Daily Times

Criticism about the NFC allocation system has long been a point of friction for Pakistan’s provinces. In fact, prior to East Pakistan’s separation, Punjab had opposed the instatement of a population-based metric, owing in part to the fact that East Pakistan was more populous. However, after the separation, Punjab became the most populous province, and subsequently, was adamant that population should constitute the sole criterion for resource distribution.

The NFC granted no financial awards in 1980 or 1985 during the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq. Elimination of the NFC award during this time reflected the army’s dominance over Pakistan’s statecraft, which led to grievances between the Punjabi dominated centre and Pakistan’s other federating units. General Zi’s dictatorial rule rendered provinces entirely subservient to the centre, thereby diminishing their political autonomy.

The NFC distributed its second consensus award in 1991, which allocated 58 percent of total funding available to Punjab on the basis of the aforementioned population criterion. In contrast, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then named the North-West Frontier Province) received 14 percent, Sindh 23 percent, and Balochistan five percent. The NFC released its third award in 1997 during the interim government of Meraj Khalid. The political elite in smaller provinces protested this award because they considered financial allocations to be beyond the jurisdiction of an interim government. The narrative among the aggrieved provinces was that the interim government released the award to court Punjabi political support, given that the interim government announced the award just three days before national elections. Notably, the prime minister, president, and finance minister of the interim government were all Punjabi, a fact not overlooked in the smaller provinces. This became a major source of friction between the three provinces and the centre, which was once again perceived to be protecting Punjabi interests. Moreover, the subsequently elected federal government of Nawaz Sharif, whose political stronghold is Punjab, did not review the
award’s allocation.

The 2010 NFC award used a slightly revised formula that acknowledged alternate criteria for federal funding, including poverty and hydroelectricity. However, allocation discrepancies between provinces persist — even if these discrepancies owe to legal and fair practices in effectuating the NFC’s allocation policies — with Punjab remaining the recipient of the largest amount of funding. Thus, even if allocation of the NFC award is “fair” for successfully achieving allocation policies, Punjab receipt of a majority of funds has stirred resentment against Punjab and weakened citizens’ sense of allegiance to the national government.

Pakistan largely constitutes a “one institution state” due to military’s overwhelming influence on the country’s political system and processes. Since independence, the Pakistani military’s ability to override the state’s decision-making apparatus has demonstrated its vast power. Military is predominantly Punjabi. Thus, military operations in the other provinces influence the contours of Pakistan’s ethnic politics.

Protracted military rule in Pakistan has produced a fragile democracy. Military’s upper hand in the decision-making processes has hindered development of democratic institutions. Periods of military rule intensified the differences and grievances between the provinces, while the military’s ad hoc policies resulted in the dismemberment of East Pakistan.

The pseudo-democratic process employed by military rulers has long created political dilemmas. In 1965, Ayub Khan contested Fatima Jinnah during the country’s first presidential elections and secured his political victory through force and co-option. Though Karachi was considered Jinnah’s political stronghold, Khan reengineered the social demography of Karachi to his favour by facilitating the migration of ethnically Hindku-Pakhtuns from his home city of Haripur. Much of Karachi’s ethnic violence today originates from demographic transformations that took place during this period.

Economic policies set by Khan’s administration created discriminatory economic opportunities between the East and West, further marginalising East Pakistan and fomenting a Bengali ethnic national identity. For example, the tariff regime under Khan offered West Pakistanis unabated market access to East Pakistan, while East Pakistan lacked similar access in return. Moreover, cultural similarities between East and West Pakistan were minimal, and proved insufficient to unite the country amidst economic marginalisation.

General Yahya Khan imposed the country’s second period of martial law in 1969 after seizing political power from Khan. Yahya’s period of leadership became Pakistan’s most politically tumultuous era; the 1970 elections triggered a civil war and the eventual division of the country. Yahya’s reluctance to transfer political power to Bengalis, despite the Awami League’s electoral majority, fomented a Bengali secessionist movement. To understand the legacy of the Punjabi dominated federal centre’s exploitation of Pakistan’s federating units, it is crucial to consider Yahya’s role. While Khan intensified Bengali grievances, Yahya employed force to crush Bengali demands for equal political representation.

General Zia imposed Pakistan’s third period of martial law in 1977 by removing a popularly elected Sindhi prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto had provided a rare example of Sindhi leadership at the national level, and his subsequent execution both incensed Sindhis and exacerbated the public’s perception of a Punjabi-dominated military that prioritised Punjabi interests. In short, Sindhis interpreted Bhutto’s hanging as a Punjabi attack on Sindh.

Over time, Sindhi resentment of other political and economic developments at the national level evolved into a resonant political narrative of Sindhi victimhood leading to development of what was later referred to as the “Sindh Card.” The Bhutto episode reshaped Sindhis’ perception of the Punjabi influence on the federation as an exploiter and established an indigenous Sindhi identity as the victim of discrimination.

(To be concluded)

This article originally appeared in the SAIS Review of International Affairs, Journal of John Hopkins University, Summer-Fall 2015, and is published in the form of opinion article for the general interest of the readers

The writer is a lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is the author of Democracy in Pakistan: From Rhetoric to Reality (Islamabad: Narratives, 2015)