Daily Times

Recently, The Pakistan Foreign Office has been expressing its concerns regarding the discriminatory and exceptional behavior of the Nuclear SuppliersGroup (NSG) in dealing with the Non-NPT states, particularly.  The issue of the NSG membership is paramount importance for the credibility and normalization of NSG and larger non- proliferation regime, without politically polarizing the NSG.  Islamabad has justifiably regretted that this global multilateral export control regime adopts a different policy vis-a-vis the Pakistani and Indian applications. The Obama administration was enthusiastic to grant India the NSG membership through a tailored-made criterion.The new US administration under Joe Biden’s administration seems to be focusing on regional strategic stability/ nuclear stability in a region. Obviously the current status of nuclear stability in South Asia is undeniably linked to the Pakistani bid for the NSG.  Arguably, the current NSG chair, Belgium, including the other NSG stakeholders/members must display a justice-based/non-discriminatory criteria-based approach with regard to the NSG bid.

NSG working methodology: The group of 48 countries, NSG is a core part of nuclear weapons export controls. With the aim of limiting the vertical/horizontal/non-state actors proliferation of nuclear arms by monitoring, dual-use nuclear technologies and export limitations, NSG monitors the transfer of nuclear technology between states transparently. Although, there is no mechanism for legal enforcement in NSG yet it keeps states accountable for nuclear proliferation.The basic prerequisite for NSG membership is that the applying-state should have the capacity of supplying specialized nuclear technology and material. So far, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is considered to be the most important pillar of the international nuclear nonproliferation norm (NPR), which is a set of global standards related to nuclear nonproliferation.

According to their own website, the NSG- stipulated guidelines basically facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation could be implemented in a manner more consistent with international nuclear nonproliferation norms. A starting point is that there is no model list of countries in the NSG “guidelines” the way there is for the technologies. Instead, this aspect seems to be the most discretionary element–of the NSG working mechanism–thereby making it possible for different countries to implement different understandings of which nations may, or may not, pose potential nuclear threats. The duality becomes evident by the fact that India and Pakistan, despite being advanced capable states remain out of the NSG, while several nuclear states which have no significant nuclear expertise are NSG members .Even more troubling is the fact of growing politicization in the NSG, because numerous Pakistani firms have been unjustifiably included in the US entity list to deny legitimate dual-use nuclear technologies.

So far, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is considered to be the most important pillar of the international nuclear nonproliferation norm (NPR), which is a set of global standards related to nuclear nonproliferation

The Nuclear Export Regime pursues the aims of the NSG through fidelity to the NSG Guidelines that are adopted by consensus, and through an exchange of information, notably on developments of nuclear proliferation concern. The first set of the NSG Guidelines governs the export of items that are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. These include: (a) nuclear material; (b) nuclear reactors and equipment, therefore; (c) non-nuclear material for reactors; (d) plant and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment, and conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production; and (e) technology associated with each of the above items. The second set of NSG Guidelines governs the export of nuclear-related dual-use items and technologies (items that have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications), which could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.

Indian vs Pakistani case:In recent times, the debate of extending membership to the non-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has intensified. India and Pakistan, both nuclear states and non-signatories of NPT, applied for the NSG membership in 2016. India’s membership in the group has been supported by the US, despite the fact the NSG was founded after India’s 1974 nuclear test, misleadingly termed as ‘Smiling Buddha’. India is getting favors from the group members– owing to the support given to it by Washington. It is also argued that India’s nuclear explosion in May 1998 prompted the USA and the UK to strengthen nuclear weapons’ non-proliferation regime beyond the scope of NPT. All the current members of NSG are the NPT signatories as it is mandatory that all the NSG members should also sign NPT.)In this backdrop, both India and Pakistan being the nuclear powers and non-NPT signatories should receive the same treatment.

US unqualified support for India:The NSG exemption given to India in 2008 gave India the benefit to negotiate nuclear cooperation agreements with over dozen countries, including, the US, France, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, and few others. This has helped India to meet its energy needs by importing nuclear material and power plants from the NSG countries, while diverting its domestic stocks for weapons purpose. The formal membership of the Group may help India to further pursue its case for UNSC permanent membership and de jure nuclear status.

More broadly, advocating India’s case for the membership, the US circulated a draft paper in 2011, arguing that India may be accorded membership in the NSG based on its strong non-proliferation credentials. This proposal was strongly opposed by several countries, who are of the view that exemption for India from the export control guidelines are different than granting membership to a country that was part of the raison d’être of NSG’s own existence. The US subsequently challenged the factors by arguing that since these factors are not legally binding, the NSG may allow India to become a member of the Group. The India specificUS approach triggered a debate on the relationship between the NSG and the NPT and the veritable consequences of admitting non-NPT states in the Group.

Further, owing to the US pressure and influence in the group, India has been currying favours with different member states of the NSG. . Since the new NSG ENR guidelines stipulated in 2012, Some American and European officials have said the new ENR guidelines do apply to India and that the 2008 NSG decision on India exempted India from the requirement for comprehensive safeguards but not NSG policies on ENR transfers. Therefore, the argument –that India is already a part of three multilateral export control regimes: the MTCR, Waassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group – holds no leverage since the NSG Guidelines “take relevant factors into account” including whether the applicant should be party to the NPT, a stipulation that the other regimes do not list.

Whereas, Pakistan has played a responsible and constructive role toward the goal of nuclear nonproliferation and is part of manifold significant nonproliferation initiatives. Pakistan, however, has not been treated on equal grounds.  Therefore, it is justifiably paramount to bring Pakistan into the fold of the nonproliferation regime by taking it on-board in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

To be continued