Daily Times

September 1965 was like the famous battle of Jutland in WWI when the two navies — German and the British — went pell-mell into a climactic conflict like two blind gladiators charging at each other, each one afraid of other’s capabilities, yet ignorant of intentions. The 1965 war was a war born out of the womb of a negative peace that had resulted out of the iniquitous and unjust border adjustments in Northern Punjab and Kashmir in 1947. After Jawaharlal Nehru’s death, chances of a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict had significantly receded much to the chagrin of Kashmiris themselves, and an influential segmented of Pakistani power wielders including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Aziz Ahmed and few military officers. Having stung by the American perfidy and the inaction of a credulous Pakistani leadership during the 1962 Indo-China Border conflict the popular sentiment in Pakistan started turning sour, putting pressure on civil-military leadership to react.

The politico-strategic environment in Kashmir appeared in favour of Pakistan. The Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 had dampened the morale of Indian armed forces along with a diversion of troops from Kashmir towards the North East Frontier Agency region. After the death of Nehru the unassuming Lal Bahadur Shastri appeared to be a weak leader unsure of himself, especially after shoddy handling of the Hazrat bal riots in1963. The Pakistani military establishment was gung-ho about its military capabilities that according to them had a qualitative edge over Indian weaponry and troops as a consequence of sedulous US military support in last decade. The failed Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks in 1964 to resolve the Kashmir issue had left Pakistan in no doubts about India’s ill intentions about a just and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

It was under this politico-strategic and operational environment that Pakistani leadership decided to defreeze the Kashmir issue with a view to weaken India, and to bring her to the negotiating table from a position of weakness. The symbiosis of the fervent advocacy of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan’s superciliousness and the operational acumen of Major General Akhter Malik resulted in conception of the Operation Grand Slam that planned to infiltrate six groups of approximately 700 to 800 troops. Each comprised regular infantry and SSG troops inside the Indian-held Kashmir to foment an uprising and to inflict damage with a view to facilitate the subsequent operations by Pakistani forces to liberate areas up in arms against Indian occupation. Before the Operation Gibraltar a probing operation was launched along the Ceasefire Line (CFL) named Operation Nusrat to probe the gaps and relieve pressure on the deployed troops besides assessing enemy reaction before own troops infiltrated into the Indian-held Kashmir.

In the first week of August, six infiltrating groups, approximating a battalion size each, started crossing over into the Indian-held Kashmir across CFL and the Pir Panjal Range. These groups infiltrated towards Srinagar Valley, Mendhar-Rajouri, Kargil-Dras, Nowshera-Sundarbani, Bandipura-Sonarwain, Qazinag-Naugam, Tithwal-Tangdhar, Gurais, and Kel Minimarg. According to Lt General B M Kaul from Indian Army, some of these groups succeeded in causing serious damage and reached as far deep as Srinagar. The Indian Army’s response was swift and firm. They moved two infantry divisions into Kashmir besides choking off the supplies and escape routes of the Pakistani guerilla forces. The Pakistani infiltrators failed to find the expected support amongst a populace that was at once confused as well as terrified. The desultory coordination with the local supporters and logistic difficulties resulted in setbacks for the doughty infiltrators.

Alarmed by these infantry forays the Indians marshalled their forces for an offensive in Azad Kashmir to effect a recoil on the marauding Pakistani guerillas deep inside the Indian-held Kashmir. The locale they chose for their offensive was the famous Hajipir Pass across Pir Panjal lying on Uri-Punch Road inside the strategic Bedori Bulge. The capture of Hajipri Pass would allow Indians multiple options to develop operations towards Bagh, Punch and Rawalakot. The Indians launched a brigade attack each from axes Uri and Punch in third week of August, and managed to make headway with the northern pincer to capture Hajipir Pass on 30 August. Had it not been for the overcautious approach of Indian General Officer Commanding Major General Kalan who instead of allowing the northern pincer to move towards Punch insisted on clearing a tenacious Pakistani deployment on Bisali Hill feature the situation would have been grimmer for Pakistan.

Stung by the loss of the strategic Hajipir Pass the Pakistani military planners put into effect the Operation Grand Slam initially conceived in May 1965 as a contingency plan along with the Operation Gibraltar to launch an offensive from Bhimber, aimed at capture of Akhnur, an important choke point separating Srinagar Valley from Jammu. The fall of Hajipir was a serious setback for Pakistan as the Indians now sat ominously poised to open the Uri-Punch link besides controlling all movements in and out of the bulge. Up north along the CFL another Indian offensive had resulted in loss of Kargil too. The situation was critical indeed to warrant launching of the Operation Grand Slam in order to relieve pressure on 12 Division. The military objective chosen and the terrain selected for the Operation Grand Slam was ideal with no major obstacle to armour movement and natural flank protection.

The Pakistani 7 Division came within an ace of creating history when it was just seven kilometres short of Akhnur. The Indians were in panic, and the civilians had started fleeing the city. With Indian reserves still some distance away and the defending forces in disarray the Akhnur city was ready for the taking. A needless delay of one day to consolidate the gains and the controversial change of command in midstream gave Indians some breathing space to recover. In the words of Lt General Kamal Matinuddin, “General Yahya was about to make his Grand Slam but the joker in the pack was with Lal Bahadur Shastri who played it just when the game was up saving a humiliating defeat for the Indians.” Indian offensive across the international border halted Pakistani offensive on the brink of victory in Kashmir forcing a shift in forces towards Lahore and Sialkot.

Pakistani land forces fought with panache missing yet again a few gilt-edged chances of victory in the Khem Karan sector when a nervous army chief had ordered withdrawal of all Indian forces West of Beas! In Sialkot it was 25 Cavalry and First SP Artillery regiments that produced prodigies of valour stemming Indian armour juggernaut around Pasrur-Phillora. With a stalemate approaching and the logistical difficulties compounded by US non-cooperation, Pakistan had no choice but to end the war. The war had several highs for Pakistan because of which it can be dubbed as a ‘good war’. It was a good war for a young nation that stood up to a largely superior adversary in terms of population and geography for what it believed were its core tenets of nationhood i.e justice for oppressed Kashmiris and a right to be treated fairly.

The war that galvanised the entire nation as one single unit acted as a leaven for Pakistani nationalism ridden hitherto by fissiparous claims on its nationhood. The war proved the thesis of the eminent social scientist Michael Desch that wars promote internal unity and cohesion resulting in strong states. It was a war that was begotten out of a negative peace and thus had the promise of a positive peace after an honourable draw between the two protagonists. It was a war that brought the best out of the Pakistani patriotism and the military élan. Madam Nur Jehan’s ethereal melodies, Aziz Bhatti’s supreme sacrifice and the visages of the charged masses raring to fight the enemy on Lahore border are some of the timeless reminders of our national resilience.

The writer is a security expert and a PhD scholar at NUST. He can be reached at rwjanj@hotmail.com)