Daily Times

After 35 years of civil war and 15 years of the US led-intervention, prospects for peace in Afghanistan are bleak. The much- touted Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process is a mirage. It is apparent that the vicious cycle of violence will continue unabated for the foreseeable future. The recent death of the Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan seems inconsequential. The Taliban are not wilting under the pressure enough to bring them to the negotiating table. Overall, the balance of power remains unchanged and the military status quo persists.

The principal reason that peace in not on the cards in Afghanistan are the divergent goals and objectives of the warring parties and the external players involved in the conflict. For instance, Pakistan’s incomprehensible Afghan policy is a serious impediment to bringing peace to Afghanistan. In a nutshell, Pakistani is fine with the joys of Taliban rule in Afghanistan but does not want the same for itself. It is opposed to the enforcement of harsh Taliban religious laws in Pakistan but quite satisfied if they are imposed in Afghanistan. It battles the Pakistan Taliban, but provides safe haven and logistical support to its ideological cousin, the Afghan Taliban. It whines over lost sovereignty when the US frustrated with the lack of success in the peace talks takes out a Taliban leader on its territory.

Clearly, confidence-building measures and incentives will not bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. They are unlikely to renounce their objective of regaining political power and territorial control. The Taliban underpinned by a hard-line ideology are on a quest to re-establish the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. Sharing political power in a democratic system would be an anathema and would dilute support for the movement. Therefore, it is imperative that other parties particularly Pakistan do more to end Taliban intransigence.

At this moment, there is a glaring lack of trust between the purported allies Pakistan and the US, who are the main external players in the Afghan conflict. Neither the US’s fight-talk nor Pakistan’s talk-talk strategies seem to be working in Afghanistan. The US strategy seeks to weaken the Taliban sufficiently to allow the Afghan people to safely reject it; develop Afghan security forces so that Afghans can defend themselves as US troops leave; and, through an enhanced civilian effort, help the Afghan government sustain the support of its people by providing basic services. However, the Taliban have been resilient, reminding one of the Viet Cong in Indo-China, as they keep coming back despite heavy losses and technological disadvantages. The Taliban strategy of wearing down the enemy and re-capturing lost territory, even holding it for short periods, seems to be working.

On the other hand, the National Unity Government led by Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah appears weak. The government is dogged by allegations of corruption and incompetence. It is sincere and anxious to make peace but it cannot seem to get rid of the tag of being a US ‘puppet’. It can try to do all it can to create an environment conducive to reconciliation. But as long as the Taliban sense that government will collapse once the US leaves they will play the wait-and-see game. For obvious security reasons, government cannot agree to the Taliban’s main precondition for peace talks, which is the complete withdrawal of US-led foreign forces from Afghanistan. Many Afghans would oppose a return to harsh Taliban rule despite the shortcomings of the Ghani government. Some progress has been made on women’s rights, freedom of expression, education and democratic values that the Taliban do not share. Under the Taliban rule, girls were prohibited from attending school; women were entirely shunned from public life; boys were forbidden to play sports; music was banned.

To paraphrase the author John Steinbeck, “All conflict is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking animal.” In Afghanistan, all parties must think their way out of the quagmire. Some obvious approaches come to mind: 1) All countries agree to act against the common threat emanating from the network of like-minded terrorist groups in the region 2) Pakistan is persuaded to dropping the Taliban as a useful hedge in a post-US Afghanistan 3) the US accepts an Afghan government that incorporates the Taliban 4) Afghanistan ensures that its territory is not used against its neighbours 5) Political reforms in Afghanistan grant a greater voice to a broader range of Afghan interests, such as local and provincial leaders, political parties, and parliament. The Afghan government needs a wider base of political support than it currently enjoys and its institutions are able to deliver 6) Taliban are convinced that their dream of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan is unrealistic and will remain unfulfilled. It should be made clear to the Taliban that if they persist in their campaign, they would face the full military might of Pakistan and the US on both sides of the porous border.

The writer can be reached at shgcci@gmail.com