Daily Times

Pakistani politicians and public may be following with interest the latest turn in American politics, at home and abroad. The Clinton-Trump presidential race seems to be tightening as Hillary’s health and unfortunate use of “basket of deplorables” have become political albatrosses with seven weeks left. And Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s dismissal of President of Barack Obama as an “SOB” and demand that US forces withdraw from the southern part of his country do not suggest America is held in universal awe and respect.

Further, the cancellation of F-16s to Pakistan and denial of $300 million in coalition support funding are seen as indications that the US Congress has become increasingly aligned against Islamabad. The US-Afghan-Indian talks likewise are not seen as beneficial for Pakistan. Nor is growing American proximity towards India.

Perhaps most unsettling is the upsurge in Russian-Chinese relations with joint naval exercises held in the Pacific at a time when Kim Jung-un tests another nuclear weapon and launches extended range ballistic missiles. Unstated but understood in America is that much of the source of North Korea’s nuclear knowledge came from Pakistan and Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Clearly, a new cold war could be brewing. If that occurs, Pakistan’s geostrategic situation could become far more important. And if Moscow and Washington enhance mutual espionage against the other, that too will have far-reaching implications.

Following the latest revelations of email hacking, which appears to be Russian-inspired, (full disclosure: I was party to some of Colin Powell’s emails that were stolen and released), media was reporting that the United States was increasing its espionage assets against Moscow. Despite the fragile agreement struck with Moscow over a Syrian ceasefire and the need for US-Russian cooperation in the fight against the Islamic State, are both sides starting a new cold war? And, if so, what would even greater spying inside Russia really achieve?

Since its inception, the Soviet Union maintained a muscular spy service both domestically and internationally. The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) and the Comintern (Communist International) it replaced in 1947 represented 30 years of combining external propaganda with recruiting fellow travellers and actual agents. After World War II, the US and, chiefly, Britain turned their espionage assets onto the Soviet Union. John LeCarre and James Bond novels captured slices of this espionage world.

The US and Soviet Union spent hundreds of billions of dollars and rubles on everything from very sophisticated and expensive space satellites to bribing officials to commit treason. The infamous Walker naval spy ring, Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanson, were Americans turned traitor. Oleg Penkovsky, a disgruntled military intelligence colonel (GRU), was lessor known but a very important Soviet gone rogue.

Sometimes, spying became the theatre of the absurd. A trip to Moscow was cancelled because of a fire in Spaso House, the home of the US ambassador to Russia, started by a careless KGB agent. Surreptitiously checking surveillance equipment in Spaso House’s attic, the not-so-secret agent dropped a lit cigarette on a pile of old newspapers. No doubt, we succumbed to similar incidents.

The questions that should be asked and answered first are: what would an increase in American espionage assets deployed against Russia look like? What are the benefits and gains? What would be the consequences, intended or otherwise, risks and possible Russian responses? And are there better alternatives than returning to what could become a replay of the spy versus spy Cold War days?

The weakest reason is retaliation for what appears to be increasing Russian attempts to manipulate American elections. Retaliation is only likely to provoke a counter-response. In that regard, escalation may prove to be to Russia’s advantage. Russia has far greater access to American society due to our laws and constitutionally protected free speech and right of assembly than the US has to the Russian public.

A second reason is that as Russian actions — whether in cyber space or in intimidating its neighbours — seem to be more bellicose the relation is headed on a nastier and darker course. One result is that the US Defence Department is now planning to deter and if war comes to defeat Russia. If this unsettling priority persists, a new cold war footing is setting in, and hence the need for more espionage to gain intelligence on Russian military and other capabilities.

A third reason is political. By checking or matching Moscow’s more aggressive posture, the competition can be frozen or deadlocked. This is the equivalent of nuclear deterrence that was meant to prevent an all-out conflict during the Cold War.

None of these reasons is compelling. As the Pentagon touts a “third offset” strategy to make transformational changes to military capability, an offset strategy to merely upping espionage is essential. Increasing numbers of NOC’s (CIA clandestine agents operating with Non-Official Cover), more intrusive covert military activities largely with the nuclear submarine force, and other active means is probably a waste of money.

Open source intelligence has been a vital and viable alternative that has yet to reach its full potential in providing necessary insights on targets of interest. Questioning Russian officials in the course of normal diplomacy can yield treasure troves of intelligence. Dirty tricks such as identifying and releasing the hidden assets and wealth of Russian leaders or disclosing personal information such as the names of children studying in Western schools or embarrassing peccadilloes can mitigate bad behaviour. Fourth, consulting with real experts on Russia from many different vantage points especially business is important.

During the Cold War, each of these techniques was tried. Today, in the 21st century, it is non-espionage techniques that are more important than traditional ‘spying’. Before falling prey to reflexive responses to heightened Russian aggressive policies with enhanced ‘espionage’, examining alternatives beforehand is a much wiser course of action.

The writer is UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave Distinguished Columnist. He serves as Senior Advisor for Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Atlantic Council and Business Executives for National Security and chairs two private companies. His last book is A Handful of Bullets: How the Murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand Still Menaces the Peace. His next book due out next year is Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Wars It Starts