Daily Times

Joe Biden has long been a critic of the war in Afghanistan and his decision to withdraw should not be a surprise. The Afghan war was initiated two decades ago not to rebuild a distant nation, but to prevent terror attacks like the one on September 11, 2001. The longest war in the US’s history should have ended a decade ago when Bin Laden was killed. President Biden whispered, “We did not go to Afghanistan to nation-build.” It’s the right and the responsibility of the Afghan people alone to decide their future and how they want to run their country. He feels satisfied with the stratagem for looking after future political interests in the Persian Gulf as well as in Afghanistan while strongly dismissing suggestions that the withdrawal from Afghanistan carried echoes of the US’s humiliating exit from Vietnam in 1975.

The consequence of the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan is that the Taliban will win political influence through negotiations with a government that has lost its main leverage. It would ramp up violence to gain more control militarily. As a result, armed strongmen around the country, who are already mobilising, may decide to fend for themselves and the country may fracture once again: a repeat of decades-old bloody history. With the high potential for military conflict to re-intensify in the months to come, a resumption of peace talks between the two sides could grow increasingly unlikely.

Afghanistan has already seen the beginnings of an exodus of its political elite and civil society activists, journalists and intellectuals over the last year due to a targeted killing campaign that swept the country. Largely unclaimed, the spree widely attributed to the Taliban. This campaign, along with the potential for the country to slide back under Taliban rule, has struck fear in the hearts of many neutrals.

Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process may become irrelevant if the anticipated volatility in Afghanistan becomes a bigger security headache for Pakistan

The controversial choices of the Afghanistan peace process have created an image problem for Pakistan in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The US has often accused Pakistan of supporting militant groups in Afghanistan, including the Afghan Taliban, which have, to some extent, undermined Washington’s war efforts. Arguably, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan offers Pakistan an opportunity to reorient its international image by playing a key role in encouraging regional cooperation to ensure stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan will have to build trust with all Afghan ethnicities and political forces, rather than just being seen as a “Taliban supporter” or as “Taliban sponsor.”

Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace process may become irrelevant if the anticipated volatility in Afghanistan becomes a bigger security headache for Pakistan. Increased instability in Afghanistan will produce spillover effects, increase the refugees flow, bring forward a more robust drug trade, and heighten the risk of cross-border terrorism. Another major concern for Pakistan would be that Taliban advances, especially a takeover in Afghanistan, could galvanise “terrorists” within Pakistan. Any civil war in Afghanistan will be terrible for Pakistan in terms of instability in Pakistan’s tribal belt and an opportunity for various militant groups to use war-torn areas for their activities and hiding. If this happens and the peace process fails, Pakistan will be forced to return to its decades-old policy of supporting the Taliban.

One of Pakistan’s key goals in Afghanistan has been to keep India at bay. Amidst this highly volatile and uncertain situation, the possibility of a “proxy war” between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan is a considered probability. Pakistan and other regional actors would fall back on the empowerment of respective proxies to give them an upper hand against rival groups supported by the likes of India. The logical forecast would be, mostly repetition of the 1990’s cycle of violence. Afghan National Army (ANA) would crumble in the next few months even if the US keeps funding it for the next four years as promised. However, the funding may stop seeing large defection from ANA as it will be considered futile.

Iran would not be as opposed to the Taliban as was in the past. They now probably understand that the Taliban have no agenda beyond Afghanistan. Kabul would eventually come under Taliban control, maybe in a year or two. One cannot be very sure whether the TTP would be back to life. If that is effective, there will be a surge in terrorist incidents within Pakistan. A massive influx of refugees as in the 1980s is not expected because the younger generations of Afghan Pashtuns would not like to come to Pakistan. But still, the number of refugees would increase enhancing numerous psycho-social and economic problems.

In the developing scenario, once the Taliban are in control of Kabul, it will definitely create new challenges for Pakistan. The anti-establishment stance within Pakistan would increase due to meddling in politics and cracking down on the dissents, especially the leftist and Pashtuns. The US may impose sanctions as usual; accusing Pakistan of supporting Taliban and Haqqani networks etc. In nutshell, more political and economic instability within Pakistan and in Afghanistan may be anticipated just round the corner. In the developing scenario, Pakistan has to continue maintaining strategic relevance with the US in foreseeable future.

The writer is a retired Pakistan army officer