Daily Times

For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been at the centre of a skewed Pakistan-US relationship, notwithstanding their cross-purpose objectives and strategic interests. The American goals in Afghanistan were transactional, largely driven by specific motivations: to bloody the nose of the erstwhile Soviet Union as well as to eliminate the well-entrenched Al-Qaeda along with its leaders. Au contraire, Pakistan is linked with Afghanistan by a long border straddled on both sides by common and inter-related Pashtun tribes, shared history, spiritual bonds, economic interdependence, and strategic compulsions.

The relationship was, therefore, characterised more by divergence than convergence; causing friction and distrust through the years. Those who had pushed Pakistan in this lopsided alliance with the US were its generals, who had acquired power through coup d’états and were desperately looking for legitimacy for their extra-constitutional adventures. The elected civilian leaders in between just did not have the grit to recalibrate the alliance or come out of the American embrace. They had to put up with this fait accompli and the ever-growing mantras of “do more” and the condescending attitude of US leaders with a pinch of salt.

We continued fighting the American war pursuing and capturing Al-Qaeda leaders and bearing the brunt of its devastating political, economic and security fallouts during all these years. We lost democracy, civilian authority and foreign and security policy space to the Generals. The country’s border regions got infested with militant outfits, Kalashnikovs and drug culture that, over the years, spread into every nook of the country. We lost tens of thousands of precious lives in terrorism and drug addiction; incurring economic losses in billions. The US leaders just ignored our sacrifices and their strategic blunders in Afghanistan. For years, they have been blaming Pakistan for their failures. Last time, they beat a quick retreat from the conflict scene after the withdrawal of the Soviet Army; leaving us to face the consequences of civil war.

All stakeholders know that Pakistan would be most affected by the consequences of the Afghan civil war

This time too, they are repeating the same strategic blunder. First, they did not heed our advice for years for a negotiated settlement of the imbroglio. Finally, when they came to realise the need for negotiations, they failed to exert pressure on the warring parties to enforce a ceasefire and devise a power-sharing formula. Being the occupying state, the US was duty-bound to give a peace plan that ensured the withdrawal of troops, ceasefire, power-sharing and general elections to save this violence-wracked country from further bloodshed. The consequences of this hasty withdrawal have already begun unfolding.

No country in the region, including Pakistan, wants the Taliban to take over Kabul by force. At the same time, no regional country also wants to militarily intervene to stop the civil war. The empty threats of the US Generals in their dying military campaign will not slow the Taliban advances. The ruling clique and their allies have started arming tribes to fight the Taliban and the Afghan National Army. Thus, the Afghan blood will continue to spill for months, if not years. Ironically, the Afghan ruling elite holds Pakistan responsible for the escalating civil war. The Americans continue to fuel this anti-Pakistan tirade; blaming Pakistan for their ineffective military campaign against the Taliban.

They did not commit enough ground forces and in the beginning, relied on air strifes. Sub-contracting the war to warlords; trusting the corrupt Karzai and Ghani administrations and heavily depending on the ill advices of India to reduce Pakistan to the periphery: the US did it all. No doubt, Pakistan also made many policy mistakes during the past two decades while dealing with the war spillover. Pakistan’s mistakes owed a great deal to the long pores border with Afghanistan and the ideological radicalisation of its society. Nevertheless, Pakistan still committed its military and resources despite tension on its eastern border.

All stakeholders, including the US, know that Pakistan would be most affected by the consequences of the Afghan civil war. Faced with a growing antagonism from the Kabul regime and its allies despite playing an instrumental role in nudging the Taliban to the negotiating table, Pakistan is once again being called upon to become a party to the escalating civil war in Afghanistan. It has been asked to host American airbases to bomb Taliban positions so that the Ghani regime can gain a few months. This would, by implication, prolong the civil war; making it bloodier.

Would this be a pragmatic course for Pakistan to adopt? Or, should it remain neutral in the civil war, like other regional countries, and mobilise its resources in close cooperation with friendly countries to deal with the spillover? The implications of angering the US, though staggering, would be transitional. Yet, any complicity in the bombing of the Taliban–the only force in Afghanistan with some soft corner for Pakistan–would have lasting adverse consequences for us. India is already on the path to woo the Taliban. Here lies Pakistan’s dilemma. The Americans are accustomed to pressurise Pakistan to take sides–may it be the question of airbases against the Taliban or our relationship with China.

Pakistan has no alternative option. It simply has to remain neutral in the Afghan civil war with a constructive approach towards its peace and stability. We have to forge good neighbourly relations with the future government in Kabul. In the meantime, we should proactively engage with the regional states and the US to hammer home our political, economic and security compulsions in the region.

The writer was a member of the Foreign Service of Pakistan and has authored two books