Daily Times

The defeat of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces at the gates of Tripoli is being hailed as a turning point in Libya’s protracted civil war. Since the fall of Gaddafi in October 2011, Libya has been marred by political turmoil and instability, with powerful outside actors influencing events in the country. The current conflict is primarily between General Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the UN recognized Government of National Accord, although numerous smaller factions continue to hold territory. Similar to the Syrian conflict, the Libyan civil war has pitted regional powers against one another. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army is bankrolled by Egypt and UAE, who are suspicious of the Islamist opposition and prefer to engage with a strongman. Significant arms and material support to Haftar has also been provided by Moscow, which seeks lucrative oil contracts and construction projects in Libya. On the other hand, the Tripoli based GNA is internationally recognized as the country’s legitimate government, with support for its anti Haftar war effort being provided by Turkey and Qatar.

Pakistan has thus far abstained from choosing sides in the conflict and has not altered its position of strict neutrality since the beginning of the crisis in 2011. Islamabad’s position on Libya echoes its stance on similar disputes and is part of its delicate balancing act. Earlier, Pakistan had refused to intervene militarily in Yemen to avoid engulfing itself in the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical tussle. However, the war in Libya, as opposed to the conflicts in Yemen and Syria, does not have sectarian overtones. Instead, the Libyan civil war can be more aptly categorized as being part of the surging intra Sunni conflict, which has been intensified by Ankara’s increased sway in the region.

As events in North Africa take center stage in the region’s multifaceted conflict, a shift in Islamabad’s cautious foreign policy can potentially pay dividends

Despite its military muscle and stature in the Muslim world, Pakistan is currently pre-occupied with economic problems and border tensions with India. As such, greater engagement in the Libyan conflict does not appear to be a foreign policy priority. Nevertheless, Islamabad’s position of neutrality in the aftermath of the Arab Spring has irked its traditional Gulf allies, who were especially displeased with Pakistan’s decision not to send in troops to Yemen. It is also not clear as to what Islamabad has gained on the diplomatic front as a consequence of it’s restrained foreign policy. Even though Pakistan has consistently refused to support a foreign led overthrow of the Syrian regime, Bashar al Assad continues to publicly back India’s stance on the Kashmir dispute. Likewise, non-intervention in Yemen has not improved Pakistan’s relationship with Tehran as bilateral ties remain complicated and mistrust hampers any meaningful security cooperation.

In the wake of New Delhi’s abrogation of Article 370 and ensuing tensions in South Asia, Prime Minister Imran Khan sought to galvanize the Muslim world in favor of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute. The Pakistani premier achieved only minimal success in his anti India drive as Islamabad’s mantra of ‘neutrality’ has alienated its historical partners, as well as ensured that Pakistan does not win over new allies. The civil war in Libya thus presents Pakistan with an opportunity to reset its foreign policy and gain much needed diplomatic support from the Muslim world. Support from Pakistan for either of the two main factions in Libya has its own merits and can be crucial in deciding the ultimate fate of the war.

A potential decision by Islamabad to support Khalifa Haftar’s campaign would greatly improve Pakistan’s ties with the UAE. The Gulf Kingdom is home to millions of Pakistani workers who contribute a hefty amount to the Pakistani economy but bi- lateral ties have gone downhill in recent years as a consequence of Pakistan opting out of Yemen and shrewd Indian diplomacy. At a time when the UAE backed Haftar has faced a string of defeats, even minimal military support by Pakistan would be hugely symbolic and repair the damage inflicted on its once intimate relationship with the UAE. In addition, Pakistan can then leverage its improved ties to gain Gulf support for its Kashmir policy. The prospect of economic aid from UAE is an added incentive. Moscow is another major backer of Haftar’s Libyan National Army and there have been numerous reports of Russian mercenaries operating inside Libya. By choosing to side with Russia’s preferred strongman; Islamabad can further strengthen its developing security ties with Moscow and increase chances of acquiring Russian made weapon systems.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s support for the Tripoli based GNA government would cement its alliance with Ankara and signal the start of a strategic relationship with Qatar. The Turkish arms industry is fast emerging as an attractive alternative to Western military hardware and a more prominent Pakistani role in Libya opens up the possibility of buying top of the line Turkish weapons at favorable prices. In the past decade, Doha has seen its international prestige and profile grow considerably. Qatar also played an instrumental role in the Afghan peace process by hosting talks between warring factions in Afghanistan, in a development with major security repercussions for Pakistan. Strengthening of ties between Doha and Islamabad would prove especially fruitful in the context of an eventual American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, as Pakistan can rely on Qatar’s extensive contact with regional and international power brokers to ensure that a repeat of the 1990’s Afghan civil war does not take place.

Whereas neutrality in international relations has certain advantages, Pakistan faces a multitude of security threats which require courting of new allies. Islamabad’s chief concern lately has been India’s sabre rattling amidst constant tensions over Kashmir. Furthermore, New Delhi’s cordial relationship with much of the Islamic world complicates any Pakistani attempt to establish a united bloc of prominent Muslim nations to support its territorial claims. Islamabad’s best bet to gain support for its Kashmir policy is hence a more active role in the Middle East and North Africa.

The author is a defense and security analyst based in Lahore. His work focuses on Pakistan’s relationship with the Middle East and issues concerning military strategy. For queries, contact at ammadmalik@protonmail.com