Daily Times

In the backdrop of the ongoing strife with Afghanistan over the alleged proxy wars, the souring relationship with the United States over the uninhibited prowess of the Haqqani network and like-minded groups in the north, and increasing bitterness with India over the slain Kashmiris, water disputes and the NSG membership, one can hardly find a country facing more external threats than Pakistan. The foreign policy representatives in the country are embattled on numerous international frontiers, and the war to strengthen and establish the country’s narrative on international platforms is fiercer than ever before.

The foreign office of Pakistan has recently warned the Afghan government to stop the blame game, and fight mutual regional threats through cooperation and understanding. But with the ameliorating India-Afghan relationship, especially in the aftermath of the initial deliberations on the Chabahar agreement, the reversal in the deteriorating Pak-Afghan relationship seems quite unlikely. Likewise, foreign policy matters on the Indian front don’t look too promising either; confidence building measures and strategic dialogues have either backfired or swiftly fallen into a forgotten past.

India’s bid to join the coveted nuclear arms group was finally rejected last month after days of deliberation in Seoul, South Korea. “China upsets India’s plans to join the Nuclear Arms Group,” read one local newspaper in Pakistan. China has been cited as the main hurdle in the way of India’s membership, even though a number of countries besides China — read, approximately 12 — were not satisfied with India’s credentials as it continues to be a non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Pakistan was also denied membership for avoiding the terms of the NPT for a long time. Foreign policy thinkers, oblivious to the tasks required of the active functionaries of the state, are seemingly rejoicing the Indian rejection more than the expected dismay over the rejection of their own application. The India-centrism of Pakistan’s foreign policy frameworks has not only been detrimental to the country’s foreign policy aspirations but has also raised concerns over the attitude of the country’s foreign policy authors and projectors terming their approach “passive” and “reactionary.”

Pakistan’s foreign policy has historically been clouded with myths and conspiracy theories. While this can be said for all policies — whether be interior, economic or legal — the anonymity of the source from where the foreign policy emanates makes it a popular conspiracy subject, something that features quite frequently in Pakistan’s political discourse. The speculations over who formulates the plan of action, and who wields the concealed power to call the shots have surfaced in discussions on media and platforms provided by state’s legislative pillar regularly.

Among others, three sources have gained significant popularity and expert-backing over the years. The first that foreign policy is dictated by the military establishment of the country, and that the civilian political elite has little say in matters that govern the policy formulation and espousal; second that foreign policy is a collective draft of the major superpowers of the world, and is usually imposed on Pakistan like a number of prime ministers were in the past. Clearly, the first two narratives contradict each other, but more interestingly, the third one, in a rather ferocious display of indifference, dismisses the first two in furthering that there is no delineated foreign policy, and the foreign office works on the whims and moods of high-ranking officials — civilian, military or both.

There is a major constituency in Pakistan that believes in the third narrative that foreign policy is neither formulated locally nor is there any evidence of external involvement in the process. The fact remains that there is no delineated foreign policy in Pakistan, and the foreign office doesn’t only work without a foreign minister, it does so too without an implementable and plausible foreign policy. The diversity and inherent contradictions within these foreign-policy related narratives is indicative of the fact that while any one of the narratives could be true, it is certain that the foreign policy initiatives lack transparency, consensus and a coherent sense of purpose. This is evident in our diplomacy failures of the past, and the fault lines have surfaced once again through the NSG imbroglio. A number of concerns loom over the NSG membership application and its subsequent disapproval. The very obvious ones include the need for the NSG membership now all of a sudden. Pakistan’s foreign office has shrugged off allegations levelled by the opposition that the foreign policy, if it exists, is reactionary, and lacks the research and development required to identify and capture opportunities, some of which may not have emerged on the mainstream as yet. Pre-empting changes on the global political landscape, and aligning the diplomatic efforts and foreign policy tasks with the changing environment are essential competencies that need be exhibited by diplomats. However, with a nearly dysfunctional research and development wing, our foreign policy has failed us on a number of occasions. Why was the NSG membership, if as coveted as it now seems, not applied for in the past many years since the union’s inception? If our foreign policy is not India-centric as Sartaj Aziz would infallibly maintain, the applications should have been tendered a long time back. Over the last few weeks, considering the jingoism over the application leading to the ultimate denial of membership, it seems that there isn’t a stronger tool to assert one’s opinion and gain control over the international security policy than enrollment with the NSG. While it might not be too late for Pakistan, the negligence and inexplicable delay in tendering the application is going to rub it off in a bad way.

India already enjoys most exemptions provided by the NSG through the exemption instrument enacted in 2008. Therefore, it appears that India’s NSG membership campaign was only to push the agenda and build ground for a potential permanent slot on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, since the rejection was a likely possibility, the Indian government had formulated a back-up plan that was to initiate a simultaneous bid for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)’s membership. As soon as the NSG membership got rejected, India successfully enrolled with the MTCR, widening its clout in the diplomatic circles, specifically ones that are involved with formulating an international security policy. As I write this article, India is a member of the MTCR and an implicit member through exemptions that provide an ostensible authority of the NSG expected to become a full-designated member by the end of 2016. On the contrary, Pakistan has so far resisted the urge to apply for the MTCR membership and their aspirations, if any spring up now, will only add to the opinion that their approach is reactionary and bears no resemblance to vigilance, prudence and professionalism typical of diplomats from the more developed countries of the world. The research and development wing of the foreign policy department needs to be activated immediately with a mandate to identify and build on diplomatic opportunities protecting the country on international frontiers and safeguarding its social, political and economic interests. The conspiracies surrounding the policy sources must be avoided to promote a coherent sense of purpose, and to build a policy of consensus that is clear, well-communicated, and is not confused by the stakeholders involved with policy formulation, espousal or advocacy processes.

The writer is currently the Economic Consultant at the Shahid Javed Burki Institute of Public Policy and a visiting lecturer in Lahore. He can be reached on Twitter @AsadAijaz