Daily Times

India stole a victory from Pakistan in 1971 at Dacca. As the people watched petrified with grief, the Armed Forces begged for battle and continuation of the struggle; they were prepared to offer a sacrifice of their very lives to save the integrity and honor of their country. Their commanders, however, whose weak wills had been conquered, abjectly and ignominiously, surrendered. The top brass of the time had ascended to high command, in spite of character defects caused by lust, greed cowardice, and a host of other similar weakness that plagued them, besides their astonishing lack and ignorance of our nation’s cultural values and stunning professional incompetence.

The system that let them ascend must, therefore, be examined by those who are responsible, the Government and the Armed Forces themselves, in order to avoid more catastrophes. However, such catastrophes as the one of 1971 are not the acts of a few individuals like Yahya, Niazi, etc, who may be conveniently utilized as scapegoats to wish away the collective guilt and let all others absolve themselves of it, feel smug, satisfied and happy, and consider all would be well in the future. Not so, in fact, the Armed Forces rank and file, the junior officers, the field officers, and each citizen of this Country, all need to carry out a profound and honest introspection as to what they did at the time to augment the nation’s strength, to maintain its integrity and retain its freedom. The resultant analysis is bound to bring home our individual shortcomings, lapses, and share of responsibility for the debacle.

India did not win the war, Pakistan lose it by default

In East Pakistan, even though Maulana Bhashani spoke for the peasants of the province, it was Sheikh Mujib, who, after raising his Six-Point Programme in 1966 for democracy and greater provincial autonomy, and who was implicated (but later released) in the Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1968, was fast emerging as the main voice of East Pakistani/Bengali nationalism when Ayub was forced out.

The deployment and operations, while further alienating the people, ignored the actual threat, which was an attack from India in the guise of a liberator

It is important to state that while some Bengali voices were challenging the unity of Pakistan, Mujib, at this political juncture, was still in favor of a united, democratic, federal Pakistan, despite the growing realization in the eastern wing that East Pakistan became a mere colony of West Pakistan. Under these circumstances, led by charismatic and populist leaders who had sat through 11 years of military rule, Yahya Khan announced elections for October 1970, doing away with the One Unit, giving the majority province on the basis of its population 162 seats in a parliament of 300. The 1970 election results went further in confirming these fears. Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats in East Pakistan, giving it a majority in united Pakistan’s parliament. Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party won 81 seats out of 138 in West Pakistan, becoming the majority party in West Pakistan, mainly from Sindh and Punjab. The critical outcome from the 1970 elections was that neither of the two largest parties won a single seat in the other wing. Electorally, Pakistan stood divided. While the military’s Operation Searchlight in East Pakistan started in March 1971, the short period following the elections until the brutal military operations, clearly showed how the egos of a handful of West Pakistani politicians played out and were matched with the incompetence and unwillingness of the military leadership in understanding and addressing political issues. United Pakistan just might have been saved in these few weeks had the Punjabi-Muhajir military-bureaucratic leadership allowed the results of the 1970 elections to be honored. But this would have gone against their very own genius and their core material interests.

Moreover, there was one particular popular democrat who refused to acknowledge the democratic mandate which did not entirely suit him.

Soon after the election results, there was talk of having two prime ministers for Pakistan, with Bhutto apparently having agreed. Yahya, on the other hand, on a visit to Dhaka, called Mujib the “future prime minister of Pakistan”. On his return to West Pakistan from Dhaka, Yahya flew to Larkana to meet Bhutto, who advised Yahya not to give control of the National Assembly, and, hence, of Pakistan to Mujib. Bhutto flew to Dhaka to meet Mujib but talks clearly failed between the two leaders.

Eventually, India launched a military attack on East Pakistan in November, with (West) Pakistan attacking Indian Territory on Dec 3. Despite the fact that West Pakistanis were told as late as Dec 14 and 15 that they were winning the war, on Dec 16, 1971, Gen A.A.K. ‘Tiger’ Niazi, GOC, East Pakistan, surrendered to the Indian troops led by Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora in Dhaka. East Pakistan formally becomes Bangladesh. Not just had there been yet another partition in the Indian subcontinent, but Jinnah’s ‘two-nation theory’ had also come undone.

War is defined by Von Clausewitz, “As an instrument of policy”. The policy in 1971 did not exist because Gen Yahya did not have any clue about it, resulting in absolutely inappropriate political action. On the other hand, the Indians won a victory, at least in the technical sense, because they had recognized the need to win. They have been subjugated for centuries and desperately needed a victory of sorts to achieve their goal of “Unity in Diversity”. In 1962, they had been humiliated in the Himalayas by the armed forces of their great neighbor in the north. Then, in 1965, the numerically inferior Pakistanis fought them to a standstill. All these factors combined to make them perceive the need.

The deployment and operations, while further alienating the people, ignored the actual threat, which was an attack from India in the guise of a liberator who during the early part of summer had finalized its operational plans and started preparing thoroughly for a winter onslaught. That there were many a flaw in their planning as well as execution is of little help to us, as we had to plan at the national level. Our High Command refused to plan seriously because they had a readymade excuse: our friends, the USA and China did not provide sufficient help’. That was enough to allow them to retain power and indulge in base pursuits. Thus lip service, and only that, was given to defensive preparation against India.

The writer is Legal Practitioner and Columnist. He tweets @legal_bias and can be reached at shahrukhmehboob4@gmail.com