Deconstructing extremism in Punjab

Author: Faisal Raja

Over the years, Punjab has been considered as hotbed of extremism, especially its southern region where huge landholdings are coupled with high unemployment and low literacy rates. The districts in the region have witnessed mushroom growth of madaras (religious seminaries), along with hefty foreign financial aid for establishing large infrastructures for medical, housing and educational facilities through an array of selective sponsorship programmes. While moving towards Bahawalpur, the landscape abruptly changes as one enters the old city of Multan. Sand dunes and muddy tracks can be seen on both sides of the road frequented with small and big religious seminaries all the way up to the boundary of Rajanpur.

In order to understand the extremist structure in Punjab it is essential to synthesise the data on account of district-wise distribution, educational qualification, age-bracket, caste, financial position, marital status, parents’ occupation and economic condition of extremists. It will help us to determine the actual extremist framework, and ways and means available to combat and curb these tendencies.

Before analysing the situation, three assumptions have been made. One: we have not used the word militant for these persons, although some of them have participated in violent activities or have experience of active battlefields. Second: though frequent changeovers from one group to another have been observed on multiple grounds we have assumed that the picture remains static when it comes to group affiliation and attachment. Third: the region is akin to division as elaborated in the Police Order 2002.

A data of more than 4,000 extremists is available for analysis. Among the extremists include persons on 4th Schedule, 34 percent; Afghan Trained Boys (ATBs), 40 percent; Tribal Trained Boys (TTBs), (one percent); Local Trained Boys (LTBs), two percent; Returnees from Afghan Prisons (RAPs), five percent; Lal Masjid Elements (LMEs), two percent; Persons Released from Jails (PRJs), seven percent; Persons Confined in Jails (PCJs), one percent; Returnees from Guantanamo Bay (RsGB), less than one percent; and activists of various religious organisations operating in the province, seven percent.

On regional basis, the percentage distribution of extremists shows that 16 percent of total extremists belong to Bahawalpur Region, followed by Multan (14 percent), Rawalpindi (13 percent), Dera Ghazi Khan (13 percent), Sargodha (13 percent), Faisalabad (13 percent), Gujranwala (nine percent), Sahiwal (five percent), Sheikhupura (two percent), and Lahore (less than two percent) respectively.

The district-wise distribution of these extremists indicate that Bahawalpur district has the highest number (278), followed by Bhakkar (235), Attock (231), Faisalabad (225), Multan (203), Bahawalnagar (195) and Rahim Yar Khan (163) respectively.

The data indicates that majority of the extremists have either been affiliated with defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP,) followed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HuJI), Tehreek Jafria Pakistan (TJP), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) respectively. The percentage distribution of extremists indicates that 43 percent are affiliated with the defunct SSP entailed by the JuD (11 percent), HuM (10 percent), JM (seven percent), SMP (four percent), HuA (three percent) and LeJ (less than one percent) respectively.

Before analysing extremist data, it is pertinent to determine exact numbers of madaras and total cultivatable land with respect to district population in a given region. The data shows that Multan and Bahawalpur Regions exhibit the highest madrassa density followed by Sargodha, Dera Ghzai Khan, Sahiwal, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi and Gujranwala respectively. Among the least cultivatable regions include Sargodha and Dera Ghazi Khan, followed by Bahawalpur, Rawalpindi and Sheikhupura, thus accommodating lowest number of persons per acre land cultivation. The estimated employment rate is lowest for Bahawalpur and Sahiwal Regions entailed by Sargodha, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan and Rawalpindi respectively. The regional number of government mosque schools is highest in Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur Regions followed by Multan, Rawalpindi, Sahiwal and Sargodha respectively.

The district-wise madaras density indicates that Attock, Khushab, Bhakkar, Toba Tek Singh, Khanewal, Sargodha, Layyah, Lodhran, Sahiwal, Rajanpur, Bahawalpur, Multan and Chakwal are among the high madrassa density areas. Whereas, per capita cultivatable land in a district shows that Layyah, Rajanpur, Bahawalnagar, Mianwali, Bhakkar, Attock, Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh are among least cultivatable districts in the province.

Since agriculture is the main occupation in the province, therefore, the districts having high madrassa density and low cultivatable areas present more probability for contributing extremism in Punjab. The southern region therefore exhibits high extremist susceptibility on account of madrassa density and per capita total cultivatable land in the region. Here it is pertinent to mention that the above calculations are not based on urban-rural divide but solely concentrate on the available data.

The data indicates that nine extremists hold PhD degree, 108 are postgraduate, 121 have masters degree, 286 are graduate, 416 are intermediate, 1,180 are matriculate, 220 are under-matriculation, 937 have completed their high school, and 981 have passed their examinations up to fifth grade. Interestingly, only 36 extremists are illiterate. In other words, the foot soldiers of terror are qualified personnel with 99 percent literacy rate. Nearly 30 percent of these extremists are matriculates, which represents the major portion of literacy level among them.

The data further shows that nearly 85 percent are married, and 90 percent belong to poor or lower middle class. A very small fraction (less than one percent) can be bracketed as financially well off.

The financial condition and educational qualifications of these extremists’ parents have also been determined on account of available data. Majority of extremists (40 percent) have either lost their father posthumously or at a tender age, whereas only one percent are born in rich families, and nearly 50 percent come from poor backgrounds. Families of majority of the extremists (20 percent) are labourers, and nearly eight percent are associated with private services or businesses. A small percentage of these extremists’ parents (1.5 percent) are government employees.

The age-wise distribution of these extremists indicates that majority of them either falls in the age-bracket of 31-40 years or belongs to 41-50 years category. The percentage representation of these two age groups comes out to be 46 and 29 percent respectively. It further points out that majority of the extremists are fairly young, and they are mature men of well-settled mindset. Only nine percent of them are in their youth (20-30 years), whereas approximately three percent can be categorised as senior citizens (60-plus years).

The analysis clearly shows the current extremist anatomy of the province. A semi-literate, married, poor person having age-bracket of 30-40 years, and belonging to southern region has the greater probability to work for an extremist organisation or a banned group than any other person across the province. More efforts need to be focused on enhancing per acre production, improving educational standards, discouraging undue foreign aid for specific purposes in any region, scrutinising establishment of madaras through a transparent system of monitoring and supervision and providing maximum facilities for youth exuberance outlet.

The writer is a senior superintendent of police

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