Daily Times

Doha, capital of Qatar, in the Middle East, became the rendezvous place for talks to bring peace in a volatile part of modern South Asia: Afghanistan. It has come to be known as the US-Afghan Taliban Agreement, a deal to ease the peace process in Afghanistan. The way forward is intra-Afghan dialogue. It is an open secret that there is a bitter division in the ranks and files of the Afghan Taliban in relation to the modus operandi for, firstly, peace process in Afghanistan; secondly, for conditionalities as to withdrawal of US-led NATO forces therefrom; and thirdly, for any future government in Afghanistan. Peace is in the offing in this flash point of South Asia. Its voice is being heard for the last two years and is now echoing around the globe.

Peace and security are sine qua non for progress and prosperity of a nation. After withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 in consequence of a decade long so-called Afghan jihad, no serious efforts had ever been made to rehabilitate and reconstruct that area.The US, which gave resistance to the Soviet Union through its allies and jihadists in Afghanistan, had abandoned Afghans after achieving its objectives. Had attention been paid to that area and to those who fought the battle against the Soviet Union, and that too,a war of the US and the Soviet Union on the soil of Afghanistan, the issue of Talibanisation would not have arisen.

A decade had hardly passed when Afghanistan fell victim to yet another tragedy after 9/11 as the US suspected that the Al-qaeda and other groups behindthe deadly attack on theTwin Towers had taken refuge there. In a bid to avenge the tragedy of 9/11 and to chase the enemy wherever they were, the US along with its allies, i.e. NATO, not only attacked Afghanistan but occupied it with military might. Although it was in violation of the sovereignty of an independent state and it was an international crime,nobody overtly condemned the action of the USA. It was perhaps for the simple reason that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the world had become unipolar.The end of the bipolarity in 1989 had the effect of virtually making the USA as the only hegemon on the world stage. It was taken as a realist view of the situation at that time.

Whether the USA had or had not achieved military and strategic objectives of occupying Afghanistan is still a subjectmatter of a very hot debate, but it is a matter beyond this article. It is a myth that the USA had not forethought the output of the adventure before attacking Afghanistan after 9/11 and had not learnt any lesson from the war withthe Soviet Union in 1989. Though the realistswere of the opinion at that time that Americans would have the same difficulty and fate on that land as the Soviets had because Afghanistan is an unconquerable land.

The event, attended by foreign ministers of fifty countries at Doha on February 29, 2019, was meant to strike a negotiable deal between the USA and the Afghan Taliban. This aspect might hint upon the orthodox theory of the “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban” being no longer relevant.Taliban’s own narrative has been and still is that they consider themselves to be the exclusive decisionmakers in relation to forming government in Afghanistan. That being so, Taliban think that they are now accommodating NATO forces led by the US and the present Afghan government for peace process. Russia had failed in its efforts for an intra-Afghan dialogue. The signing or not signing of the US and Afghan Taliban peace agreement in Doha might not materially matter. What would ultimately matter is the way forward for an intra-Afghan dialogue.

The Afghan Taliban do not accept the Afghan government as legitimate. There are bitter differences between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban. The former champions the supremacy of the constitution, democracy and human rights, while the latter believes in the religio-political perspective for governance of Afghanistan. Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani, the Northern Alliance and the Southern Alliance factors are inimical towards the narrative of the Taliban. All these divergences have fractured the political culture of the country. The direct result was that the very social order had gone to the lowest ebb. Not only that, the economy was almost fully devastated, leading to statelessness.

As regards the role of Pakistan, it was thought that the Afghan government under the leadership of Ashraf Ghani had not been on good terms with Pakistan owing to manifold reasons, including India’sinfluence.However, when the Taliban had control over Kabul, they were not on bad terms with Pakistan. This point of view does not depict the true picture because history testifies that Pakistan faced many difficulties even when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan. Whoever comes into power in Afghanistan in consequence of a settlement between the Taliban and the US or between the Taliban and Afghan government, and whatever be the formula-whetherpower sharing between Taliban, other groups and Afghan government or partial military presence of US forces in Afghanistan until complete normalcy-allgroups had used different cards against Pakistan-be it the Pashtuncard or the Durand Line card.

For Pakistan, what is and will be the win-win situation is that there has to be peace on its western border. Pakistan will not be a beneficiary of anything bad happening inside Afghanistan. It must be noted that no one can bring all groups of Taliban on one page. The USA, China, Russia, Iran, India and Pakistan have conflicting interests in the region.The US’s interest is that Afghanistan must not become a safehaven for re-strengtheningof the Al-Qaeda network in future. The other area of interest is access to the Gulf oil and supply line. India is abig market for the USA for sale of arms and military equipment. The US thus wantsIndia as a policeman in this region to counterChina’s influence with special reference to CPEC.

After a successful deal between the US and the Afghan Taliban, the next phase-the intra-Afghan dialogue-wouldbe the most difficult one. It could also be messy. There are a number of reasons for that.Firstly, the Afghan government is supportive of constitutional rule, democracy and human rights as against religio-political narrative of the Taliban for governing Afghanistan as a state.Secondly, there are various factions of Taliban and it is difficult to convince them not to think differently.Thirdly, there are even two antagonistic factions inside the Afghan government.Fourthly, if the Taliban try to dominate, it will not be acceptable to the US and Afghan government.Fifthly, in case the US-led forces do not make a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, Taliban will require guarantee for their security. Sixthly, in case NATO forces leave the soil abruptly, the possibility of an intra-Afghan fight and civil war cannot be ruled out.Seventhly, the Taliban would, in case elections are held and there is a formula of power sharing between them and Afghan government, demand a revision of the constitution.And lastly, there is a school of thought inside and outside Afghanistan that suggests sharing of power between Taliban and Afghan government on mutually acceptable terms and conditions as a formula for peace in Afghanistan.

Though internal instability in Afghanistan was one of the major factors that made it vulnerable to foreign interference, the volatility of this soil is also closely linked with conflictual interests of other states in the region. Had there been internal peace, security and stability inside Afghanistan, the political landscape would have been different. Internal weaknesses of Afghanistan have been an incitement for trouble from all powers having conflictual interests and agendas.

For Pakistan, what is and will be the win-win situation is that there has to be peace on its western border. Pakistan will not be a beneficiary of anything bad happening inside Afghanistan

A number of questions require answers.Wouild the presence of US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan still be necessary to continue? Is there any understanding and a compromise based on some give-and-take between the Afghan government, Taliban and the US to end thenineteen- year long war?Does the US want an honourable withdrawal from this area as it has sustained a defeat? Why did Donald Trump decide to withdraw the US forces? What will be the stance and role of Pakistan at the moment and in the future in this area? Would there be stability if the US-led forces abruptly withdraw? Who has won thenineteen-year long war and who has lost it?

There is no denying the fact that the US-led forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan is necessary but the question of an abrupt complete withdrawal as opposed to a phase-wise withdrawal is still debatable. US’s direct military presence in Afghanistan is, however, not necessary; it has installed a strategic framework to forestall any danger. The US does have strategic interests in Afghanistan. There is now a paradigm shift in thinking on both sides and non-state actors like the Taliban. The Bush administration and his successor had dispatched military troops to Afghanistan, but Obama’s narrative was of a phase-wise withdrawal, and that of Trump is of a complete abrupt withdrawal. Occupation of and military intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 is recorded as the second chapter of 1980s situation in Afghanistan.

The extant realist view is that you cannot silence all turmoil by guns and that you need to take soft measures through initiatives like CBMs. Signing or not signingof a deal might not be a big deal. The follow-up action will be a big challenge. Earlier,the Taliban believed in gun and fire. The US-led forces paid them in the same coin. Pakistan was the only country thathad been asking the US to engage with the Taliban to initiate the peace process but to no avail. Now the US has realised that the advice of Pakistan was a feasible and a practical solution to the issue.

There is a change in the thinking of the Taliban too; now they say that they can also do politics. Politics, diplomacy and CBMs may play a vital role in this scenario to achieve good results.

The good news is that the US and the Taliban have signed an important deal in Doha. The agreement so signed, inter alia, stipulates:

a) Afghan Taliban will not allow Afghan land to be used against USA and its allies;

b) US-led forces to be withdrawn within 14 months;

c)Taliban will negotiate with all groups of Taliban for peace in Afghanistan;

d) There will be ceasefire between US-led NATO forces and Taliban.

Pakistan has successfully faced the untoward situation on its western border for a very long time. Pakistan has the capability of defending its geographical and ideological frontiers. Peace and stability in Afghanistan must be the baseline for every effort to make this region free of conflict. A civil war in Afghanistan would be dangerous and wouldhave adverse effects on Pakistan. The Afghan conundrum needs to be resolved by Pakistan on a top priority basis. Pakistan would achieve nothing from it, but Pakistan make all effortsto ensure that there is minimal damage. It is a matter of economic and strategic interests.

Pakistan has learnt a lesson from the Afghan War of 1979-89 and from the situation in Afghanistan after 9/11. The peace deal is the result of Pakistan’s efforts for peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs to play a positive role keeping its economic and strategic national interests as of paramount consideration. The route is not through Afghanistan. Pakistan has to prove that the route of peace is through Pakistan. The world cannot overlook the strategic importance of our countryin regional and international politics. To have good relations with the USA and that too for achieving the benefits of CPEC, Pakistan needs to focus on Afghanistan rather than its eastern border. By saving Pakistan-Afghan border through peace and stability inside Afghanistan, Pakistan will be able to concentrate its potential on internal progress and prosperity.

The writer is a lawyer and partner at UMR Practice