Daily Times

It is noteworthy that many national flags in Africa share a commonality of colours. The red, green and yellow, ubiquitous in their designs, are a symbol of pan-Africanism, the roots of which trace back to the 19th century Ethiopian Empire. By adopting them, African countries from Mali to Mozambique pay homage to the only continental people that successfully repelled European (primarily Italian) attempts at colonisation during an expansionist frenzy between 1881 and 1914 known as the “Scramble for Africa.” Ethiopia, then known as Abyssinia, eventually fell to the invading forces of Benito Mussolini in 1936, thereby exposing the tragic helplessness of the League of Nations in mobilising an international force against fascism.

Some contemporary historians believe the emotional trauma from that period of shockingly exploitative and repressive European rule ails Africa even today. This is how they rationalise its widespread poverty, the frequent eruption of civil wars and Africa’s inability to produce a single major power on the world stage despite trailing only Asia in sheer human numbers. The Democratic Republic of Congo, for example — the successor state to Belgian Congo, arguably the most brutal regime in colonial Africa — is still beset with cyclical episodes of deadly conflict that again inflamed in September.

By the late 20th century, however, the momentum of global economic growth had swung to East Asia. China, especially, with its newfound prosperity from singularly embracing globalisation and ravenous appetite for fossil fuels began eyeing resource-rich Africa as the perfect feeder for its industrial engine. The continent’s large, young population also made it an attractive market for cheap Chinese goods. Publicly, China practices the “peaceful development framework,” a geo-economic policy that prioritises win-win partnerships in the developing world to synergistically boost its own coffers. Critics, however, accuse Beijing of employing an amoral brand of economic imperialism in Africa that profits from lax regulatory oversight and the bottomless greed of its many corrupt leaders.

Rivals Japan and India are also deepening their investment and trade ties to Africa, but their footprint dwarfs that of China’s. At $220 billion, China is Africa’s largest trading partner, importing oil and metals, and exporting electronics, machinery and textiles. And officially, some 250,000 Chinese live and work in various African countries, although the real number could be close to a million. Their employers, China’s state-owned corporations, have invested billions in local energy and mining projects. Africa also tops Beijing’s aid disbursement list with an estimated $30 billion injected into regional economies between 2000 and 2013, chiefly in the shape of concessional loans. Small wonder, then, that the vast majority of Africans — 70 percent according to some polls — have a favourable opinion of China. Furthermore, the projection of soft power to complement its economic prowess is a key objective for Beijing. This has led to the establishment of 46 Confucius Institutes across Africa where students immerse themselves in Chinese language and culture. Scores of African ruling party officials and bureaucrats also fly to China annually to attend political training schools where they hone their governance chops. There is naturally a darker side of this fairy-tale partnership. Chinese firms are routinely accused of undercutting local competitors and flouting safety and environmental protocols, while Beijing is blamed for fuelling internecine strife by selling arms to known war criminals and regimes embargoed by the West.

The Sino-Japanese rivalry currently heating up temperatures in the South and East China Seas extends to Africa, where Japan is selling itself as the ethical and qualitatively superior alternative to Beijing’s often opaque business practices. Though the total value of trade remains minuscule at $20 billion when compared to China, Tokyo is making moves calculated to ramp up its economic presence on the continent. In late August, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe travelled to Kenya to preside over the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development where he pledged more than $30 billion for infrastructural development, a critical metric for the region’s many impoverished states to better their standards of living.

Like China, Japan heavily relies on African raw materials to power its industry. Many of its automotive and electronic exports use manufacturing inputs from the continent. Thus, besides using Africa as a new theatre of competition with China, Japan aims to secure the supply chains pivotal to its future economic growth. Additionally, since the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Japan is looking to wean itself off atomic energy by tapping into new energy sources in Africa through broad investments and joint ventures.

There is also the significant matter of UN reforms that Tokyo champions and which the 54-member strong African bloc could fast-track should it bandwagon behind Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. However, in view of China’s expected opposition to such a move and its outsized investment role in Africa, most regional leadership will be lukewarm to the cause.

India, too, is gunning to raise its profile in Africa. It is presently the continent’s fourth largest trading partner with an annual turnover of $70 billion and a 2.5 million-strong diaspora — the product of colonial-era ferrying for indentured work — that offers a ready-made coupling to the region. For India, geopolitics informs its African initiatives as much as economics. New Delhi fears that China plans to encroach on its traditional sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean through a web of naval alliances and bases in Africa’s littoral states. It also knows that Beijing has the cash to buy regional loyalties.

By this logic, China’s anti-piracy patrolling operations in these waters and its naval facility in Djibouti are incipient measures foreshadowing a militarisation of the Indian Ocean in a repeat of its East China Sea strategy. To keep a lookout, India plans to cast a wide surveillance net comprising 32 radar stations that will be stationed in Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius. Under premier Narendra Modi’s stewardship, India is also pushing for “blue economy” partnerships with Africa that combine oceanic cooperation with a maritime security agenda aimed at stalemating China.

Since it cannot hope to match China or Japan in investment outlays, India instead emphasises what it calls “pro-people” programmes focused on vocational training, scholarships and skills development. Still, the third India-Africa Forum Summit last year ended with New Delhi’s announcement to provide a $10 billion line of credit. There remains a trust deficit, though, that is proving hard to bridge. Unlike the Chinese who always deliver on time, developmental projects under Indian supervision have the unfortunate knack of getting delayed, often indefinitely. To boot, the recent rash of hate crimes against African students in India caused an uproar across the continent, and led many to denounce New Delhi’s apathy towards what has now become an endemic problem. The new scramble for Africa led by three of Asia’s economic powerhouses is multilayered and nuanced, although some would argue no less exploitative. There is also little doubt that many African states desperately need cash infusions to remedy their ramshackle infrastructure. If continental leaders play their cards right and refuse to compromise on national interests, this tripartite competition could herald a transformative era for the region.

The writer is an Islamabad-based freelance journalist