Daily Times

The US war of vengeance in Afghanistan which followed the catalytic events of September 11 stretched for about two decades. Today, a hindsight view tells us that enough has been lost in this war. This protracted war proved a double-edged sword bleeding both sides. The US is not only at loss because of the blood and enormous resources drained but also because it lost purpose in this war, especially after Bin Laden’s killing. Similarly, Taliban are also exhausted of their protracted insurgency. They learned it the hard way that war is not an end in itself, but to further political ends which are unattainable through peaceful means.

Taliban always put premium on liberating their land from foreign occupation while the US wanted to punish the perpetrators and abettors of the September 11 attacks, famously dubbed as ‘this generation’s pearl harbor’. After Bin Laden, the US was stripped of this justification for staying in Afghanistan, especially when public opinion had already started showing signs of war weariness. A change in the US policy for Afghanistan was first signaled when Barack Obama entered the Oval Office in 2009. As an Illinois senator, he had already opposed the Iraq invasion by calling it a bad war. A radical change in the afghan policy was almost certain because his advisers, unlike his predecessors, were not from the Cold War generation. This new generation of advisers dominated his National Security Council and was called ‘Obamians’ for their influence over the foreign policy decision-making.

After the US lost interest in Afghanistan due to the ‘inward looking’ domestic mood, the main contest is now reduced to three players, Afghan government, Taliban and the neighboring Pakistan

Moreover, this re-calibration was guided by a pragmatic approach hyphenating Pakistan with Afghanistan: the Obama’s Af-Pak policy. Another prominent feature was a fourfold increase in drone strikes, dubbed by critics as a ‘kill, not capture policy’. This drone policy also caused a greater friction between Islamabad and Washington. Since there was a partisan dimension involved, Obama authorized the troop surge for both deflecting the Republican criticism of being soft on the issues of national security and to improve the security situation in Afghanistan. Obama injected greater restraint in the use of force and introduced a cost-cutting dimension to the American foreign policy by its forces’ drawdown. President Trump amplified this cost-cutting approach and Afghan peace process gained momentum.

Ole R Holsti, the veteran American political scientist, introduced an overlooked dimension to the study of world politics during the Cold War. It was the role of images and perceptions in hostilities between the states. Perceptions of hostility are self-reinforcing while the perceptions of friendship are self-liquidating in the interstate relations marked by hostility, he said. This one-liner axiom means that it is very difficult to break the loop of suspicion in any conflict. Today, all stakeholders involved in the Afghan problem are carrying these images of hostility towards each other. The Afghan government and Taliban have demonized each other to the extent that peace process has become a bumpy ride. Similarly, Pak-afghan relations are tainted by misconceptions. After the US lost interest in Afghanistan due to the ‘inward looking’ domestic mood, the main contest is now reduced to three players, Afghan government, Taliban and the neighboring Pakistan. The principal bone of contention between the Afghan government and the Taliban is the prisoners’ release clause of the U.S.-Taliban peace agreement which obligates the Afghan government to release 5000 Taliban prisoners before the intra-afghan talks.

On the other hand, this contentious clause provides the appropriate depth for conflict resolution process as it will liquidate the perception of hostility among the ranks of the Taliban and will break the cycle of hostility because reciprocating the prisoners’ release with halting hostilities will become a moral imperative for the Taliban. The Afghan government on the other hand is reluctant to honor this clause and using delaying tactics in releasing the Taliban prisoners. These delay tactics are underpinned by its image of the Taliban and the fear of an upsurge in violence if intra-afghan talks end inconclusively. Another factor that can hinder the peace process in future is the differences between Afghan leadership. While in principle, they should set aside their own differences and adopt a clearheaded approach towards the peace process, they are still occupied by their mutual differences.

The parallel oath taking ceremonies in the presidential palace stripped the afghan government of both its credibility and a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the Taliban and the US. The Afghan government is still bent on tactically using its criticism of Pakistan to deflect concerns about its own incompetence and parochial interests that can torpedo the entire peace process. While political mileage can be extracted in the short run by manipulating the anti-Pakistan sentiments, nonetheless, it cannot solve the enduring problems of Afghanistan.

After two decades of protracted war there is finally some hope for peace in Afghanistan. Today, Afghanistan controls the initiative and both the problem and its solution lie within Afghanistan. Today, the afghan leaders owe it to their people that they seize this opportunity and ensure a peaceful future for their countrymen. Only if Taliban and the Afghan government shed their burden of the past, Afghan peace will be ‘a few steps of reciprocity’ away.

Writer is the HEC indigenous fellow in American studies at Quaid-i-Azam Univrsity, Islamabad. He can be reached at mhussain@asc.qau.edu.pk