Daily Times

Officials of the US administrations during the tenures of George W Bush and Barack Obama clearly stated that their relations with Pakistan were limited to cooperation in the fight against terrorism. However, with India the US relations were based on long-term cooperation in the areas of trade, commerce, defence, and high-technology exchange. The peak-point in the US-India relationship was the deal in the area of civil-nuclear technology, which was for all practical purposes a scheme to make India a preeminent, legitimate nuclear power. The same treatment was denied to Pakistan. Thus the US was developing close relations with India at a time when Pakistan had the dubious distinction of being the greatest non-NATO ally, and at the same time the US had allegedly given a free hand to India to use Afghan soil for anti-Pakistan activities.

It was in such an environment that Pakistan and the US started their cooperation in the war against militancy and terrorism after 9/11. The US had done things that aroused Pakistan’s misperceptions and apprehensions with regard to motives of the US in co-opting India as its greatest future ally in the region. The US was expecting Pakistan to give sacrifices in the war against terror beyond its capacity, and was demanding to do more and more in this respect. Pakistan was doing all that was possible in the harsh geographical and social environment of FATA. The US accused Pakistan of taking no action against the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, which were based on the Pakistani side of the border, and alleged that this fact was responsible for the failure of international forces in Afghanistan. But the question is how the forces of Afghan Taliban or Haqqani network entered Pakistani territory. Why did the ISAF-NATO forces not stop them from crossing into Pakistan? And if they somehow managed to come to Pakistan, and Pakistan did not or could not take action against them on its territory, why did the US not or was unable to stop them on the Afghan territory despite huge intelligence and technological resources at its disposal?

The point is that if Pakistan failed to completely stop the entry of Afghan resistance forces into Afghanistan from its territory due to lack of financial and technological resources, harsh terrain and tough local reaction, the US could not control the same forces on the Afghan territory despite tremendous resources.

The US policy of ignoring Pakistan’s sensitivities regarding domination of the Northern Alliance also helped spawning resistance of Afghan Taliban and popularity in the Pakhtun-majority areas because the Pakhtuns felt deprived and sidelined in the new dispensation. They saw in the rise of Taliban a new hope of realising their lost position and glory. Moreover, the failure of the US to arrive at a settlement with the defeated Taliban, and invite them to the Bonn conferences for the future of Afghanistan, left the defeated Taliban with no constitutional way to become part of the new political system. The only way left to them was to raise arms against the US and the government in Kabul installed by its support.

The Taliban started an insurgency when the first opportunity came their way. It was a great folly on the part of the US to think that the Taliban had been defeated beyond any possibility of rising again. They had been defeated but not crushed. The best way for the US after the Taliban’s defeat was to arrive at a settlement with them, and make them part of the future set-up, thus preventing them from starting an insurgency.

Pakistan’s role was quite critical for the US in the entire Afghan war. Pakistan played an important role in apprehending Al-Qaeda activists on its soil, and handing them over to the US. Pakistan also had to wage a long and arduous task of action against homegrown Taliban forces, spread over several military operations in Swat and FATA, which had challenged state’s authority due to its support of the US against the Afghan Taliban. But still the US was dissatisfied with Pakistan’s contributions, and continued its demand of “do more.” What Pakistan was doing within its limited resources, and given the policies of the US that were in total disregard of Pakistan’s strategic interests, was more than enough. No other country would have done better than Pakistan in such circumstances.

The US itself was responsible for its defeat and the rise of the Taliban due to its shortsighted and narrow policies in Afghanistan. Besides, to assuage US’s reservations, Pakistan, despite unfavourable circumstances, started an across-the-board operation against terrorists in North Waziristan in 2014 in the name of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Nevertheless, due to lack of cooperation from across the border, most of the terrorists fled to Afghanistan; it was the responsibility of the Afghan and US forces to stop this infiltration over there.

And now it is time for Washington to review its policy towards Islamabad to make this partnership viable for the latter.

(Concluded)

The writer is an Islamabad-based independent researcher and journalist