Daily Times

Undoubtedly, US-Taliban peace agreement has been the hallmark event to declare the culmination of US’ longest war in its history and vindication of Afghans‘ fighting spirit against the foreign occupation. It’s the fulfilment of President Trump’s election promise to end the “wasteful war and bring the boys home”. That the US acknowledged Taliban as formidable stakeholders in the Afghan milieu was quite visible in Doha when Zalmay Khalilzad and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the peace agreement on behalf of the US government and the Taliban, respectively. But the real battle begins now.

Within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement President Ashraf Ghani refused to release 5000 Taliban before 10th of March, first benchmark towards the implementation of Peace Agreement and resumption of intra-Afghan dialogue. Mr. Ghani’s logic that he cannot honour the deal reached between the US and Taliban represents a view which would want continuation of war so that the beneficiaries of the war-economy may thrive and the country remains a narco-state. Mr. Ghani’s U-Turn may also suit some in the Pentagon and CIA who insist on US’ presence in the country. Meanwhile, Taliban’s announcement that they would resume attacks on Afghan military and police forces but avoid attacking foreign troops is a serious warning to all and sundry that breach of agreements may entail a serious cost. In fact, Taliban enacted a suicide attack in Khost within 24 hours of President Ghani’s refusal to release the Taliban. Taliban have also refused to resume intra-Afghan dialogue till the release of prisoners. Reportedly, President Trump in a 35-minute telephone-talk with the Taliban leader Mullah Baradar hinted at resolving the issues that may come in the way of implementation of the Agreement, hinting at intervening with the Afghan government on the prisoner swap issue.

The question is how fragile is the US-Taliban agreement? Didn’t the signatories anticipate roadblocks in the way of smooth implementation of various conditionalities laid down in the agreement? There could be many interpretations but all is not lost as the Peace Agreement envisages a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of various timelines and benchmarks agreed to by the parties. What Taliban have done is in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. But one thing is becoming clear with Ashraf Ghani’s announcement and Taliban’s counter measures that the Peace Agreement is prone to sabotage, a concern highlighted by Afghanistan watchers from the beginning given the tribal nature of the society and its vulnerability to external influences, which in many cases serve as bread and butter of warlords and their camp-followers. Mr. Ghani has fired the first salvo; other ethnic groups in Afghanistan who have enjoyed power after 9/11 would be flexing their muscles during the intra-Afghan dialogue, the most crucial and sensitive part of the Peace Agreement.

Taliban are likely to be the major shareholders in the future dispensation or, at least, this is the vibe one is getting from the Taliban’s body language

Apparently, Taliban are likely to be the major shareholders in the future dispensation or, at least, this is the vibe one is getting from the Taliban’s body language. In simple language, other stakeholders fear that they will have to live and survive as junior partners. In such a scenario, resumption of fighting between Taliban and other ethnic groups cannot be ruled out. According to Hazara leader Ustad Mohammad Mohaqqiq, who heads Hizbe Wahdat, “a deal without justice and honour would be unacceptable and war (with Taliban) would continue”. Certainly, other ethnic groups, who are armed to the teeth, would be thinking on similar lines. Such a situation would offer a fertile ground to external spoilers to jump the fray. In worst case scenario, eruption of civil war would have severe consequences for Pakistan, foremost being the fresh influx of refugees in the country.

Based on the above developments and likely reaction by the Afghan stakeholders, multiple scenarios could emerge vacillating between mature handling of the ensuing challenges to deterioration of peace in the country. An optimist view of future events could be seen from multiple angles: First, the US should nudge Ashraf Ghani and other partners who have been part of the dispensation ever since the fall of the Taliban, to release 5000 Taliban prisoners as stipulated in the Agreement. Mr. Ghani’s assertion of Afghan sovereignty is misplaced as the Joint Declaration between the Afghan Government and the US is essentially a subsidiary document of the Peace Agreement. Moreover, Mr. Ghani owes his presidency to the US; it was he who signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) giving immunity to the US citizens and soldiers from prosecution in Afghanistan. Therefore, US will be bound to press Mr. Ghani to honour the deal reached between the US and Taliban for the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners.

Second, it is incumbent upon the US to strictly follow timelines and benchmarks stipulated in the agreement including delisting of Taliban from the UN sanctions list; withdrawal of US-NATO forces in next 14 months; and, support for Afghan security forces in future.

Third, the Peace Agreement also entails huge responsibilities upon the Taliban leadership, which, of late, have been projecting a positive image of their movement. They have admitted past mistakes in the socio-political arena, especially women’s rights although their explanations about women’s rights have not satisfied a large section of urban based women. Taliban have also effectively reached out to the outside world; beginning from neighbours-Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia-a qualitative difference in their conduct and world view is discernable if compared to their conduct prior to 9/11. Even about India, Taliban spokesman Nusrat Shaheen wished to have friendly relations with India, which shows that unlike rigidity of the past, Taliban have learnt lessons in the conduct of pragmatic diplomacy in the region and beyond. Such an approach is likely to pay off in the recognition of a future government led by the Taliban.

Fourth, in terms of adequate representation to various ethnic and religious groups, a future interim or national government may work according to the formula applied by Karzai and Ghani administrations since 9/11 which has by and large worked satisfactorily although American mentoring was available whenever a crisis propped up. This would be the major test of Taliban’s political acumen as to how they dispense with various ethnicities with justice, and in accordance with the tribal traditions.

For Pakistan, the major achievement would be peace and stability in Afghanistan; return of bulk of Afghan refugees and resumption of normal business activities between the two countries and Central Asia. This objective can be achieved by playing the role of an honest broker without playing favourites. Pakistan must change its mindset and stop looking at Afghanistan from the Indian prism. Former Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan has aptly remarked in his recent article that “peace (in Afghanistan) will contain Indian capacity for mischief”.

The writer is a former ambassador