Daily Times

Since the drawdown of its forces from Afghanistan in December 2015, US policy on the war ravaged country appears unclear. In his final months in office, Obama had left it to Trump and his administration to find a method in the madness and redraw an Afghan policy. US state and defence secretaries have said that the new Afghan strategy that the Trump administration is working on would ensure that terrorists do not use Afghanistan as a safe haven again. To shed some light amidst the prevailing uncertainty, Mr. Ashley Tellis, an American scholar of Indian descent at Carnegie Endowment along with Jeff Eggers who was the senior Director for Pakistan in the Obama administration at White House have co-authored a paper titled: “US Policy in Afghanistan, Changing Strategies, Preserving Gains” to analyse the prevailing scenario and make recommendations.

The United States should prioritise reaching a political settlement with the Taliban while continuing to bolster the Afghan state and its security forces

The paper is worth examining since recalling the bleak security and governance situation in Afghanistan, the authors argue for a political settlement as the best way forward which envisages reconciliations with Taliban. Contrary to the existing more dominant role of Generals in the policy making regarding Afghanistan, the authors recommend for empowering the US Ambassador in Kabul to nudge the Afghan Government of National Unity (GNU) to initiate a serious national dialogue for reconciliation. The recommendations also call for inducing Pakistan to constrain Taliban sanctuaries and evolving support for a political settlement. The release of this paper before the June meeting of Kabul

Process is an interesting co-incidence. Assessing the prevailing milieu, the authors conclude that these curity environment in Afghanistan is still precarious, heightened bythe uptick in violence in 2016 and the diminishing government control in rural areas. They find factions of the GNU to continue being divided while a corrupt patronage system continues to impede reform. Tellis and Eggers observe that the economic growth has shrunk since the drawdown of international forces, while the Kabul government remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. They deduce that

Afghan-Pakistani relations have frayed due to widening differences on security at a time when regional competition in and over Afghanistan persists. Under the existing circumstances, the United States ‘willingness to indefinitely subsidize Afghanistan with some $23billion per year is uncertain, especially when it is being claimed that al-Qaeda’s core has been reduced to incoherence. They rightly infer that the combination of a weakening Afghan regime and an unrestrained Taliban resurgence could lead to the catastrophic collapse of the Afghan government and state, resulting in either are turn to anarchy or the recrudescence of terrorist groups.

The informed scholars recommend that the US needs to develop a strategy that protects the gains in Afghanistan while terminating the conflict. In the context of seeking a “Regional Solution to End the Proxy War”, the authors find the existing Pakistan-India conflict especially on Kashmir relevant to the situation and necessitating resolution but the worthy analysts, with a touch of realism, find that regional options resolving the India-Pakistan conflict, creating a neutral Afghanistan or squeezing Pakistan, are too difficult to relyon alone. Unilateral options either pursuing major escalation or a complete disengagement is equally implausible because of their high costs and risks, respectively.

This leaves only limited approaches like moderately expanding thecurrent commitment, seeking a political settlement, or fostering along-term counter terrorism partnership. Since a “counter terrorismonly” solution is unlikely to be efficacious, they recommend that the

United State should prioritize reaching a political settlement with the Taliban while continuing to bolster the Afghan state and its security forces. While still preaching the oft repeated cliché of an”Afghan-led-Afghan-Afghan-owned” solution, the armchair strategists contradict themselves when they recommend that to be successful, Washington will need to empower the US ambassador in Kabul to virtually become a “Czar” to oversee the administration’s entire strategy in Afghanistan.

In quest of seeking peace with the Taliban, Tellis and Eggers recommend “Pressuring of Pakistan to Squeeze the Taliban”.  They advocate persuading the Afghan government to begin a serious national dialogue on political reconciliation; engage in direct talks with the Taliban; target the Taliban shura, if necessary, while inducing Rawalpindi to constrain the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan; and secure regional support for a political settlement in Afghanistan.

The above counsel is marked on the archaic view that “the war in Afghanistan is perpetuated by the Pakistan Army’s policies-inparticular, its search for “strategic depth”-which results in Rawalpindi’s support for a Taliban sanctuary within Pakistan’s borders.” At one time it may have been true but the situation is now more complex and intertwined with the fruition of Pakistan’s development plans which are reliant on peace in Afghanistan.

The knowledgeable proponents of peace recommend unilateral approaches by the US like “major military escalation” vs. “complete disengagement” but both are fraught with peril. Perhaps the most cogent counsel is evolving an “Enduring Counterterrorism Partnership” with all stakeholders including Pakistan.

The writer is a retired Group Captain of PAF. He is a columnist, analyst and TV Talk show host, who has authored six books on current affairs, including three on China