Daily Times

Politics is the art of the possible, and there are no permanent friends and foe in the international relations. These two golden statements were coined centuries ago by Otto von Bismarck and Lord Palmerston, respectively. However, in South Asian context, these precepts seem to lose relevance. The enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan due to protracted conflicts, particularly on the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has made the possibility of peace look bleak and probability of war much brighter. Ideally, it should have been otherwise.

The ongoing debate among the strategic communities of India and Pakistan over the question whether the space for a conventional war between India and Pakistan under the nuclear overhang exists or not, seems to be hitting a blind corner. The behavior and thought process of the states is extremely divergent. India’s leadership seems convinced that there is a space for war under the nuclear overhang, and for that India has in fact worked extremely hard to craft a space for war through its cold war doctrine to be manifested as proactive strategy. On the other hand, Pakistan’s politico-military leadership is confident that there is no space for war particularly with the introduction of low yield weapons and series of dual-use missiles that it has developed to bridge the ever-widening gap in conventional force deferential with India. While Pakistan is ensuring the sanctity of strategic stability in South Asia, India’s extremely hard line government of BJP practicing RSS political philosophy of Hindutva, is displaying an aggressive behavior towards Pakistan’s peace offers. The threats to annex Pakistan’s part of Kashmir by Indian senior political and military leadership have become a routine, thus making a repeat of Balakot with more precision and lethality, a stark reality. Whereas Pakistan’s politico-military leadership has categorically stated that India’s aggression would be blunted more forcefully than before.

In order to bridge this ever-widening gap of common force differential, Pakistan has developed its low yield weapons and an effective missile programme to deny India any advantages of its proactive strategy

India’s involvement in spearheading the tenets of hybrid war over Pakistan has been recently exposed by European Union watchdog through ‘Indian Chronicles.’ One needs to investigate the impact of India’s anti-Pakistan activities over the past 15 years in the domain of foreign relations, economic fallout, particularly in the Financial Action Task Forces (FATF), besides irreparable losses to lives and properties of the people of Pakistan. The results of the proposed investigation might reveal that Pakistan has been pushed back by years in its endeavors of achieving self-reliance in defense acquisitions, economic prosperity, and sustainable development due to India’s involvement and support in the planning, funding, and execution of hybrid war on Pakistan.

While Pakistan is making effort to deny India any space for a conventional war of any character, no matter how limited it is, the possibility remains; primarily due to protracted conflicts, lack of trust between the two archrivals, and lack of will to resolve any of the pending disputes. Perhaps India considers that in the years to come the gap between India and Pakistan, in terms of conventional asymmetry, economic disparity and the international stature would have reached a level where it would be able to dictate its terms on Pakistan to resolve the disputes. This in fact, is a profoundly serious situation. Pakistan, perhaps fearing the same has embarked upon a route which it considers to be its savior. In order to bridge this ever-widening gap of common force differential, Pakistan has developed its low yield weapons and an effective missile programme to deny India any advantages of its proactive strategy. Meanwhile both India and Pakistan continue to stick to its stated stances on nearly all the pending disputes; Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir. The ongoing conflict management processes are only able to avoid an all-out military engagement between the two, that too with active intervention of the US. Otherwise, extensive fire exchanges across the LoC have become a routine. The two states leave no stone unturned to confront on issues related to politics, sports, and economy, either bilaterally or on international fora. Therefore, there is a need to seriously fear the situation even if the probability of war is relatively low, but its possibility exists.

Unless the possibility of war is converted into possibility of peace by marginalizing the probability of war, the situation in South Asia would remain tense and uncertain. The dream of peace pipelines, energy and trade corridors and SAARC’s development on the lines of ASEAN would remain a distant possibility.

Dr Zia Ul Haque Shamsi is the author of the book ‘Nuclear Deterrence and Conflict Management Between India and Pakistan’ published by Peter Lang, New York. He is currently working as Director Research and National Security at SASSI University, Islamabad