Daily Times

The encounter was clean and swift. Malik Muhammad Ishaq, once a fearsome leader of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), finally met the fate of a lowly dacoit. The 28-year career of the LeJ chief abruptly ended in the dead of the night at Shahwala, a peripheral location in district Muzaffargarh, along with 13 other affiliates of the organisation including his two sons. In a single blow the first tier leadership of the LeJ was completely eliminated. Are we witnessing the end of one of the most efficient anti-Shia organisations in Pakistan? Apparently, there exist more chances of retaliation from diehard Ishaq supporters or splinter elements of the LeJ as we have witnessed in the case of twin suicide attacks at the residence of the Punjab home minister at Shadi Khan, Attock in August 2015.

The organisation has passed through different phases since its inception in 1996 with selective members playing key roles in its operation and outreach. After the organisation was banned by Pakistan’s government in 2002 most of its diehard sub-commanders were either eliminated or captured by law enforcement agencies (LEAs). A different type of the LeJ emerged from the ashes of the original one, excluding those who formed the Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (ASWJ) under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmad Ludhyanvi, including small multiple loosely connected terror groups. These small groups include the Jund-ul-Hafza, Jund Ullah, Punjabi Taliban, Jamaat-e-Khurasan and LeJ al-Alami. Each of these splinter groups has overlapping strategic objectives. Any affiliated LeJ group conducting operations within Pakistan has been complemented through technical and logistical support by other auxiliary groups associated with the LeJ. After each successful operation everyone shares its success and accomplishment.

Mati-ur-Rehman, who belongs to Head Rajgan, Bahawalpur, a close affiliate of Qari Ehsan, who along with the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) planned complex and well coordinated multiple attacks on Pervez Musharaf, is considered to be a confidant of Ishaq. Reportedly, he is heading a TTP faction in one of the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Zia Ullah, another diehard follower of the LeJ, a student of Banoori Town seminary, has ganged up with the TTP and established the Sheikh Abu Bakr group for perpetuating terrorist activities. Asif Chhotu, another staunch follower of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, established close links with top TTP commanders, and the LeJ provided logistical and human support to him for conducting terror operations in Karachi. Chhotu was finally arrested from the peripheral area of Dera Ghazi Khan in a targeted operation in February 2016. Both TTP and LeJ have actively been involved in incidents of firing on Shia pilgrims buses in Quetta and its environs in 2012 and 2013.

The death of Malik Ishaq has left deep imprints on the operations of defunct organisations in Pakistan. It is a clear message to such militants to remain within their bounds. Ishaq, soon after his release, started a mass mobilisation campaign among his followers, and visited every main city district of the province. He even proceeded for religious pilgrimage to Makkah in 2013. These endeavours were undertaken for the purposes of charity collection as well as financial support.

Pakistan suffered worst sectarian tensions in 2011-13 when nearly 1,039 Shias were killed and 1,658 wounded in 220 sectarian attacks. The killings of Shia Hazara spiked in 2013 in Quetta, and Ishaq was subsequently rearrested on multiple legal grounds. His son, Haq Nawaz, was also apprehended in these cases.

The diehard Ishaq group followers run into 200-250 who can do anything for the sake of their leader. Reportedly, 7,000-8,000 passive acolytes of Ishaq exist throughout the country. The belt running from southern arc of the Punjab in Bahawalpur to peripheral areas of Quetta in Baluchistan is considered to be a stronghold of the LeJ. Security forces need to keep a tight grip over it. The Islamic State (IS) or Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh thrives on sectarian rifts, and regions where these splits have ossified are an easy target for it to consolidate its position. Perhaps the state of Pakistan has realised this threat and decided to craft future course accordingly. Many transnational jihadi organisations like the al-Qaeda have been using these sectarian outfits for their strategic aims so that the host nation is kept busy in sectarian warfare or other matters, and al-Qaeda can carry out its plans without any hindrance and interruption.

Additionally, there are different criminal gangs operating along the swampy areas of the River Indus as it snakes through Dera Ghazi Khan and adjoining regions forming a triangular delta at the conflux of three provincial boundaries. LeJ operatives have reportedly developed close nexus with some Baloch gangs for refuge and safety. A broad-based operation against these criminals hiding along riverbeds in the areas of Dera Bugti and Sui (Balochistan), Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan (Punjab) and Ghotki (Sindh) must be conducted through a joint effort of different provincial police forces. If the reports of mutual coordination between LeJ operatives and Baloch insurgents are true, a dangerous network might be developing where LeJ cohorts are fighting against the state of Pakistan, and we can positively predict that this ideological shift is LeJ-specific.

Currently, the secondary leadership of LeJ is in a state of shock. Ishaq had not nominated anyone as his successor, therefore an apparent discomfort among rank and file LeJ organisation is quite natural. They will probably look towards some of the primary tier LeJ members, locked up in provincial incarceration centres, for retaliation and retribution. Moreover, militants like Mati-ur-Rehman and Qari Ehsan can design a terror activity if they succeed in getting together at some place in near future. They are battle-hardened jihadists having experience of working in different militant organisations. They can activate local LeJ elements for logistical and financial support for carrying out a deadly attack against soft targets like Shia congregation facilities, marriage ceremonies and minority places of worship. LEAs convoys or paramilitary station buildings can be one of the targets where vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device like attacks are imminent.

The LeJ has suffered a severe dent in its frontlines but it has to be seen whether ASWJ leadership can transform the operational militant-sectarian side of the organisation or not. If the head of the ASWJ accomplishes this job, the LeJ would automatically melt into its political body. Otherwise disgruntled LeJ followers can conduct sporadic attacks that will either phase out or get external support from organisations like ISIS, TTP or al-Qaeda. It may also be aided by a foreign agency or agencies to achieve their goals inside Pakistan.

A strategic question arises whether defunct organisations like LeJ can actually end or not. It is an established fact that organisations based on sectarian rifts cannot be eliminated overnight. In fact, there is no fixed period for complete annihilation of any defunct organisation. A better strategy would be to goad such organisations into political mainstream. The disintegration of these organisations though weakens them internally but also promotes ambiguity and uncertainty. The intelligence community hates confusion and ambivalence. Therefore, the current situation of the LeJ signals a concerted limited tactical shift on Pakistan’s ideological front, although only time will judge whether the LeJ completely transforms into a political organisation or further disintegrates into small groups carrying on the basic ideology of the Lashkar or becomes functional with another name and title.

The writer is a senior superintendent of police