment of Vietnam were completely alien to Americans. The Americans were trained to fight a straight country war, whereas in Vietnam they had to fight a guerilla war in hills, swamps and jungles (infested with deadly and poisonous animals). For the first time, they had to face land mines and booby-traps. This, fighting a fruitless war for about 18 years and suffering 58000 casualties, America did not gain anything in material terms except earning political infamy at the global level. Ultimately, they left Saigon in 1975 with a demoralised image. Ironically, war-hardened Vietnam became the Socialist Republic within a year after America’s departure. In due course of time, it became one of the most prosperous industrial nations by 2020.

There were enough lessons for America to learn in fighting a prolonged war in an alien culture whose indigenous population remained hostile to Americans. Ironically, the 300,000 strong Afghan Security Force that America had raised in Afghanistan to protect the government of Ashraf Ghani against attacks by the Taliban were the first to willingly surrender and hand over power to the Taliban without firing a single shot. This unnerved the US President as well as the American nation.

The question is that if the people left to themselves can change their loyalties so soon, is there any mechanism to keep them loyal to the system, which was supposed to work for their betterment without any outside fear or favour? The answer appears to be in the negative. The loyalty could not be given to the system, which has not yet taken roots in the new polity. But loyalty could be given to people who run that system, for their honesty, their integrity and the niche they occupy in the hearts and minds of people whom they govern. That is what truly matters. Before the Taliban took over, did anyone think that Ashraf Ghani and his team of ministers could evoke even a fraction of that respect? Or conversely, did the Americans take any steps for Afghanistan’s nation-building; leaving some positive contributions to give Afghanis a better future? If answers to these questions are in the negative, there is no surprise that after the departure of the US forces the government raised by them in Afghanistan would fall like a house of cards. In the case of Vietnam, it is also no surprise that within less than a year of the Americans leaving Vietnam, the latter embraced the socialist ideology and made progress by leaps and bounds. The war euphoria in the aftermath of 9/11 was the only logical reason for the US forces to invade and dislodge the Taliban government in Afghanistan. And the effectiveness of all subsequent operations by the Americans need no discussion if, at the end of 20 years of ferocious war, the result is that Afghanistan is still ruled by the Taliban. Killing the enemy isn’t enough if the enemy can reconstitute their manpower, as had been done both by the Vietnamese Communists and Taliban after Americans left their land. The fragile structures of governance they constructed tended to disintegrate under the weight of inherited political and social circumstances.

In Vietnam, if the US nation-builders could develop effective and legitimate institutions of governance to keep it firm and united, Vietnam would have sustained itself and remained united even after the departure of Americans. In the case of Afghanistan, which is highly decentralised, Americans had put all their bets on the ability of the central authority of Kabul to control the entire country, despite their knowledge that except for a few big cities, more than 90 per cent of its population lived in rural areas with their tribal affinities and differences, and had no sympathies for Americans. It is more likely that Americans knew the fragility of the Centre, but could not risk sending their security forces in the rural interior over fears of being attacked. Given its typical topography, a strong centre with the universal backing of all its provinces remained the only way to keep the country stable and united. Unfortunately, this was not the case in Afghanistan even after 20 years of American intervention.

In the aftermath of 9/11, as well as the euphoria generated to take revenge against Al-Qaida and to eliminate terrorism, the US was forced to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and dislodge the Taliban regime. It is high time that the US acknowledge its failure of nation-building, both in Afghanistan and Vietnam, due to which its entire venture of 38 years in both countries had gone wasted. Today, just as 20 years before, the Taliban is saddled in power in Afghanistan while Vietnam has no links with America, except their trade relations on a parity basis.

The Afghan war, as well as the Vietnam war, shattered the myth that the US was invincible. As the formal deadline of the withdrawal of American forces draws closer, entire Afghanistan is faced with the danger of being entangled in a regional conflict for an indefinite period. Thus, the American ventures as a leader on the world map have so far failed to enforce lasting peace.

The writer is a former member of the Provincial Civil Service, and an author of Moments in Silence