Daily Times

May 8 commemorates Victory in Europe Day. That is, the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 to the Allies which brought World War II to a formal end. On its ashes came the Cold War and NATO, which started off as a collective defence mechanism for western Europe.

It is now seventy-six years later and NATO is once more seen as rendered moribund by the Trump administration’s commitment to withdrawing American forces from Germany, Afghanistan and Iraq. This is reflected by the reluctance of a majority of members to allocate a minimum of 2 percent of GDP to defence spending; a commitment made seven years ago at the Wales summit. There has also been the failure or indifference of many of the Alliance’s European members to mount a credible defence against an increasingly aggressive Russia. Critics also note the deplorable status of much of Europe’s military forces in terms of readiness, training and numbers. Many German tanks, for example, are unserviceable while pilot training does not provide ample flying hours. And, as of 2020, the British military holds a total capacity of just 144,00 personnel as compared to the 180,000-strong US Marine Corps.

On the other hand, Russia not only boasts a standing military of 900,000 – it is also modernising conventional forces as was seen in the intervention in Syria and during the 2014 war with the Ukraine which involved non-strategic nuclear weapons. The recent Russian troop build-up along the Ukrainian border, including aggressive military exercises, was aimed not just at Kyiv but also at NATO air and sea power, thereby underscoring the extent of hostile intent. Elsewhere, the US fixation on China as the “pacing threat for the next decade” and the UK’s apparent tilt to the Indo-Pacific region reaffirm these concerns about NATO’s ability to deter and defend against Russian encroachment.

Several competing conclusions emerge. First, NATO spends more than enough on defence to contain the Russian threat. Second, the Alliance discounts Russian weaknesses. Third, the military club is failing by not countering Moscow’s ‘active measures’

But wait a minute. Is Russia really ten feet tall? Or is NATO underplaying its strengths and ignoring Russian weaknesses? Moscow is home to an energy-dependent economy and geography is not its friend in the sense that the Kremlin feels encircled by the powerful, thirty-member Alliance. Although, in reality, it shares borders only with four of these nations: Norway in the north; Estonia and Latvia in the Baltics; and the fourth is the United States in the Barents Sea. America’s Little Diomede is only a mortar round distance from a nearby Russian island. Poland and Lithuania cut Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave, off from the rest of the country. Moscow is therefore confined to the Black Sea by restricted passage through the Bosporus Strait – guarded on both sides by NATO member Turkey and in the Baltic by seven NATO members. Moscow is therefore severely outgunned by the Alliance. And while China may represent a tactical ally, it has never been a long-term partner.

Using open sources, in virtually every category, the numerical military balance swings vastly in NATO’s favour. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the military club spent over USD 1 trillion on defence last year, with the US contributing around three-quarters of this amount. Russia, whose defence spending is on the decline, spent about $65 billion (in 2019), thereby giving NATO a 16 to 1 advantage. NATO has about 3.3 million active-duty troops and another 2.1 million in reserve; Russia about 900,000 and 2 million reserves.

NATO outnumbers Russa in terms of weapons, as well. The Alliance has access to about five times as many tanks; four times as many combat aircraft; three times as many attack helicopters; and 300 large surface combatants and 140 submarines as Russia; which boasts a measly 35 warships and 50 submarines. Regarding the strategic nuclear balance, New Start limits the US and Russia to a total of 1550 warheads each (with 700 deployed and 800 deployed or non-deployed launchers), and does not include the British and French nuclear deterrent of about 400 warheads in total.

Quantitative military inferiority and Russian paranoia about encirclement have led Moscow to rely on nuclear weapons to overcome conventional force imbalances and “active measures”. The latter fall short of direct military force but are employed to divide and disrupt and include: cyber warfare, social media disinformation campaigns, intimidation, and leveraging its supply of natural gas to Europe as an economic weapon.

Several competing conclusions emerge. First, NATO spends more than enough on defence to contain the Russian threat, provided that prudence prevails and this is undertaken to strengthen Alliance capabilities and not just those of individual members. Second, NATO discounts Russian weaknesses. Third, NATO is failing by not countering Russian “active measures”.

With that understanding, NATO can readily enhance its posture vis-à-vis Russia. But it needs a strategy and plan for the 21st century age of information warfare as opposed to one rooted in the industrial age of last century. And it needs forward thinking leadership to make this happen.

Dr Harlan Ullman is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist and Senior Advisor at Washington, DC’s Atlantic Council. His latest book is ‘The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Threat to a Divided Nation and the World at Large’