Daily Times

Recent clashes along the disputed Indo-Chinese border in Ladakh and the inability to get the problem under control are a visible sign how a long-standing dispute can endanger peace, not only between two major countries but a whole region.

Ladakh is a region occupied by India since 1947 and administered as a union territory since last year. Constituting a part of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir, it has been the subject of dispute between India, Pakistan and China since the withdrawal of the British from the subcontinent. It is bordered by the Chinese Tibet Autonomous Region to the East, the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh to the south, both Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan to the West, and the southwestern corner of Xinjiang across the Karakoram Pass in the far north. It extends from the Siachen Glacier in the Karakoram range to the north to the main Great Himalayas to the south. The eastern end of Ladakh, consisting of the uninhabited Aksai Chin plains, is claimed by the Indian Government and has been under the Chinese control as a result of the Indo-Chinese war of 1962.

The population of Ladakh consists of about 300,000 people (2011) and is of Tibetan origin. Ladakhi people speak Ladakhi, a group of Tibetan languages or dialects called Balti in Baltistan and Bhoti in Ladakh. It is the predominant language in the district of Leh and in and around Kargil. Another language spoken is Zangskari, an endangered Tibetan language because its population is close to extinction as a result of Indian military operations and forced curfews in the area. Religion-wise, the population of Ladakh consists of an almost equal number of Buddhists and Muslims (mainly Shias of the Nurbakshia sect) by now with the former majority of Buddhists dwindling. Noorbakhshia Islam is Sufi tariqa and a school of Islamic jurisprudence that emphasises Muslim unity. It is named after a 15th-century Iranian mystic Muhammad Nurbakhsh Qahistani. In Baltistan and Ladakh, the Sufia Nurbakhshiya still survive as a sect with doctrines of its own that combine elements of both Shi’ism and Sunni Sufi Islam. Due to the Indian policy of changing the ethnic balance, the number of Hindus from the plains is growing in Ladakh. In 1981, Hindus comprised just three per cent of the population. In 2011, Hindus constituted 17 per cent of the population. Since ancient times, trade routes have passed through Ladakh connecting it to India, China, Tibet and Central Asia.

Ladakh is historically, ethnically and culturally close to Tibet and has been ruled most of the time by local dynasties connected to Tibet

One could find more interesting facts about this far-flung disputed area but the fact remains that Ladakh is historically, ethnically and culturally close to Tibet and has been ruled most of the time by local dynasties connected to Tibet. It never belonged to India until the 19th century. In 1834, the Sikh Zorawar Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu invaded and annexed Ladakh to Jammu under the suzerainty of the Sikh Empire. After the defeat of the Sikhs in the First Anglo-Sikh War, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was established as a separate princely state under British suzerainty. Modern India’s claim to Ladakh is based on the signing of an “Instrument of Accession” by Maharaja Hari Singh under questionable circumstances. In October 1947, irregular troops from the Pakistani side had reached the outskirts of Srinagar; trying to force the Hindu Maharaja to accede to Pakistan given the Muslim majority of his princely state. Scared by the Pakistani irregulars, the Maharaja appealed to India for military help and fled Srinagar. India promised to send troops if the Maharaja accedes to India first, but the historical research conducted by Dr Alastair Lamb reveals that the first Indian troops had landed already in Srinagar before Hari Singh–by then on his way towards Jammu–could have signed the document of accession.

Gilgit’s population did not favour the state’s accession to India. The Muslims of the Frontier Districts Province (modern-day Gilgit-Baltistan) favoured accession to Pakistan. Sensing their discontent, Major William Brown, the Maharaja’s commander of the Gilgit Scouts, mutinied on November 1, 1947; overthrowing Governor Ghansara Singh and announced the accession to Pakistan on November 2, 1947. The Pakistani political agent, Khan Mohammad Alam Khan, arrived on November 16 and took over the administration of Gilgit. After taking control of Gilgit, the Gilgit Scouts, along with Azad irregulars, moved towards Baltistan and Ladakh and captured Skardu by May 1948. They successfully blocked the Indian reinforcements and subsequently captured Dras and Kargil as well, cutting off the Indian communications to Leh in Ladakh. The Indian forces mounted an offensive in Autumn 1948 and recaptured all of Kargil district, Dras and Leh.

In 1947, China was in no position to even take notice of the Indo-Pakistan war and the situation in Ladakh. A civil war had been going on for years between the Kuomintang government and the peoples’ army led by the Chinese Communist Party. The Communists gained control of mainland China and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The Communist military forces suffered 1.3 million combat casualties in the 1945-1949 phase of the war: 260,000 killed, 190,000 missings, and 850,000 wounded, discounting irregulars. Nationalist casualties in the same phase were recorded after the war by the PRC 5,452,700 regulars and 2,258,800 irregulars. It can be imagined in what condition the country was at that time and that Ladakh was the least of their problems. Kuomintang fighters withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan and Burma and launched frequent attacks on Communist China with US military support. The fighting continued into the late 1950s.

Ladakh and the Indo-Chinese border became a problem during the 1950s. The McMahon Line, which was supposed to delineate the border in the eastern part, was a line on paper and never demarcated on the ground. The same was the case in the western sector of the border with Tibet, which was supposed to have been settled between Britain, Tibet and China during the Simla Convention 1914. On closer inspection, the documents disclose that China had not agreed and the border agreement was only signed by Tibet, which, at that time, was under Chinese jurisdiction and not entitled to single-handedly sign contracts. That is why China does not recognise it. So, while India, under Nehru, was officially stating that there was no border problem and everything was settled, unofficially, a “forward strategy” was adopted and implemented that consisted of slowly-slowly advancing Indian troops in the area and, thus, silently pushing the borderline.

Both India and China were drawing their maps that differed considerably. However, this could not be noticed unless one saw the map of the other or troops in the border area realised that what was shown as their territory on their map was taken by the other. The intransigence of India refusing all Chinese urging for negotiated settlements finally resulted in the Indo-Chinese war of 1962 that dealt a decisive defeat to India and the acquisition of Aksai Chin–a part of Ladakh–to China. The border conflict has never been resolved because of the Indian attitude that “all is settled and there is nothing to talk about.” Multiple border clashes have taken place and Modi’s India is probably fanning the conflict to detract from the domestic problems of a brewing Muslim and Kashmir unrest, a declining economy and a pandemic that is going out of hand.

Over the years, China has been patiently condoning India’s stubbornness has now heightened interest in the disputed territory because of its BRI plans. The end of China’s restraint and their take-over of the disputed territory of Ladakh could easily serve as rectification of the borderline. An ensuing war would end the same way as in 1962. Internationally, the take-over of Ladakh would be defendable: if Israel can take over Palestinian territory (which is not under any dispute) without arousing a storm, China can have the same option. India should now reconcile with the realities on the ground and not risk any 1962-like adventure. While a conflict could lead to a great conflagration in the region, we are party to the tri-lateral dispute over Kashmir. We let the people of Kashmir down in 1962 when we could have acted, but Field Marshal Ayub Khan was taken in by Indian promises, guaranteed by the US, to solve the Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolution. Almost 60 years have elapsed since this strategic blunder. One should not wish for a war, but it seems more than likely and we should be prepared for it.

Ikram Sehgal is a defence and security analyst. Dr Bettina Robotka is a former Professor of South Asian Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin